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ThE IMPoRTANcE oF TEXTuAL 
SchoLARShIP IN ANcIENT
chINESE STudIES
BEN HAMMER · ShANdoNg uNIVERSITy
ABSTRACT
All the various branches of classical Chinese studies 
have an important common denominator, and that is they all 
begin with Chinese texts. Whether our discussions favor an-
cient literature, history, or philosophy, the ancient text is the 
first and most important obstacle that one must overcome. 
Since the texts that we base our research on are hundreds if not 
thousands or years old, they present to us unique problems 
of understanding and interpretation. Textual scholarship, or 
documentology, is the field that deals specifically with textual 
problems, helping us both to identify the problems in ancient 
texts (whether they be mistakes or particularly obscure pas-
sages), as well as confidently navigate our way through them. 
Though textual scholarship is an often under-appreciated and 
under-utilized branch of study, a basic understanding of its 
methods and reference books is in fact a necessary compli-
ment to any “higher” discussions. This article introduces just 
such basic principles and reference tools of documentology 
that consistently prove to augment the sinologist’s chosen 
field of research. 
•••
In 1998 a mainland Chinese publishing house special-
izing in ancient books published a book entitled Wen Zhi 
《文致》. Wen Zhi is a literary anthology originally com-
piled at the end of the Ming Dynasty during the reigns of 
Emperors Tian Qi and Chong Zhen by a scholar named Liu 
Shi Lin 刘士麟.  It contains more than eighty works from 
over sixty authors, from the Han Dynasty up to the Ming.  
In the preface to this new 1998 edition, the editor 
wrote that this was an “unknown, lost work that is difficult to 
come by” (一部难得的明人不传秘笈) which he recovered 
accidentally while on a trip in South Korea. He brought his 
new discovery back to China and promptly had it published 
in the form of a modern book.
Unfortunately for the editor, not only is this not a 
“lost” book, it is not even rare.  In fact it can be found in doz-
ens of public archives throughout China.  If we pick up just 
one, common reference book, A Catalogue of Superior Versions 
of Chinese Books 《中国古籍善本书目》and search for Wen 
Zhi, we will find that there are nine different versions of this 
book located in one hundred different institutions in main-
land China.  These do not include the less-than-superior edi-
tions stored in countless library stacks or other editions pos-
sessed by private and overseas collectors.  And if that were not 
enough, the public library in the city where the publishers 
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and editor are located contains at least two of these editions. 
This is a telling example of someone in the field of an-
cient Chinese studies who was unaware of the importance of 
bibliographic research.  
Bibliographic research is but one part of the textual 
scholarship arsenal with which we need to arm ourselves in 
order to overcome any textual issues or problems that may 
arise with every Chinese text we encounter. As sinologists 
who wish to understand and explicate myriad aspects of 
China’s rich cultural history, we are first faced with the texts. 
As numerous as they are ancient, Chinese texts present us 
with many layers of obstacles which lie between the ancient 
author’s original intent and the message that we read and per-
ceive today.
The simple childhood game of “Telephone” or “Grape-
vine” illustrates well this point.  A random sentence is whis-
pered from one participant to the next until the final person in 
the chain reveals aloud the message that was finally received, 
only to hear how far it has strayed from the originator’s. This 
is an example of the corruption and distortion inherent in the 
process of transmission. If this corruption is extrapolated to 
a text being copied and recopied over the course of hundreds 
and even thousands of years, among the hands of scholars and 
scribes who at any point may intentionally or unintentionally 
alter the text itself based on their misreading, then the need 
for rigorous textual analysis and reconstruction is obvious. 
Herein lies the reason for textual scholarship.
•••
Textual scholarship may be seen by some as a very dry 
aspect of sinological research, but it is essential, and even in-
teresting.  When we say textual scholarship, we are referring 
to its broadest sense, also called documentology 古典文献
学. We must first take these ancient texts themselves as the 
object of study and meticulous research before we can safely 
move on to the philosophical (or historical or literary) ideas 
transmitted by them.  
The scope of texts which lends itself to this discipline 
is equally broad.  To use the traditional Chinese method of 
bibliographic classification, the “four-branch system,” it en-
compasses the (Confucian) Classics, history, philosophy, and 
literature 经史子集. This article allots one section to each 
subdivision of traditional Chinese textual studies: biblio-
graphic research; bibliology, or the study of different versions 
of a text; textual collation, or comparing variant texts; pa-
leography; phonetics; and hermeneutics, or glossing ancient 
words. We end with a relatively new subdivision, the study of 
unearthed texts.
•••
Let us begin with a brief explanation of documentol-
ogy and follow up with examples to illustrate why it is not 
only helpful but indispensable to us.
While historians, philosophers, and classicists expound 
on a work’s deeper meaning, the documentologist’s job, as the 
name suggests, has at its center the document itself.  Anyone 
who engages in the research of ancient China and its texts 
must approach each new project first as a documentologist, 
second as a philosopher, historian, or literary critic. 
There are two levels to documentological work. The 
first level attempts to ascertain the various versions of a text. 
This level has three main disciplines: bibliography 目录学, 
bibliology 版本学, and textual collation 校勘学. The collec-
tive goal of these three disciplines is to find the most reliable 
version of the text we wish to study and use. Reliable here 
means most faithful to an ancient or original version, so that 
what we comment and philosophize on is in fact a fair repre-
sentation of the author’s/authors’ original, and not a distor-
tion of their words and ideas.  
Once one or more quality versions have been estab-
lished and located, we then engage in a critical analysis of the 
written content of the text to obtain a correct understanding 
of what we are reading. This must be done at the most basic 
level, from the most basic units of the text—the characters 
字 and words 词. This, too, is work that must be done prior 
to any discussion of the philosophy which we perceive the 
words to carry. 
This second level also comprises three disciplines: 
paleography, or the study of ancient characters 古文字学, 
phonology, the study of the sounds of a language 音韵学, 
and glossing, defining the meaning of words 训诂学. Taken 
together, these fields constitute philology. Sometimes referred 
to as historical linguistics, philology observes the properties 
and meanings of words—or for our purposes, characters—
especially as they develop throughout history. Adopting a 
historical and text-critical approach to all the works we use 
is the best way to ensure that we can maneuver past these 
linguistic obstacles, scribal errors, and sometimes misleading 
commentaries that have accrued layer upon layer and even 
become canonized, and finally arrive at a faithful rendering 
and accurate reading of the text. “However mysterious and 
impenetrable the Chinese jungle may have appeared to the 
early missionaries, its underbrush has been somewhat cleared 
by generations of devoted scholars, and pathways have been 
opened here and there.  But these ways are nothing else than 
methods, and those that serve the translator best are the 
methods of philology.”1 Though we would be quick to point 
1 George Kennedy, review of William Charles, An Album of Chi-
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out, the rewards of philology are by far not limited to the 
translator, but rather belong to anyone who takes the time to 
study and resolve textual issues before attempting to tackle 
the historical, philosophical, or sociological ones.
Knowledge in these fields, and knowing how to answer 
questions and resolve problems in these fields, will allow us to 
understand the author’s words and the intention with which 
they were written some hundreds and even thousands of years 
ago.  
After we have done sufficient work on both of these 
levels of the text we are researching, we can then speak of its 
ideas, depth, beauty, and shortcomings with confidence and 
authority.
BIBLIogRAPhIc STudy: RESEARchINg 
CATALOGUES 目录学
To emphasize the importance of textual scholarship is 
not to do so at the expense of any subsequent philosophical 
discussion. There is no need to choose between meticulous 
textual research and the more humanitarian goals of historical 
and cultural understanding. Rather they are, or at least should 
be, collateral. Textual scholarship is the necessary preparatory 
work that needs to be done at the beginning of all sinological 
endeavors. This is because “the successful application of the 
methods of either the sociologists or historians is predicated, 
at least on one level, on the skillful handling of texts. The 
question is, of course, not a matter of superiority of one dis-
cipline over another but of timing and appropriateness to the 
task at hand.”2 Within this broad field of work, bibliographic 
research is the first step. To avoid a mistake similar to that of 
our unfortunate scholar from the introductory anecdote, who 
mistook a common book for the rediscovery of a “lost” book, 
we must first reach for the catalogues. 3
The single Chinese word mulu 目录 comes from two: 
mu 目 (or 书目, 篇目, 子目) is simply a list of entries-- in 
this case, names of books.  Lu 录 (or 序录, 叙录) is a brief 
description of the book, usually entailing information about 
the work’s content, author, critical commentary, and editions. 
Put together we can see the usefulness of mulu.  Bibliogra-
phies tell us what books there are for our topic of study, and 
how useful they might be to us. This list of books can include 
what books have ever existed, and of those, which have been 
lost and which are still fully or partially extant. 
Bibliographies are often selective about the type of in-
formation they provide, and thus themselves can be divided 
into different categories. For example, annotated bibliogra-
phies supply a synopsis of a work’s content, sometimes along 
with the compiler’s subjective appraisal of its literary merit 
nese Bamboos, in Li Tien-yi, ed., Selected Works of George A. 
Kennedy (New Haven: Far Eastern Publications, 1964), p. 488.
2 David B. Honey, Incense at the Alter: Pioneering Sinologists and 
the Development of Classical Chinese Philology (New Haven: 
American Oriental Society, 2001), p. 83. 
3 While one can make a distinction between catalogues and bib-
liographies based on the amount or detail of information they 
provide, we will be using the terms relatively interchangeably.
or academic value; descriptive bibliographies, on the other 
hand, describe the physical attributes of specific editions, tak-
ing into consideration not just formal or structural features 
such as size, binding, and printing format, but also more nor-
mative characteristics like overall quality of printing, ink, and 
paper, and the frequency of errata. Descriptive bibliographies 
often also remark on an edition’s provenance and filiation, 
that is to say, its origin and relationship to earlier versions 
upon which it has been reproduced. 
There are numerous bibliographies from China’s long 
history, so we shall limit our discussion to a few of the most 
influential and, more importantly, useful ones.  
Let us say we are in the field of studying Chinese Con-
fucian Classics, 经, and need to research one of the thirteen 
classics. We can start by searching a specialized “classics” cata-
logue. The early Qing Dynasty scholar (born in the Ming), 
Zhu Yi Zun 朱彝尊 compiled Jing Yi Kao 《经义考》, 
an extensive annotated bibliography of works on all of the 
thirteen classics form the Han up to his own time. The Jing 
Yi Kao lists a total of more than 8,400 works by more than 
4,000 authors. It is neatly divided into twenty-four separate 
categories for easy reference, the first thirteen of which are 
simply the classics of the Shisanjing Zhushu 《十三经注
疏》. They are followed by comprehensive categories like 
“the complete classics” or “collection of classics” 群经, “The 
Four Books” 四书, and then more specific categories such as 
“lost classics” 逸经, “Han Dynasty alternative classics” 谶纬, 
“stone inscriptions” 石刊, “wall inscriptions” 书壁, “general 
discussions of the classics” 通说, etc. Each entry states the 
length of the book, given in juan 卷, and whether the book is 
wholly or partially extant, completely lost, or not seen by the 
author. It also reproduces the original prefaces and postfaces 
to each book as they have accrued and appeared in all the 
historical editions, in order to provide us with an idea of the 
work’s content and value.
One of the great advantages of a catalogue such as this 
is that not only can we find different versions of the text we 
are researching (for example, for The Analects there is 古论
语, 齐论语, 鲁论语), but more importantly we can find a 
sizable corpus of commentary and related literature on our 
text, allowing us to stand comfortably on the shoulders of the 
prolific scholars who came before us.
Up until recently the most common version of Jing Yi 
Kao was the one from 中华书局 publishing house. It is a 
photocopy print of a Qing Dynasty woodblock version, with 
small, dense characters and unpunctuated text, making it 
somewhat unwelcoming to many readers. In 2010, Taiwan 
scholars Lin Qing Zhang 林庆彰 et al. came out with Jing 
Yi Kao Xin Jiao《经义考新校》, a newly collated and ex-
panded version of the original in clear typeset format with 
western style punctuation, making it much more accessible 
to the modern reader. There is also additional commentary to 
the entries based on recent research.
However, Zhu Yi Zun’s Jing Yi Kao presents us with 
two limitations. The first is that this monumental work of 
his is a bibliography only, which means it is just a catalogue 
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or list of works along with some limited information about 
them. His work does not give us the texts themselves. Once 
we find a work or several works on the Confucian classic we 
are researching in the Jing Yi Kao that seems to have the po-
tential to be useful, we would do well to look them up in the 
Zhongguo Congshu Zonglu 《中国丛书综录》4 (or in a later, 
similar supplementary congshu catalogue such as 《中国丛
书广录》 or 《中国近代现代丛书目录》, to accommo-
date more recently published congshu), and find the specific 
congshu in which the whole work can be found.
The other limitation to the Jing Yi Kao is that since Zhu 
Yi Zun lived in the very early part of the Qing Dynasty, the 
books in his catalogue are restricted to pre- and early Qing. 
Needless to say many valuable commentaries to the classics 
have been written since then. To solve this problem, and at 
the same time solve the first problem of knowing only the 
book we want without having the book itself, we can search 
directly some well known “classic” themed congshu. The first 
collection we should look for is Huang Qing Jing Jie 《皇清
经解》, also called Qing Jing Jie 《清经解》 or Xue Hai 
Tang Jing Jie《学海堂经解》. This is a collection of Qing 
Dynasty studies on the classics from mostly highly reputed 
Qing Dynasty scholars.  It was compiled by one of the most 
famous, most accomplished, and most outstanding classicists 
of the Qing Dynasty, Ruan Yuan 阮元.  (His studio name 
was Xue Hai Tang, thus Xue Hai Tang Jing Jie.)  He also did 
the collation work for the version of the thirteen Confucian 
Classics that we most commonly use today, 《十三经注疏
校勘记》. This work, Huang Qing Jing Jie, is organized by 
author and reproduces the works in their entirety, and in their 
Qing Dynasty, woodblock print original form.  
If we want to view a collection of commentaries on the 
classics from before the Qing Dynasty, we can look through 
the contents of Tong Zhi Tang Jing Jie 《通志堂经解》, a 
classic-specific congshu similar in form to Ruan Yuan’s Jing 
Jie, but containing commentaries and expositions from the 
Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties. The putative compil-
er as listed on the congshu itself is Nalan Xing De 纳兰性德 
(sometimes 纳兰成德), but in reality it was put together by 
his teacher, the more famous scholar Xu Qian Xue 徐乾学.  
If we want to know of more Qing Dynasty classic 
studies which are not limited to pre-Ruan Yuan times, there 
are two follow-up compilations to the original Jing Jie.  The 
late Qing Dynasty scholar Wang Xian Qian 王先谦 com-
piled Qing Jing Jie Xu Bian 清经解续编, and modern Shan 
Dong scholars Liu Xiao Dong 刘晓东 and Du Ze Xun 杜泽
逊 compiled Qing Jing Jie San Bian 《清经解三编》.  For 
4 A congshu 丛书 is a collection of independent and usually com-
plete works which are published together as a set or series, usu-
ally in order that the works do not become lost, or in order to 
provide wider circulation. Thematically speaking, some congshu 
are miscellaneous in content while others are limited to one sub-
ject, e.g. just 经 or 子, or one person, era, or geographic region. 
It is safe to say that a majority of all the works throughout Chi-
na’s history that have been successfully saved and passed down to 
today, owe their survival to having been collected in one congshu 
or another.
more recent work on the commentaries from the Republican 
Era, there is Lin Qing Zhang and Du Ze Xun’s Mingguo Shiqi 
Jingxue Congshu 《民国时期经学丛书》.
The studies on the classics from these few collections 
alone would give us more than ample material to produce 
a comprehensive, well-informed study on our own chosen 
topic, and plenty of authoritative, textual evidence to buttress 
our claims.
If we are doing research into an ancient Chinese philo-
sophical work (子部), the preparatory work is the same, just 
with slightly different books.  When we decide to make a new 
critical interpretation of Lao Zi or translation of the Dao De 
Jing, for example, we need to be aware of the different ver-
sions already in existence, their differences (a tricky question 
for the Dao De Jing in particular), and their relative usefulness 
to us. A Taiwanese scholar, Yan Ling Feng 严灵峰, compiled 
an extensive bibliography of major Chinese philosophical 
works, entitled Zhou Qin Han Wei Zhuzi Zhijian Shumu 《
周秦汉魏诸子知见书目》. Just like Zhu’s Jing Yi Kao, this 
detailed catalogue not only shows us versions of the text itself 
(《河上公本老子》and 王弼《老子注》), but it also lists 
even more commentarial work done by scholars throughout 
the ages, both philosophical (e.g. 程俱《老子论》) and ex-
egetical (e.g. 焦竑《太上老子道德经注解评林》).
While area-specific bibliographies, such as the ones 
mentioned above, are usually the most helpful, there are 
many comprehensive catalogues as well. They can be fre-
quently used as our fall back catalogues if we do not know of 
or have access to a specialized one.  The 《中国丛书综录》 
already mentioned is one such reference book.  
Shumu Dawen 《书目答问》 is one of the best 
known and widely used general catalogues of ancient Chinese 
book titles. Its authorship is attributed to Zhang Zhi Dong 
张之洞, but in reality it is more likely that it was under his 
auspices that another late Qing Dynasty book collector and 
scholar, Miu Quan Sun 缪荃孙, compiled it.  This work is 
organized by the traditional four branch system, plus a fifth 
section, congshu 丛书.5 
The Shumu Dawen has two major shortcomings worth 
mentioning up front.  First, it is by no means exhaustive.  In 
fact, the compiler was highly selective, choosing to include 
only well-known books with extant, superior editions. (This 
could also be considered a strong point of the book.) Sec-
ond, it is devoid of any annotation in the individual entries. 
It was originally intended to be a handbook for elementary 
students to study and probably memorize, and thus it gives 
no information on the author (it usually provides the author’s 
name) or content of the book. It does however provide basic 
information on a superior edition of each of the carefully se-
lected entries.
Fortunately for us, this catalogue has undergone the 
redaction and supplementary work of later scholars. These 
“new and improved” versions of Shumu Dawen are much 
more helpful to us. The original compilation was edited and 
5 This marks the first time in China’s academic history that congshu 
was delineated as its own individual bibliographic category.
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expanded (in terms of information provided about the en-
tries, not in the number of entries) in the 1920s by Fan Xi 
Zeng 范希曾. His extended version is called Shumu Dawen 
Buzheng 《书目答问补正》. While he provides slightly 
more detailed information on the extant versions of many of 
the books listed, the two main shortcomings of the original 
still remain. In 2010, Sun Yang Wen 孙泱文 came out with 
an exhaustive supplemented edition of Shumu Dawen Bu-
zheng, called Zengding Shumu Dawen Buzheng 《增订书目
答问补正》. The two additions of this book which are most 
beneficial to us are its very detailed bibliographic research 
and its annotative descriptions. Sun’s book tells us in which 
specific modern collections we can find each book, using up-
dated congshu catalogues as opposed to the difficult-to-locate 
Qing Dynasty wood block versions given by Zhang and Fan. 
Furthermore, his supplementary annotation offers informa-
tion on the author, content, and value of the entry. All of this 
information is extremely valuable in our search for material 
for our own research.
One of the largest annotated bibliographies of ancient 
Chinese books is the Siku Quanshu Zongmu 《四库全书总
目》(sometimes incorrectly written as 《四库全书总目提
要》). This is an annotated and descriptive catalogue (it pro-
vides information on both the content and the editions of 
each entry) of books collected in the Siku Quanshu 《四库全
书》, one of the largest single collection of books in China’s 
history (compiled as one congshu). Siku Quanshu was com-
piled under the auspices of Qing emperor Qian Long 乾隆 
and headed by the scholar Ji Yun 纪昀. So armed with these 
two, the Siku Quanshu Zongmu and the Siku Quanshu, we 
can search for and locate works under certain topic headings 
(also the four brach system, with detailed subdivisions), read 
the detailed description to learn about the author, the book’s 
history, content, and editions, and then if so desired access 
the book itself for our study.
Much work has been done to add new books and new 
descriptions to the already large collection, such as 《四库全
书存目丛书》, 《续修四库全书》and its corresponding 
《续修四库全书总目提要》, and Yu Jia Xi’s 余嘉锡《四
库提要辩证》.
BIBLIoLogy: VERSIoNS oF ThE TEXT 版本学
There can be great differences between two or more 
versions of the same work, and our understanding of a book’s 
content or a philosopher’s philosophy may depend on which 
version we read.
If we are studying Han Fei Zi 韩非子, the most rep-
resentative figure of China’s ancient Legalist School, and in 
particular if we study his famous essay Shui Nan 《说难》, 
“On the Difficulties of Persuasion,” we will quickly notice 
that the version of this essay as transmitted by Sima Qian in 
The Grand Historian 《史记·老子韩非列传》, is much dif-
ferent than the one found in the complete collection of the 
philosopher’s works 《韩非子》.  
An even more telling example is the story of one Dai 
Yuan Li 戴元礼. Dai Yuan Li was a famous doctor in the 
early part of the Ming Dynasty. He took a trip to Nanjing 
where he happened to pass by a local clinic. He noticed that 
it was full of patients waiting to see the local doctor inside, 
and he concluded that this must be quite an excellent doctor. 
Dai decided to observe the traffic in and out of this clinic 
for a few days. One day, as a patient was leaving the clinic, 
the local doctor rushed outside after him, for he had appar-
ently forgotten to give the patient the full instructions on 
how to prepare the herbal medicine that he had prescribed. 
The doctor was very clear in his instruction: Do not forget 
to put a piece of tin in the broth when cooking the medi-
cine. Upon hearing this, Dai was taken aback at such an odd 
formula, and proceeded to inquire to the local doctor why 
this was necessary. The local doctor said that this was an old 
and true formula. Still skeptic, Dai requested to see the book 
of prescriptions he was using. Upon looking at the text, Dai 
realized where the mistake occurred. The book that the local 
doctor was using indeed listed tin, 锡, as on of the ingre-
dients, but it was a misprinted character, a slight aberration 
from the correct ingredient-- sugar 饧. (For anyone who has 
taken Chinese medicine, we know that sugar is an ingredient 
quite necessary to offset the bitterness!) These two characters 
are similar in their traditional form, 錫 and 餳, even more so 
when copied in a running or cursive script.  Some scribe or 
woodblock engraver had accidentally replaced “sugar” with 
“tin”. The Nanjing doctor had not taken the time to procure 
a reliable book of medicine, instead blindly following the one 
copy he had on hand, to the detriment of his patients.
Thankfully, in questions of pure scholarship, textual 
discrepancies are not usually a matter of life and death, but 
they are nonetheless important to our issues at hand.
After searching through the catalogues discussed above, 
we have found the names of a few books that we think might 
be useful to our personal project. Now we need to know what 
different versions there are of these books and discern which 
are relatively accurate and which are incomplete or full of er-
rata. Indeed, a good descriptive catalogue will provide this in-
formation for each entry. There can be much overlap between 
our search for titles and our search for their respective edi-
tions. Many good catalogues, including some of those men-
tioned above, are both annotative and descriptive in nature.  
It is usually the private scholar, collector, or book seller 
who can give us the most helpful information when it comes 
to the description of editions.  Many of these types of bibliog-
raphies carry the words 知见书目 or 经眼书目 in their title, 
meaning, respectively, a catalogue of books that the compiler 
has either seen or heard of, 知见, or that they all are books 
that the compiler has seen with his own eyes, 经眼. Some 
famous examples of these are 《郘亭知见传本书目》 by 
莫友芝, 《藏园群书经眼录》by 傅增湘, and《贩书偶
记》by 孙殿起. Note that these catalogues are comprehen-
sive, not specialized.  That is to say, these catalogues contain 
books in all the categories of classics, history, philosophy, and 
belles-lettres.  
There are even some bibliographies which take the an-
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notation and description process one step further and research 
the authenticity of the books that have been passed down to 
us. Of this type of bibliography, 辨伪书目, the four most fa-
mous works are 《诸子辨》by 宋濂, 《四部正讹》by 胡
应麟, 《古今伪书考》by 姚际恒, and 《考信录提要》
by 崔述. The most commonly used and comprehensive one 
today is《伪书通考》by 张心澂.  
There is an expression in the field of Chinese tex-
tual scholarship: lie yi tong, duan shi fei 列异同，断是非. 
Roughly it means to enumerate the similarities and differenc-
es between things, and then determine their respective veraci-
ty and value. This can be applied to many fields and activities. 
In terms of searching for materials that we intend on using 
for our personal project, this should be our first goal, our first 
step. It can be achieved by using the two kinds of reference 
books and methods described above. We use catalogues and 
bibliographies, that is, lists of books, or even better, anno-
tated bibliographies, to find out what different books there 
are out there related to our topic of interest. These could be 
in the form of the book itself or direct commentary on it 
or general discussions on pertinent topics. Lie yi tong. Then 
we use studies of specific versions of these books, descriptive 
bibliographies, to find out which versions have been collated 
and corrected by savants, which are still full of mistakes (or 
which have gained new errors though sloppy engraving and 
poor collation), which are printed fully and clearly, which are 
incomplete and unclear, and which editions are copies or de-
rivatives of other editions and thus not worth seeking out. In 
a word, they tell us which versions we should base our work 
on and which should we avoid. Duan shi fei.  
Hence regardless of what our ultimate goal is regard-
ing the text we study, whether it is historical investigation, 
philosophical analysis, aesthetic appreciation, or translation, 
we must first ensure that we are working with the proper tools 
and best material available. As the famous Qing Dynasty clas-
sicist and paleographer Duan Yu Cai 段玉裁 reaffirmed, “必
先定底本之是非，而后可定义理之是非.”
TEXTuAL coLLATIoN: coMPARINg ANd coRREcT-
INg TEXTS 校勘学
We have already alluded to the superior editions of 
books as those which have passed through the hands of schol-
ars who have collated and redacted erroneous texts. This is 
another important example of how we can reap the benefits 
of the arduous work done by generations, indeed centuries, 
of scholars before us.  
Often what determines whether a certain text contains 
many errors or not is precisely whether it has been emended 
by later scholars. Considering that so many of the texts we 
read and rely upon to engage in “authoritative” and polemic 
discussion are thousands of years old, we should not hold 
out hope that the particular one we are studying has been 
copied from scribe to scribe, transmitted from teacher to stu-
dent over countless generations completely intact and with 
no textual changes, accidental or otherwise.  
The Qing Dynasty, especially early to middle, was a 
time when the academic and social atmosphere was hostile 
to open philosophical discussion, leaving most academics 
too timid to engage in discussions of the political philosophy 
or morality stemming from the ancient classics and philo-
sophical texts. As a result, the safe disciplines within textual 
scholarship became the stomping grounds for academics to 
exercise their intellects, and these fields flourished to new 
heights. Armed with an ever-growing number of catalogues, 
congshu, leishu 类书, and a highly developed printing indus-
try which made books widely accessible, many Qing Dynasty 
bibliophiles would collect and compare various editions of 
books. They would make notes pointing out the mistakes in 
texts and use the various editions, as well as their extensive 
knowledge in paleography (discussed below), to correct each 
other. The end result would be notes on the errata and their 
respective corrections.  
This process itself is yet another example of lie yi tong, 
duan shi fei. They obtain different versions of one work and 
put them side by side for a detailed comparison. Lie yi tong. 
They then use their knowledge of ancient Chinese history, 
philosophy, and most of all characters, to decide, in any given 
discrepancy, which version of a text (if any) is correct and 
which are erroneous. Duan shi fei.
In this golden age of textual criticism, the Qing Dy-
nasty, some scholars were most well known for their achieve-
ments in textual collation and their works are still helpful 
to us today. Two such scholars are Lu Wen Chao 卢文弨 
and Gu Guang Qi 顾广圻. Both Lu and Gu meticulously 
collated and emended texts from all of the four branches of 
Chinese literature. Lu’s collation work can be found in his 
《群书拾补》,《中山札记》, and 《龙城札记》, all of 
which are included in his complete collection 《抱经堂丛
书》. Gu’s work is more scattered, with some examples be-
ing 《国语札记》,《战国策札记》,《说文条记》, and 
《说文考异》. His 《思适斋集》,《思适斋书跋》, 
and《思适斋集补遗》also contain collation notes. Other 
well known collectors and collators include Sun Xing Yan 孙
星衍, Huang Pi Lie 黄丕烈, and Hu Ke Jia 胡克家 for his 
work on Zhaoming Wenxuan 《昭明文选》.  
While these scholars were known first and foremost as 
book collectors who excelled in textual collation because of 
their knowledge of paleography (in the broad sense), there 
were other scholars who were known primarily for their 
outstanding paleography, and whose literary contribution 
includes collation.  Some of the most prominent classicists 
of this type are Wang Nian Sun 王念孙, his son Wang Yin 
Zhi 王引之, and Yu Yue 俞樾. Wang Nian Sun’s Du Shu Za 
Zhi 《读书杂志》(this “zazhi” means miscellaneous notes, 
not magazine) provides concise and incisive notes on scat-
tered words and phrases from 《逸周书》,《战国策》, 
《史记》,《汉书》,《管子》,《晏子春秋》,《墨子》,
《荀子》, and《淮南子》.  Wang Yin Zhi’s Jing Yi Shu 
Wen 《经义述闻》is similar in format, providing collation 
and glossing for abstruse passages in 《周易》,《尚书》, 
《毛诗》,《周礼》,《仪礼》,《大戴礼记》,（小戴）
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《礼记》,《国语》, 《尔雅》,  and all three canonized 
commentaries of the 《春秋》.
The late Qing Dynasty scholar Yu Yue, who faithfully 
carried on the rigorous textual scholarship tradition of Dai 
Zhen 戴震, his student Duan Yu Cai 段玉裁, and his stu-
dents, Wang Nian Sun and Wang Ying Zhi, did extensive 
collation work on a variety of subjects.  Two of his most well 
known works are on the classics, Qun Jing Ping Yi  《群经
平议》, and on the philosophers, Zhuzi Ping Yi 《诸子平
议》.  
While not all of their emendations are conclusive or 
even necessarily correct, they provide the modern student 
of ancient Chinese with very insightful interpretations from 
erudite scholars of the past.  
PALEogRAPhy: ThE STudy oF oLd chARAcTERS 
古文字学
The term wen zi xue 文字学 has two meanings, one 
general and one narrow. In its broad sense, it encompasses all 
aspects of the study of ancient characters, or more accurately, 
all aspects of the character itself: its shape, its sound, and its 
meaning. These three ideas can be represented as 形音义.  In 
this broad sense of the term, wen zi xue can also be called xiao 
xue 小学.  
As these three fields developed and deepened, each be-
came its own discipline.  Wen zi xue 文字学 took on a more 
narrow meaning, referring only to the shape of characters; 
yinyun xue 音韵学, phonology, refers to their ancient sounds; 
xungu xue 训诂学, glossing, refers to their ancient meanings. 
We need a basic understanding of Chinese paleography 
for two reasons. First, when a character or characters are writ-
ten wrong, we can recognize this mistake and possibly figure 
out how to rectify it. This is one of the tasks of the collators 
explored above. Second, when the text is written correctly, we 
need to be able to read and understand it, correctly. 
When dealing with ancient characters and their three 
component parts, one of the most important books that we 
need to keep in mind and close at hand is Xu Shen’s Shuo Wen 
Jie Zi  许慎《说文解字》. Xu was a Han Dynasty paleog-
rapher and classicist of the “old text” camp. Shuo Wen was the 
first Chinese dictionary to analyze characters and provide def-
initions based on their component parts, and the first one to 
arrange the characters into groups based on common radicals. 
Much important commentary and annotation were 
done to Shuo Wen in the Qing Dynasty, and this series of 
books is very helpful to us in trying to understand the mean-
ing and usage of words from Han times and before. Wang 
Yun’s Shuo Wen Ju Dou and Wen Zi Meng Qiu 王筠《说文
句读》,《文字蒙求》focus mainly on the structure of the 
characters; Zhu Jun Sheng’s Shuo Wen Tong Xun Ding Sheng 
朱骏声《说文通训定声》focuses mostly on the ancient 
pronunciation; Gui Fu’s Shuo Wen Jie Zi Yi Zheng 桂馥《
说文解字义证》focuses on the characters’ meaning. Each 
of these works is valuable in its respective field, but the most 
celebrated and most commonly cited commentary is Duan 
Yu Cai’s Shuo Wen Jie Zi Zhu 段玉裁《说文解字注》, also 
called Shuo Wen Jie Zi Duan Zhu 《说文解字段注》 or 
Duan Shi Zhu 《段氏注》. This works analyzes each char-
acter on all three levels, and is thus the most comprehensive. 
Let us look at an example of the importance of be-
ing familiar with the shape or structure of ancient charac-
ters. In a recent issue of the academic journal 《古籍整理
研究学刊》(Jan. 2012, 总第155期), there is an article by 
Xu Guang Cai 徐广才and Zhang Xiu Hua 张秀华 critically 
interpreting a small number of textual issues with Qu Yuan’s 
Chu Chi 屈原《楚辞》. In the 《九章·惜往日》 chapter, 
there is an unclear phrase: 心治.  Xu and Zhang rehearse ex-
planations set forth by previous scholars before offering their 
own. One of these previous scholars, a Mr. Wu, asserts that 
心 is an incorrect form of 必. The two characters are nearly 
identical, being separated by only one stroke, thus a seeming-
ly easy transcription error to make. The problem is, however, 
that when this text was composed more than two thousand 
years ago, and for hundreds of years following, the characters 
心 and 必 looked nothing alike. Xu and Zhang recognized 
this and proceeded to gather pictorial evidence of these char-
acters both from Shuo Wen and from unearthed material of 
the appropriate time period. Through a direct comparison of 
their respective shapes, the reader can easily see that these two 
characters lacked any visual or structural similarity, thus the 
purported scribal error does not seem possible, and Mr. Wu’s 
subsequent explanation is no longer feasible.  
PhoNETIcS: ANcIENT PRoNuNcIATIoN 音韵学
Grasping ancient Chinese pronunciation is one of the 
most difficult and obscure parts of textual scholarship. But 
if we can become even mildly versed in it, it will open up 
many more and much deeper avenues to understanding an-
cient Chinese.  
One of the founders of the Qing Dynasty textual criti-
cism movement was Ming-born Gu Yan Wu 顾炎武. Him-
self an expert in xiao xue as well as history and philosophy, he 
once said of the task of reading ancient Chinese texts: “When 
one reads the Nine Classics, one must start by analyzing the 
characters; to analyze the characters, one must first know 
their sounds. In regard to the Hundred Philosophers, it is no 
different.”6
In Chapter 34 of Lao Zi’s Dao De Jing 《道德经》, 
there is the line “大道泛兮，其可左右。万物恃之以生
而不辞。功成不名有。衣养万物而不为主.” The ques-
tion at hand is the correct glossing for 衣养. Traditional 
commentaries (e.g. Wang Bi 王弼, Wei Yuan 魏源) define 
衣养 as meaning 衣被, so now （大道）衣被万物而不为
主 would be roughly translated as “The Great Way covers all 
creation without claiming to be its master.” Unfortunately, to 
go from 衣养 to 衣被 is a great hermeneutical leap, one not 
supported by any textual precedent or paleographic evidence. 
The aforementioned Qing Dynasty classicist Yu Yue says that 
6 “读九经从考文始，考文自知音始，以致诸子百家，亦莫
不然。”（《答李子德书》）
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it is the 衣 that needs to be reconsidered. This 衣 is inter-
changeable with 爱. Yu begins by citing the Han Dynasty He 
Shang Gong edition 《河上公注》of Lao Zi (as do the other 
scholars, right before they dismiss it). In the He Shang Gong 
version, the original text reads 爱养万物. How is it that this 
version uses 爱养 and others use 衣养? It is because in an-
cient Chinese, 爱 and 衣 had a similar pronunciation. Based 
on the rules and principles of borrowed characters (假借字, 
通假字), characters with identical or approximate pronun-
ciation were often used interchangeably. Yu first sets out to 
demonstrate that 衣 and 隐 had the same pronunciation, and 
then that 隐 and 爱 also had the same pronunciation. There-
fore by the rules of simple syllogism, 爱 and 衣 had similar or 
the same pronunciation.7 If we are familiar with the ancient 
sounds of characters and realize that characters with similar 
or identical sounds are sometimes substituted for each other, 
then we can see that in the He Shang Gong version of Lao Zi, 
the 爱养 is not a mistake or aberration, but rather a closer 
approximation to what Lao Zi originally meant, which would 
be “The Great Way nurtures all creation without claiming to 
be its master.”  
In this instance of Yu Yue’s phonetic exegesis, it would 
seem that we need a prior familiarity with ancient pronuncia-
tion so that we could recognize when two characters might 
share a phonetic propinquity. This is true. It would be best if 
we did have a certain amount of familiarity, which can cer-
tainly be acquired with any of the numerous modern publi-
cations on ancient phonetics. Short of that, we at least need 
to be able to recognize conventions and constructions in 
exegetical writing that would enable us to distinguish when 
commentators are noting the meaning of a word, and when 
they are noting its sound.8 
For example, if we look at a《十三经注疏》version 
of 《礼记·文王世子》, there is the phrase 亲亲之杀也. 
Directly underneath this line, in smaller characters represent-
ing commentary, is Zheng Xuan’s 郑玄 commentary which 
reads 杀，差也. Underneath that is the commentary of a 
Tang Dynasty scholar named Lu De Ming 陆德明 which 
says 杀色戒反. Zheng’s commentary is straight forward: 
杀 means 差, here rank or gradation. Lu’s notation, on the 
other hand, is informing us of this character’s specific pro-
nunciation. The reason why Lu would go out of his way to 
7 樾谨案：“《河上公》本作爱养，此作衣养者，古通字
也。盖衣字古音与隐同。故《白虎通·衣裳篇》曰：衣
者，隐也。以声为训也。而爱古音亦与隐同。故《诗·
烝民篇》毛传训爱为隐。《孝经》疏引刘炫曰：爱者隐
惜而结与内。不直训惜而必训隐惜者，亦以声为训也。
两字之音本同，故爱养可为衣养。傅奕本作衣养，则由
后人不通古音者，不达古义，率臆妄改耳。” (《诸子平
议》卷八)
8 In fact a command of the conventions and constructions of 
Chinese exegetical writing and the accompanying “jargon” and 
idiosyncrasies found in all the fields mentioned above and in 
critical interpretation (训诂学) discussed below, is necessary for 
a proper reading of philological analyses and discussions.  A pio-
neering American sinologist George Kennedy’s An Introduction 
to Sinology: Being a Guide to the Ts’u Hai (Ci Hai) [辞海] is an 
attempt at just such an introduction.  
provide the pronunciation for such a common word as 杀 is 
because this is an uncommon usage. When pronounced sha1, 
in modern Mandarin, it means to kill.  But when it represents 
a different meaning, its pronunciation changes. To put it an-
other way, if we are only told that the pronunciation is differ-
ent from the norm, that signifies a change in meaning. That is 
what Lu is pointing out to us.  杀，色戒反 means the sound 
of the character 杀 is a combination of the initial sound of 色 
and the final sound of 戒. This method is called “fan qie” 反
切. In modern Mandarin, it would be pronounced shai4, and 
means decrease, difference, or here, gradation.  
When we see these two types of notation from these 
two scholars appearing adjacent to each other as they do in 
this passage, it is not hard for us to put the pieces together in 
our mind and connect the meaning with the pronunciation. 
If we turn to a later chapter in the same book, The Doctrine 
of the Golden Mean 《礼记·中庸》, we see a similar passage, 
yet we are provided with only partial, phonetic commentary. 
The Golden Mean contains the line 亲亲之杀. Under it there 
is no Zheng Xuan commentary to tell us what 杀 means. 
There is only Lu’s commentary which reads 杀，色界也. 
Seeing this we must be able to come to the conclusion our-
selves that this alternate pronunciation of 杀 represents an 
alternate meaning, namely, the “gradation” mentioned above. 
gLoSSINg: cRITIcAL INTERPRETATIoN oF AN-
cIENT TEXTS 训诂学 
This is the end game of all the work outlined above: to 
use our knowledge of all the disciplines to arrive at a correct 
reading of an ancient text, including (and especially) obscure 
passages.  
Let us take an example from Mencius: 《孟子·滕文公
上》“有为神农之言者许行”.  
Mencius is talking with Chen Xiang 陈相, a disciple of 
Xu Xing 许行, who was a well-known and respected philoso-
pher and contemporary of Mencius. Xu believed strongly in 
the importance of agriculture in daily life. Chen Xiang reiter-
ated to Mencius something that Xu Xing had told him ear-
lier, that the Duke of Teng was a wise ruler, but was still not 
enlightened in terms of “The Way.”  (滕君则诚贤君也；
虽然，未闻道也.)  Why? Because the Duke of Teng did 
not do farm work alongside the commoners.  Mencius, us-
ing a very Socratic method of question and answer, proceeds 
to demonstrate the flaw of this argument, and explains the 
rationale behind society’s division of labor. We cannot expect 
anyone to be a full-time farmer and a craftsman and admin-
istrative leader at the same time. You do one job and buy or 
trade for everything else you need. Otherwise, Mencius said, 
如必自为而后用之，是率天下而路也. 
One of the earliest and most important (and later can-
onized) commentators of Mencius, Zhao Qi 赵歧 of the Han 
Dynasty, explicated the latter half of this sentence as “是率
导天下人以羸困之路,” which means “To do this would be 
leading everyone onto a path of utter exhaustion.”  Overall 
this is a correct understanding of what Mencius was trying 
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to say, but not a very precise rendering of the actual text. The 
problem lies in the word 路 in Mencius’ original. The word 
路 itself means road or path, and Zhao Qi in his commentary 
expands it to mean the path to exhaustion.  For Zhao Qi to 
add on this idea of exhaustion seems faithful if not absolutely 
necessary to Mencius’ point; this idea is so critical, in fact, 
that it seems strange that it would not be mentioned in the 
original text.  Instead, the original text seems simply to end 
by saying “to the path.”  
So we are left with two questions.  Where did this 
strange character 羸 lei2 in Zhao’s commentary come from? 
And how are we to interpret the 路 in the original passage? 
In a Song Dynasty exegetical work on Mencius, Meng 
Zi Yin Yi 《孟子音义》, after this line of text there is the 
ostensibly unhelpful note 路与露同. So what does 露 mean 
here? (Certainly not the morning dew!)  In the Book of Odes 
there is a poem with the line “串夷载路.”  Zheng Xuan’s 
commentary to this states that 路 means 瘠 ji2, thin and 
weak.9 In the Zuo Commentary of the Spring and Autumn An-
nals there is another line 以露其体. Du Yu’s exegesis reads 露 
as meaning 羸, thin or emaciated.10 Thus far, the commentar-
ies have showed us that (1) the character 路 in some instances 
means thin and weak, (2) that the character 路 in Mencius’ 
text can be read as 露, and (3) that 露 can also mean thin and 
emaciated.
The Tang Dynasty classicist Kong Ying Da 孔颖达, 
who added another layer of hermeneutic explanation to many 
of the classics and their canonized commentary, explained 
this brief annotation of Du Yu by saying: “To be robust 
means that the muscles and flesh are thick, and one’s bones 
can not be seen; to be skinny (or emaciated.  Notice that 
the Chinese character for skinny derives its meaning from 
the radical meaning sickness 疒) means the muscles and flesh 
are thin, so one’s bones are exposed, thus it is said ‘The body 
is emaciated.（羸露）’ Lei lu 羸露 is the word used when 
one’s bones are exposed. ...... Being emaciated is necessarily 
being in a state of lei (with bones visible), therefore lei is an-
other name for emaciated.”11 From this we see that 露 means 
“exposed” as in 揭露.  
We also have extended and derived meanings for 羸 
such as poor, destitute, and even defeated. In his Du Shu 
Za Zhi 《读书杂志》, Wang Nian Sun explicates a phrase 
found in the Guan Zi 《管子》, “路家.”  Just like the Meng 
Zi Yin Yi 《孟子音义》, Wang says that this 路 should be 
read as 露, so 露家 means a poverty-stricken household. He 
then cites the Han Dynasty linguistic classic Dialects 《方
言》 as defining 露 as meaning 败, defeated, and he uses 
a line from Zhuang Zi 《庄子》as evidence of this mean-
ing: 田荒室露.  “The fields are barren and the homes are in 
disrepair.” Wang points out that the character is sometimes 
also written as 潞, but retains the same meaning. He cites the 
9 《诗经·大雅·皇矣》：串夷载路。郑玄笺曰：路，瘠也。
10 《春秋左传·昭元年》：以路其体。杜预注云：露，羸
也。
11 孔颖达疏曰：“肥则肤肉厚，骨不见；瘦则肌肤薄，故体
羸露。羸露是露骨之名。……瘦必羸，羸亦瘦之别名。
Zhan Guo Ce and then the Spring and Autumn Annals of Mr. 
Lu. The latter’s original text is 士民罢（疲）潞. “The nobles 
and commoners are exhausted and emaciated.” The Han Dy-
nasty scholar who supplied commentary for this, Gao You, 
states, “This 潞 means 羸.”  (We can see these commentaries 
slowly leading us back to our original line in Mencius.) Wang 
finally points out that this same meaning can also be written 
simply as 路. The example he gives as evidence is precisely the 
line from Mencius that we started with. Thus our exegetical 
scavenger hunt has led us full circle.12 
Now we can see that the 路 in Mencius’ original line 是
率天下而路 does not in fact mean road at all.  It is a bor-
rowed character representing the character 露.  This “bor-
rowing” is permissible since these two characters clearly have 
the same pronunciation. We should read 路 as 露, and un-
derstand 露 as 羸, thin, emaciated, gaunt from being over-
worked.  
It would seem that Zhao Qi made an error in his in-
terpretation of this line by translating 路 both into its bor-
rowed meaning, 羸困, and into its literal meaning, 道路, at 
the same time.13 
Once we understand this one word, the whole passage, 
including the commentary and its mistake, becomes clear. 
This is precisely what the preeminent Qing Dynasty scholar 
Dai Zhen meant when he said, “At the heart of the classics 
is the Dao. What clarifies the Dao are the words. What con-
stitutes the words are the individual characters. Through the 
characters we understand the words, and through the words 
we understand the Dao.”14
12《读书杂志·管子·戒篇》“路家”条，王念孙按：“路读为
露。露家，穷困之家也。［杨雄］《方言》：‘露，败
也。’ 《庄子·渔夫篇》曰：‘田荒室露。’字亦作潞。《秦
策》曰：‘士民潞病与内。’ 《吕氏春秋·不屈篇》曰：‘士
民罢潞。’高注并曰：‘潞，羸也。’亦作路。《孟子·滕文
公篇》曰：‘是率天下而路也。’”
13 As an aside we should point out that this may not be the fault 
of Zhao Qi himself but rather that of later scribal error. Wang 
Nian Sun also quotes Zhao’s commentary, though he quotes it 
differently from the way we see it in the 《十三经注疏》 ver-
sion today. He quotes it as 是率天下人以羸路也.  This is the 
same 羸路 like we encountered in Kong Ying Da’s commentary 
when he said, 羸露是露骨之名. Wang then notes, 俗本改作 
‘ 羸困之路’.  That is to say, common editions of Mencius, as 
opposed to superior editions, write out Zhao’s commentary as 
saying “leading everyone on the path to emaciation.” This is the 
version that we encountered. However the better versions of this 
text still read “leading everyone towards emaciation/exhaustion.” 
Clearly, some scribe along this text’s long history of transmission 
came upon the 路 in the original text and the 羸路 in the com-
mentary and did not correctly grasp their meaning.  Instead he 
understood 羸路 simply as 羸的路, “the path to emaciation,” 
and thus attempted to clarify by rewriting Zhao Qi’s words as 是
率天下人以羸困之路. 
14 “经之至者，道也。所以明道者，其词也。所以成词者，
其字也。由字以通其词，由词以通其道。”（《戴东原
集·与是仲明论学书》）
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uNEARThEd docuMENTS 出土文献
Sometimes the best way to resolve a textual dispute is 
to cheat: to go back in time and look at how the ancients 
actually wrote a certain passage. Studying unearthed texts al-
lows us to do just that.
This field encompasses a range of different media, such 
as stele and wall inscriptions, oracle bones, bronze vessel and 
weapon inscriptions, and excavated manuscripts in the form 
of wood and bamboo strips, silk, and paper scrolls. Using 
excavated material for textual issues adds another layer of cre-
dence to one’s argument.  
Unearthed texts can be works that have long since been 
lost to the academic world, or they can be ancient versions of 
our redacted, highly modified received texts.  Scholars have 
long understood the importance of comparing received texts 
(those that have been passed down through the generations) 
with unearthed texts. This research surged at the end of the 
Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republican Period 
with foreign-trained savants who acquired a penchant for 
archeology and skepticism, such as Guo Mo Ruo 郭沫若, 
Wang Guo Wei 王国维, Luo Zhen Yu 罗振玉, and Gu Jie 
Gang 顾颉刚, to name a few.  
Let us look at an example to see how this research can 
aid us in our projects.
In Lao Zi Chapter 31 there is the famous but trouble-
some passage: 夫佳兵者，不祥之器.  There has been much 
dispute over what exactly this line means and how it should 
be corrected. As it is in this version, we can render it loosely as 
“Those people who cherish weapons and warfare are unpropi-
tious instruments.”  The problem is “people” should not be 
categorized as inanimate objects such as instruments. 15  
Wang Nian Sun believes the 佳 is an erroneous form 
of 隹, which was the ancient form of 唯.  We thus see a 夫
唯 ...... 故 ...... structure in the full passage, which is in fact 
a set structure employed many times throughout the entire 
book. Changing it thusly, this sentence would then roughly 
mean “Weapons are instruments of ill-fortune.”  As long as 
we change the 佳 character, the sentence makes sense.
Lu Wen Chao, the famous textual collator, disagrees 
with Wang, saying that the 夫唯 ... 故 ... structure is not 
appropriate for this passage, so we should not change the 佳 
to 隹 in an attempt to use this structure.  Furthermore, all of 
the numerous received editions of Lao Zi have used the word 
佳 or one of its synonyms such as 嘉 or 美, so the 佳 must 
be correct.  If the “夫佳兵者” part of this passage is correct, 
then this line is not referring to weapons per se but rather the 
people who wield them.  More specifically, it would be a per-
son who yields and even celebrates weapons and warfare.  But 
looking at the second half of the passage, a person still can 
not be an implement or instrument, so the “之器” according 
to Lu must have been mistakenly added.  If we take it out, 
15 Though there have been a few exceptions, such as when Confu-
cius was intentionally employing the use of metaphor to describe 
one of his students: 《论语·公冶长》 “子贡问曰：‘赐也何
如？’子曰：‘女，器也。’曰：‘何器也？’曰：‘瑚琏也。’”
we are left with 夫佳兵者，不详.  “People who celebrate 
weapons and warfare are not auspicious.” This, too, makes 
sense. Both Wang and Lu have relatively convincing textual 
reasoning to support their respective claims, but neither have 
direct (or indirect) textual evidence.  
In 1972 at the Ma Wang Dui 马王堆 site in the south-
ern Chinese province of Hunan, two versions of Lao Zi were 
unearthed.  Both were written on silk, so they are collectively 
called the “Silk Versions” 帛书本.  One was written pre-Han 
Dynasty, the other was written in the early Han Dynasty. 
They represent two separate lines of transmission of the Lao 
Zi.  In both of these silk versions, more than two thousand 
years old, the passage in question is written 夫兵者，不祥
之器.  There was no 佳, 隹 etc. in front of 兵者.  From 
this we can see that this line was in fact referring to weapons 
themselves as being inauspicious instruments, not people.  It 
is probable that some earlier versions wrote 夫兵者, and oth-
ers wrote 隹（唯）兵者, and since both 夫 an 隹 are struc-
tural words (虚词) with no critical meaning, they became 
combined and early scribal error changed 夫隹 into 夫佳, 
thus causing two thousand years of confusion.  
coNcLuSIoN
China’s long, unbroken written history dating back 
more than three thousand years to the oracle bones of the 
Shang Dynasty, has bequeathed to us a corpus of texts so mas-
sive that it often feels like a gift and a curse. These texts need 
to be sifted through, analyzed, collated, and redacted, and all 
this before we can begin to mine them for the valuable his-
torical, cultural, and philosophical massages they carry. The 
sheer amount can seem insurmountable, and the layers of ac-
crued commentary and textual corruption, impenetrable.
Fortunately for us, many of these books themselves 
were written and compiled specifically to help us facilely ma-
neuver through this jungle. “Much more than command of 
classical Chinese is required to make a scholar. Among the 
most important tools are bibliography, both in traditional 
sources and in modern secondary studies, and a methodi-
cal, scientific approach.”16 Bibliographic compilations orga-
nize these texts in a way manageable to us, allowing us to 
make narrow and fruitful searches based on our own specific 
research parameters; philological work allows us to read the 
texts as they were intended to be read by the ancient authors. 
But even the helpful field of textual research possesses its own 
corpus of works with which we need to familiarize ourselves. 
Many of the more important ones have been briefly intro-
duced in this paper. For the most part all are in Chinese. 
One English-language introduction to important historical 
reference books for Chinese studies is An Annotated Bibliog-
raphy of Selected Chinese Reference Works, by Ssu-yu Teng and 
Knight Biggerstaff.17 It provides helpful descriptions to many 
16  Honey, Incense at the Alter, 200.
17 Ssu-yu Teng and Knight Biggerstaff, An Annotated Bibliography 
of Selected Chinese Reference Works (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1950).
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different kinds of reference works, but the largest chapter is 
devoted specifically to traditional bibliographies.
The methods introduced in this essay are by no means 
new, nor are they meant to be monopolized by the lonely 
textual scholar who stands outside of larger, philosophical de-
bates. They have, however, become unpopular and fallen into 
a state of relative disuse. Textual research has, in a large part, 
lamentably become the sole domain of textual researchers. 
As a major or specialty in institutions of higher learning, it is 
usually located in departments set up specifically for just such 
research. To be an optimist, we could say that the existence 
of such departments provides textual research with its own 
abode to establish itself and flourish. But I believe, however, 
that such institutional divisions are also placing it in opposi-
tion to its corresponding fields, namely the departments of 
history, literature, and philosophy. 
This was not always the case, in the east or the west. For 
most of China’s history, the outstanding achievements in all 
of those above-mentioned fields were attained in conjunction 
with textual scholarship. Feng You Lan and Hu Shi are both 
scholars of the first half of the twentieth century who are best 
known for their studies on the history of Chinese philosophy. 
Their grasp of the metaphysical aspect of Chinese thought 
allowed them penetrating insight into the essence and evolu-
tion of Chinese philosophy. Their work, however, was predi-
cated on an equally expert grasp of documentology. We can 
safely say that they were only able to penetrate so deeply into 
Chinese thought precisely because they knew what texts to 
read and how to read them. They knew how to use bibliog-
raphies, compare editions, collate texts, and analyze ancient 
characters, all to the benefit of their philosophical musings. 
Such skills are rarely taught in philosophy or history depart-
ments today. 
As we have mentioned above, textual research and the 
more abstract humanitarian studies of history, philosophy, 
and literature should be seen in processional terms—they 
are all parts of one long research process. Textual investiga-
tion is the preliminary work that must be done to lay a solid 
foundation for the “thought” oriented work to follow. When 
one skips over the preliminary work and dives right into a 
philosophical discussion, such a work, while it may attain 
temporary popularity, will eventually be replaced by a new, 
more fashionable philosophical explanation. And so on and 
so forth. The philosophical and literary commentaries with 
more permanence and universality are the ones grounded in 
the sometimes dry, but ultimately rewarding and scientific 
methods of textual scholarship. 
Dai Zhen 戴震 was a famous scholar from the early 
Qing Dynasty, who lived at a time when China experienced 
a renaissance in all forms of textual scholarship. He, too, is 
best known for his accomplishments in such fields, with text-
critical editions of many Confucian classics as well as linguis-
tic and philological exegeses. The culmination of his lifetime 
of learning, however, is his Mengzi Ziyi Shuzheng 《孟子字
义疏证》. This short monograph is a trenchant exposition of 
the key philosophical terms and concepts found in the Men-
cius. There were many scholars before him who attempted 
such a discourse, and many after, but the reason why this 
work still stands above the rest in the great corpus of mate-
rial aimed at elucidating Mencius, is that Dai’s discussion of 
philosophy is rooted in his background as a textual scholar. 
Beijing University scholar Li Ling 李零 is a modern 
example of the same type of accomplishment. His academic 
background is in archeology and paleography. As such, his 
research has always been a fact-based approach to China’s 
history and culture, not a metaphysical one. So when he 
published his commentary on the Analects of Confucius in 
2007, despite being immediately criticized for using such an 
ostensibly disparaging title (丧家狗, The Lost Dog), it reads 
as one of the most unadorned and authoritative explanations 
of Confucius’ thought. He finds resolution to many of the 
obscure passages by sifting through the old commentaries, 
carefully comparing variant texts, and utilizing his knowledge 
of unearthed documents and ancient inscriptions. He rarely 
invokes any Western “-isms” to infuse Confucius’ thought 
with philosophical leanings that were not originally there. 
Even Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr.’s The Ana-
lects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation references the 
bamboo strip fragments of the Analects unearthed at Ding 
Zhou in an attempt to understand Confucius’ words and 
deeds as they were recorded back then, as opposed to how 
we want to interpret them today.18 Similarly, Ames’ recent 
monograph Confucian Role Ethics is a philosophical reinter-
pretation of Confucius’ system of thought, but he begins 
his discussion of each key concept of Confucianism with an 
analysis of the character behind it— shenti 身体, pengyou 朋
友, xue 学, xin 心, de 德, he 和, li 礼, ren 仁, xiao 孝, zhi 
智, zhongshu 忠恕, yi 义, tian 天, di 帝, sheng 圣—drawing 
upon their variant forms found in Shuo Wen Jie Zi, bronze 
inscriptions, and oracle bones.19 Their arguments carry that 
much more credence because of the fact that they are ground-
ed in textual evidence.
Credence is indeed what we strive for in our argumen-
tation and writings. Such credence stems from a solid grasp 
of the facts. In sinological studies, the texts are the facts; our 
subjective interpretation of them is the argumentation. What 
documentology aims to do is to help us close the gap, to the 
best of our abilities, between the text itself and our subjective 
reading of it. This is the inescapable importance of textual 
studies.
18 Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., The Analects of Confucius: 
A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998).
19 Roger Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press, 2011).
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TRAdITIoNALISM AS A WAy oF 
LIFE: ThE SENSE oF hoME IN A 
ShANghAI ALLEyWAy
NON ARKARAPRASERTKUL · hARVARd uNIVERSITy
ABSTRACT
Taking inspiration from major cities such as New York 
and Tokyo, the government of Shanghai has sought to convey 
a mixture of modernity and high culture through a blend of 
high-rise construction and historic preservation. City brand-
ing is a major part of Shanghai’s urban development program. 
Apart from the building of multiple modern skyscrapers, the 
local government sees protection of distinctive “architectural 
artifacts” as essential to the branding of a city with global 
ambitions. The drive behind preservation, however, raises lin-
gering questions regarding the residents currently living in 
these historic “monuments.” Through ethnography, I show 
the lives of three different groups of residents whose sense of 
home is defined by completely different factors. “Traditional-
ism as a way of life” can be defined as practices that can only 
be understood within a highly contemporary framework, in 
which enacting or embodying “the past” has value in contem-
porary Chinese economic and globalized structures. 
INTRoducTIoN
“I wouldn’t be able to imagine my wife and me being 
anywhere but here,” said Teacher Hu when asked about their 
imagination of the future.
Teacher Hu (Hu laoshi) was born and has lived in 
Shanghai ever since he could remember. He and I got along 
with each other quite well, as I have been a regular visitor 
to his neighborhood for the past two years. Living in a tra-
ditional Shanghai alleyway neighborhood known as a lilong 
(literally “neighborhood lane”), Teacher Hu was, to me, a lo-
cal historian who always enjoyed sharing all kinds of stories 
about the place in which he had lived for more than seven 
decades.
My fascination for his neighborhood began two years 
ago as I was searching the city looking for a site for my re-
search on the gentrification of the inner city of Shanghai. 
Teacher Hu’s neighborhood was one of those lilong neigh-
borhoods that was not only in good physical condition, but 
All photography has been provided kindly by Sue Anne Tay.
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also had a unique architectural style. Most importantly, it had 
lively residents, with whom I could casually engage in con-
versation. Not only was the Teacher himself loquacious and 
outspoken, but he was also the liveliest among the residents. 
His lilong neighborhood occupied a block in the business dis-
trict of Shanghai. The periphery of this block consisted of 
luxury stores facing pavements populated by tourists and lo-
cal shoppers. Surprising to many (myself included), Teacher 
Hu’s neighborhood was one of the few lilong that had yet to 
be demolished given the value of the prime business area in 
which it was located. It was my fascination of his lilong neigh-
borhood as well as of Teacher Hu himself that kept bringing 
me back to see him there.
Since the economic reform in the early 1980s, Shang-
hai has been a city in flux. Shanghai’s urban structure is al-
ways changing thanks to relentless political and economic 
forces that, since the reform, have shaped its patterns of ur-
banization.1 Moreover, due to its status as China’s most eco-
nomically viable city (i.e., highest gross domestic product or 
GDP), Shanghai’s cityscape today is changing at an unprec-
edented pace. Old and traditional buildings are constantly 
being replaced by new, modern buildings that are usually 
much higher in their spatial efficiency, allowing the city to 
service higher income residents who are attracted to the city 
by its dynamic tertiary industries. Like many big cities, lands 
in the city are reclaimed from the original residents and resold 
by the local government to real estate developers. The broadly 
defined “public good” is usually the key argument for the lo-
cal government’s use of eminent domain to reclaim valuable 
lands for higher income residents or businesses.2
Stories of residents fighting against the government to 
maintain their rights to receive adequate compensation are 
not new. In fact, as a researcher who has been working on the 
issues of housing rights and gentrification, I felt that I knew 
a great deal not only about the brutality of the local govern-
ment’s forced eviction practices.3 Many residents are already 
1 Shahid Yusuf, Weiping Wu, and World Bank., The dynamics of 
urban growth in three Chinese cities  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997); John R. Logan, ed. Urban China in transition (Ox-
ford: Oxford : Blackwell Publishing, 2008).
2  Michael Herzfeld, Evicted from eternity : the restructuring of mod-
ern Rome  (Chicago, Ill. ; London: University of Chicago Press, 
2009); Arjun Appadurai, “The Right to Participate in the Work 
of the Imagination,” in TransUrbanism (Rotterdam: NAi Pub, 
2002).
3 Mayra Gomez and Bret Thiele, “Housing Rights Are Human 
looking to move elsewhere due to changes in lifestyle and em-
ployment, and seek to take advantage of the compensation 
money to help them make this move. Hence, although I usu-
ally felt sympathetic when I heard a story of people being dis-
placed, another part of me attempted to maintain some level 
of objectivity because I did not really know the entire story.
Nevertheless, looking into Teacher Hu’s unusually 
deep, expressive and sad eyes when hearing him say that he 
would not be able to imagine his life anywhere else but here, 
I could not help but feel sad and sympathetic about such an 
anticipated loss. The Teacher Hu I knew always smiled and 
laughed. His heavy pounding on my shoulder every time we 
saw each other always reminded me that he was healthy and 
lively. He always called home a small and narrow row house, 
half of which he and his wife rented out for extra income. “In 
a couple of years, if not less,” said Teacher Hu, “the govern-
ment will turn our houses into high-end shops just like the 
others.” Teacher Hu and his wife were not naïve, as he knew 
quite well their destiny from many of the old neighbors who 
had been moving out from their 80-year-old neighborhood 
in the inner city to apartments in the suburbs. The situation 
he described is highly possible given that a new metro station 
and a shopping complex were in the process of construction 
right outside the wall of the community. “Perhaps, I’ll join 
them in the suburbs,” he said. But still, his deeply sad eyes 
told me that there was something about this place he called 
home that nothing else could replace. There seems to be a 
discrepancy between the quantitative goal of the state and the 
qualitative needs of the residents in their basic right to dwell 
in the city.4 The question in this essay is: how do we under-
stand the sense of a place aspiring to become a global city? 
In this essay, I use ethnography to shed light on the meaning 
of home, and a sense of place, in the socio-spatial context of 
China’s most economically dynamic city.
Rights,” Human Rights 32(2005); Qin Shao, Shanghai gone : do-
micide and defiance in a Chinese megacity, State and society in 
East Asia (2013); Hyun Bang Shin, “The Right to the City and 
Critical Reflections on China’s Property Rights Activism,” Anti-
pode (2013).
4 David Harvey, “The right to the city,” New Left Review 
253(2008); Li Zhang, “The Right to the Entrepreneurial City in 
Reform-Era China,” China Review 10, no. 1 (2010).
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houSINg IN A gLoBAL cITy
Taking inspiration from major cities such as New York 
and Tokyo, the government of Shanghai has sought to con-
vey a mixture of modernity and high culture through a blend 
of high-rise construction and historic preservation.5 City 
branding is a major part of Shanghai’s urban development 
program.6 Apart from the building of multiple modern sky-
scrapers, the local government sees protection of distinctive 
“architectural artifacts” as essential to the branding of a city 
with global ambitions.7 The drive behind preservation, how-
ever, raises lingering questions regarding the residents cur-
rently living in these historic “monuments.” As China rushes 
to modernize, one may wonder how the image of urban glo-
balization affects the citizens whose lives the city government 
is ultimately seeking to improve.
At the heart of this issue are the traditional alleyway 
houses of Shanghai known as lilong (里弄) Literally meaning 
“neighborhood lane,” the lilong are the legacies of Shanghai’s 
Treaty Port era (1842-1946), representing the Chinese take 
on the British row house aesthetic. The lilong house was origi-
nally conceived by British developers as a British row house 
transplanted to Chinese soil to house a large number of Chi-
nese laborers, which later became the city’s dominant form 
of housing.8 The lilong also constituted the primary housing 
stock found in Shanghai up until the early 1980s, with mul-
tiple generations having occupied the same dwellings for a 
5 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at large : cultural dimensions of glo-
balization, Public worlds v. 1 (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996); Saskia Sassen, The global city : New York, 
London, Tokyo  (Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2001).
6 Brook Larmer, “Shanghai Dreams: China’s global city tries to 
recapture the glories of its past—this time on its own terms.,” 
National Geographic 2010; Albert Wing Tai Wai, “Place 
promotion and iconography in Shanghai’s Xintiandi,” Habitat 
International 30, no. 2 (2006); Fulong Wu, “Globalization, 
Place Promotion and Urban Development in Shanghai,” Journal 
of Urban Afairs 25, no. 1 (2003).
7 Edward L. Glaeser, Triumph of the city : how our greatest inven-
tion makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier  (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2011); Sharon Zukin, Landscapes of power 
: from Detroit to Disney World  (Berkeley ; Oxford: Berkeley ; 
Oxford : University of California Press, 1991).
8 Much research has been done on the historical aspect of this 
form of housing, For more detailed research on the historical 
and architectural aspects of the lilong houses and housing see 
Non Arkaraprasertkul, “Towards Shanghai’s Urban Housing: 
Re-Defining Shanghai’s Lilong” (paper presented at the The 6th 
China Urban Housing Conference, Beijing, China, 2007); Wen-
jun Ge, “Social congestion in Shanghai : an urban housing proj-
ect designed on its sections” (S.M., 2008); Qian Guan, “Lilong 
Housing, A Traditional Settlement Form” (M.Arch Thesis, Mc-
Gill University, 1996); Paul Harley Hammond, “Community 
Eclipse and Shanghai’s Lilong” (University of Missouri-Colum-
bia, 2006); D. Louise Morris, Community or commodity? : a study 
of Lilong housing in Shanghai  (Centre for Human Settlements, 
School of Community and Regional Planning, University of 
British Columbia, 1994); Wan-Lin Tsai, “The Redevelopment 
and Preservation of Historic Lilong Housing in Shanghai” (M.S. 
Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2008).
hundred years or more.9 The dual nature of the lilong as both 
artifact and site for community places it at the center of vari-
ous socio-political debates regarding China’s attitude toward 
urban redevelopment at the state and local levels. The city 
and the state’s image-conscious definition of civic improve-
ment stands at odds with community leaders who equate 
such “improvement” with “state-led gentrification” inevitably 
leading to the displacement of current residents from their 
homes. 
Just as the lilong can be both a monument and a home, 
I argue that housing strategies are not simply a matter of pro-
viding space to a certain number of people, but should take 
into account socio-cultural processes as well. Teacher Hu and 
his wife’s story is a vivid example. It might well be the case 
that he would get to live in a larger and more convenient 
apartment if he agreed to move out of his lilong house, but 
only if we do not take into account their deep attachment to 
place.10 Teacher Hu and his wife had lived in the neighbor-
hood for more than 40 years. They lived through the highs 
and lows of Shanghai under communism: throughout the 
hardship from devastating political campaigns to see the new 
Shanghai rising again in the early 1990s with the economic 
reform moving forward at full speed. 
Located in physical space, housing occupies a key role 
in the organization of Chinese society. Not only is housing 
about the “physical” accommodation of the population, it 
also concerns the “social and moral” organization of family, 
lineage, marriage, and the possession and maintenance of 
property as a whole.11 The rhetoric of historical preservation 
juxtaposed with the city’s goal to project a global image rep-
resents a contradiction between ideology and city planning. 
The local governments of large cities hoping to achieve rec-
ognition from the international community using words like 
“historic preservation” and “development” often risk neglect-
ing other important issues such as the provision of adequate 
housing.12 These euphemistic buzzwords take a particularly 
dangerous tone when concerning the lilong and the existing 
communities there, as “historic preservation” spells the de-
9 Samuel Y. Liang , “Where the Courtyard Meets the Street: Spatial 
Culture of the Li Neighborhoods, Shanghai, 1870–1900,” Jour-
nal of the Society of Architectural Historians 67, no. 4 (2008).
10 Tianshu Pan, “Place attachment, communal memory, and the 
moral underpinnings of gentrification in postreform Shanghai,” 
in Deep China : the moral life of the person, what anthropology and 
psychiatry tell us about China today, ed. Arthur Kleinman, et al. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Bryna Good-
man, Native place, city, and nation : regional networks and identi-
ties in Shanghai, 1853-1937  (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995).
11 Julie Y. Chu, Cosmologies of credit : transnational mobility and the 
politics of destination in China  (Durham [N.C.]: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2010); Myron L. Cohen, House united, house divided 
: the Chinese family in Taiwan, Studies of the East Asian Insti-
tute (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Ronald G. 
Knapp, China’s living houses : folk beliefs, symbols, and household 
ornamentation  (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999). 
12 Michael Herzfeld, “Spatial Clensing: Monumental Vacuity and 
the Idea of the West,” Journal of Material Culture 11, no. 1/2 
(2006).
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mise of the former, and “development” spells the demise of 
the latter.13
In this paper, I will present stories of three residents 
in the Tranquil Light neighborhood (a pseudonym), a lilong 
neighborhood in the upper quarter of Shanghai, which is sur-
rounded by luxury stores and high-rise buildings. Earlier I 
sketched the picture of Tranquil Light in my narrative about 
Teacher Hu. The picture of this neighborhood will become 
more vivid as I narrate the stories of two other residents: Rob 
and Xiao Wang. I have come to know these three residents 
well after my multiple research trips to Shanghai from 2010 
to 2014. Their lives – the original, the incoming, and the 
floating resident – are snapshots of housing situations in ur-
ban Shanghai today. I hope to show that even in the same 
neighborhood, their senses of place are defined by completely 
different factors.14 
 
ThE hoME oF TEAchER ANd MRS. hu
“Everyone [in this community] calls me Teacher Hu,” 
he said. But he never told me where and what he used to 
teach. Since he was already retired and running a small gro-
cery shop with his wife when my expatriate friend introduced 
me to him two years ago, I automatically assumed that before 
he retired (almost always at sixty years of age in the Chinese 
public school system) he was once a teacher – a title that, 
especially in a society rooted in Confucianism focusing on 
the respect for the elderly such as China, stayed with him for 
life. My expatriate friend who introduced me to him did not 
know better: “Everyone always calls him Teacher Hu – I don’t 
know why – he must have been a teacher,” he said.
A house played a central role for the vanishing tradi-
tional Chinese family. Not only was it physically important 
as a shelter for the multiple generations of the family, but 
also symbolic in that it represented the power of the leader 
of the household who is providing for the members in har-
mony. Analytically speaking, the spatial arrangement of the 
house represented the “inherent” hierarchy of a traditional 
13 James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine : “development,” depo-
liticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho  (Cambridge [Eng-
land] ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
14 In this short piece, I can only do so much in providing the details 
of the full picture of Shanghai’s urban situation. For instance, 
while a full discussion of the nature of municipal preservation 
strategies may be helpful to the understanding of how the resi-
dents make use of the discourse around them to their own ad-
vantage, I have to restrain myself from further complicating the 
situation since the strategies themselves are tremendously varied 
and complex. They range from the modest infrastructural im-
provements without disrupting residential tenure patterns (the 
Tranquil Light’s case), to the use of eminent domain leading to 
a brutal eviction of the original residents and destruction of the 
existing structure followed by lilong-style modern luxury homes, 
and to quasi-legal commercial redevelopment such as the famous 
high-end retail district in the upper quarter of Shanghai. Some of 
these strategies are known to those who are well-read thanks to 
the recent writings on the issue, but are not playing a critical role 
in the ways in which the residents themselves think about their 
sense of place, which is the main focus of this paper. 
Chinese family. For instance, the head of the family (usually 
the oldest male) occupied the largest room at the most private 
part of the house (usually on the upper floor if the house had 
more than one story), whereas the other members and the 
wives that were married into the family stayed on the lower 
level. “Older sons are given preference over younger sons,” 
said Teacher Hu as he remembered quite well what it was like 
when his parents were still alive. Unlike a traditional Chinese 
courtyard house, a lilong house was narrow and small, but was 
still organized within a spatial constraint with a clear hierar-
chical division between the space for the head of the house 
and the rest of the household. As a son, Teacher Hu slept 
with his parents on the third level of the house. His father’s 
younger brothers and their relatives who came to Shanghai to 
find jobs stayed on the lower level. At one time, there were 
more than a dozen people in his house, which was originally 
built for half that number (three bedrooms).
“Life was not convenient as there was no bathroom 
inside the house,” said Teacher Hu. The way the house was 
constructed did not include an indoor plumbing system, thus 
before the pipelines were installed in the late 1970s, everyone 
had to go to a communal well to get water or buy it from the 
seller who would go door to door to deliver water. After the 
Communists took over the city from the Nationalists in the 
late 1940s, his neighborhood was transformed into a part of a 
large danwei (also known as work unit), or a place of employ-
ment to which the socialist workers were bound to for life 
and which in turn provided them with housing, child care, 
schools, clinics, shops, and other services. Before moving to 
the Tranquil Light neighborhood, Teacher Hu lived in his 
original house in the lower quarter of Shanghai, which was 
then being re-distributed to other families. In 1964, ten years 
after he moved into Tranquil Light, he was moved again, this 
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time into his present home after he could prove to the local 
cadre in charge of the danwei that he and his wife needed a 
larger apartment (he did not say how such need was calculat-
ed). But he was given only a small bedroom, not the spacious 
one on the third floor, and a small elongated allotment space 
on the first floor of the building, which was usually used as a 
corridor leading to a stairwell communally used by the resi-
dents in the same unit.
In the early 1980s, Teacher Hu was sent by his danwei, 
specializing in industrial equipment quality control, to one of 
the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the southeastern coast 
of China to help set up a handful of factories needed to fuel 
its newly established labor intensive and export economy. He 
returned only a few years after because of his chronic health 
problem. His wife was also no longer employed because her 
danwei was dissolved. Their daughter was born a few years 
before Teacher Hu left Shanghai for work. When he returned, 
the family found themselves in a difficult situation, as the 
small monthly pension given to them by the local govern-
ment was barely enough to support the couple, let alone their 
teenage daughter. The couple had to make extra income to 
support the family. Thus, Teacher and Mrs. Hu turned the 
elongated allotment space on the first floor – with five-foot-
wide frontage and about 20-foot-deep (it was originally a cor-
ridor) – into a small grocery shop, selling all kinds of items 
but mainly cigarettes, liquors, and candies. When I met him 
for the first time in 2012, he had been running his small shop 
for more than twenty years.
As modern 24-7 convenient stores are ubiquitous in 
Shanghai, the couple did not really make money from their 
local grocery store business. However, it was precisely this 
business that gave them, according to Teacher Hu, “some-
thing to look forward to in the morning.” Having spent time 
sitting on a small wooden stool in front of the shop that he 
provided for people to come sit, drink tea, play cards, and 
smoke with him (although he no longer smoked because of 
his chronic disease), I felt that the shop was more a venue for 
conversation than anything else. In fact, many elderly with 
whom I spoke called his shop a “platform” (pingtai) to en-
gage in all kinds of conversation, from the local politics in the 
district, to collective reminiscence, and gossiping about their 
neighbors and the new residents. People did not really come 
to buy anything, but to talk, share, and chat with Teacher Hu 
and his wife about politics, law, and reminiscing about all 
kinds of nostalgic stories (usually about Mao’s China). As the 
late afternoon arrived, children would bring their homework 
to the shop and gather around a small knee-height folding 
desk that Teacher Hu kept right by the entrance of the shop 
to give the children a communal place to do their homework.
ShANghAI TRAdITIoNALISM
The post-high socialist China – some scholars call it 
“late-socialist China15 – is a period of experimentation, rang-
15 Li Zhang and Aihwa Ong, eds., Privatizing China : socialism 
from afar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
ing from the highly geographically imbalanced “let some 
people get rich first” economic agenda to a dubious one child 
policy family planning program. Older generation residents 
like Teacher and Mrs. Hu basically received almost no sup-
port from the government and had to take care of themselves, 
but how? This treatment of retirees was increasingly the case 
after the market had replaced the state in the provision of 
basic social infrastructure such as housing and employment.16 
While the economic reform program has dismantled the so-
cial safety net, which was a much-needed source of support 
for the elderly who could no longer work in a factory, the one 
child policy has disrupted traditional family relations. Teach-
er Hu recalled how, when he was young, he and all of his sib-
lings were very close to their parents and grandparents as they 
were all living under the same roof taking care of each other.
Though the couple’s house and shop were both very 
small and dilapidated, the ownership of both essentially up-
held their sense of dignity. This was because their social life 
revolved around the house and the shop. Every morning, I 
saw people, young and old, walking by Teacher and Mrs. 
Hu’s house and greeting them while they were watering their 
plants in the front of the house. Teacher Hu usually invited 
everyone to sit down with him for a tea, but really just so that 
he could have someone to chat with. What struck me in my 
last visit to Teacher and Mrs. Hu’s neighborhood was, what 
the urban theorist and activist Jane Jacobs calls “the sense of 
community.”17 With around a hundred residents living in the 
branch lane, that part of the neighborhood was small enough 
for all residents to know each other. Walking from a typical 
hectic commercial street of Shanghai where everyone was a 
stranger to each other into Teacher Hu’s neighborhood where 
everyone was a neighbor of one another, I felt that I was in a 
completely different Shanghai.
Having said that, there was another intriguing aspect 
of space-time continuum – the concept of time where there 
is simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present. 
Although time has changed, the sense of community I felt 
was rather similar to that in the close-knit alleyway house 
neighborhood that the historian Lu Hanchao portrayed in his 
classic historical ethnography Beyond the Neon Light: Every-
day Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century.18 Lilong neigh-
borhoods then were like a dense collection of villages with 
residents rarely leaving the locale of their alleyway houses 
to go elsewhere. Older residents like Teacher and Mrs. Hu 
did not travel outside the neighborhood, except when they 
had to go out to buy goods to sell in their shop. This tie to 
their locale, in turn, created a strong sense of belonging, lo-
16 Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting citizenship in urban China : peas-
ant migrants, the state, and the logic of the market, Studies of the 
East Asian Institute, Columbia University (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1999).
17 Jane Jacobs, The death and life of great American cities  (Har-
mondsworth: Penguin Books in association with Jonathan Cape, 
1964).
18 Hanchao Lu, Beyond the neon lights : everyday Shanghai in the 
early twentieth century  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999).
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cal moral world, and place attachment among the residents.19 
When asked about his friends who had moved elsewhere and 
whether or not he would go out and see them in their new 
apartments, he replied: “Why would I go out to see them…
they all come here from time to time – I know they all miss 
our neighborhood.”
There is a critical point to be made here about this spa-
tial sense of the past. Rhetorically speaking, one might say 
that when in the neighborhood, one feels as if one were “go-
ing back in time,” moving away from the chaos of modern 
life into the local communal world where everyone knows 
and helps each other. As I have argued elsewhere, this type 
of romanticization is, in fact, a common attitude among his-
torians of Shanghai, overlooking many other issues such as 
conflicts, violence, and the health hazards resulting from liv-
ing in an unsafe environment of a rundown structure.20 It is 
often the historians, architects, and planners – the outsid-
ers – who paint the picture of a romantic urban place due 
to the nature of their archival research methodologies that 
seem to accentuate certain aspects of the past. This particu-
lar emphasis of the selected portion of the past, or what the 
anthropologist Tianshu Pan calls “Shanghai nostalgia,”21 is a 
doubled-edged sword. On the one hand, it documents some 
of the important aspects of the past that would otherwise be 
forgotten. On the other hand, this romanticization comes in 
handy for the local government’s efforts to stress its cultural 
capital in the effort to make Shanghai a global city.22 As a re-
sult, the government made a few preservation programs that 
only focus on the preservation of the physical structure of the 
“romantic neighborhoods” without caring for the residents 
living in them. In fact, the use of Shanghai nostalgia usually 
results in state-led gentrification of the neighborhood. Thus, 
I had always found suspiciously rosy historical accounts ques-
tionable if not misleading, and thought that the discourse of 
nostalgic sentiment did more harm than good to the original 
residents living in the neighborhood.
Teacher Hu emphasized this romantic past, especially 
when speaking about the future of his neighborhood. “There 
is no place like this…we maintain the tradition of the com-
munity,” he said, pointing out the stark contrast between his 
neighborhood and a typical community living in high-rise 
19 Arthur Kleinman, What really matters : living a moral life amidst 
uncertainty and danger  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006).
20 Non Arkaraprasertkul, “Urbanization and Housing: Socio-Spa-
tial Conflicts over Urban Space in Contemporary Shanghai,” in 
Aspects of Urbanization in China: Shanghai, Hong Kong, Guang-
zhou, ed. G. Byrne Bracken, IIAS Series (Amsterdam: Amster-
dam University Press, 2012).
21 Tianshu Pan, “Historical Memory,  Community-Building and 
Place-Making in Neighborhood Shanghai,” in Restructuring the 
Chinese City: Changing  Society, Economy, and Space, ed. Laurence 
J.C. Ma and Fulong Wu (London: Routledge, 2005).
22 Fulong Wu and Shenjing He, “Property-Led Redevelopment in 
Post-Reform China: A Case Study of Xintiandi Redevelopment 
Project in Shanghai,” Journal of Urban Affairs 27, no. 1 (2005); 
Albert Wing Tai Wai, “Place promotion and iconography in 
Shanghai’s Xintiandi,” Habitat International 30, no. 2 (2006).
towers. For more than a decade, he always wore the same 
clothes. He always got up early to water his plants in front of 
the house, sat in front of his shop talking to his friends and 
neighbors during the day, and resumed the role of a “home-
work teacher” for the children in the neighborhood from late 
afternoon to the early evening. This might be the reason why 
people still called him teacher despite the fact that he might 
not have had been a teacher at all. That said, as noted by 
the anthropologist Andrew Kipnis, after the 1980s the term 
“teacher” (laoshi) has become a generic term of respect, re-
placing the term “comrade” (tongzhi) used in the high com-
munist period (1949 – 1976).23 According to Kipnis, the 
term “teacher” can also be used to address people one does 
not recognize, especially when asking for assistance from a 
stranger (the de facto reason why I call him Teacher Hu). 
Both of these reasons probably play a role in how the com-
munity recognized him as a respectable figure in the neigh-
borhood. This homework teacher role had diminished greatly 
because most of the kids in the neighborhood preferred to use 
the internet to help them with their homework. Once the sun 
had set, he would be sitting outside of the house, sometimes 
working on his “mini project” such as building a wooden 
chair on demand or fixing small electrical appliances for his 
friends and neighbors, sometimes just reminiscing about his 
good old days to anyone who walked by (including me). He 
had never wanted to change this daily routine and refused all 
forms of technology, including a computer, or even a calcula-
tor. (I have been keeping in touch with him through writing 
letters.) He only had a small frequency radio that he listened 
to every morning (of course, he always listened to traditional/
classical Chinese music). While one could see the Teacher as 
an old man who was living in the past, one could also see 
his lifestyle as a survival strategy, an important point which 
I will further elaborate. Teacher and Mrs. Hu were not the 
only ones reenacting the lifestyle of the past times as a state-
ment in support of the importance of their lifestyle. In other 
words, their daily enactments of the unchanging past/pres-
ent have political potential. They represent the ways in which 
residents themselves become implicated in the state’s projects 
of traditionalism.
According to the anthropologist Theodore C. Bestor, 
traditionalism, in this sense, is a collective discourse of the 
present in support of the past that particular members of an 
urban community use to create meanings vis-à-vis social forms 
around which people organize their lives.24 For instance, in 
the neighborhood of Miyamoto-cho where Bestor conducted 
the study of social organization of an ordinary urban neigh-
borhood in the lower quarter of Tokyo, older members of the 
neighborhood used the past as a tool for the present. Rituals 
and certain idealized forms of traditional events and exchang-
es were maintained by the group of people who used them 
23 Andrew B. Kipnis, Governing educational desire : culture, politics, 
and schooling in China  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011).
24 Theodore C. Bestor, Neighborhood Tokyo  (Stanford, Calif: Stan-
ford, Calif : Stanford University Press, 1989).
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strategically to position the neighborhood in the context of 
the city’s fast-pace urbanization. In the Tranquil Light neigh-
borhood, while the low and middle income residents were us-
ing history as a way of claiming the importance of their neigh-
borhoods as “heritage,” in contrast to Miyamoto-cho, residents 
did not try to harken back to historical rituals or events.
Many seniors in the neighborhood and a few middle 
age residents were also important actors in this process of 
maintaining a “traditional” lifestyle, or what the geographer 
Fulong Wu calls the process of “place-promotion.”25 There are 
many ways to “perform” a place, but in the case of the Tran-
quil Light, we might say that it was the traditionalistic place-
promotion that defined the character of the neighborhood. 
In urban China, although there is neither an official neigh-
borhood nor homeowner association with actual political or 
financial power to instigate change, the informal gathering 
group among the senior residents is what plays an important 
role in building personal relationships among the residents 
and between the state at the local level and the members of 
the community. The political scientist Benjamin L. Read ar-
gues that a form of “administrative grassroots engagement,” or 
the involvement of the state in local community life through 
the state’s sponsoring of networks and organizations at the 
community level, helps to empower the society.26 It seems 
to be the case that this traditionalistic place promotion was 
acceptable to state actors, as it neither posed financial burden 
nor political risk. In fact, the discourse of maintaining the 
traditional lifestyle has thus far supported the state’s policy 
on urban conservation.
As in the case of Teacher and his wife, the close prox-
imity of the houses to each other and the architecture of the 
lanes between the houses reinforced the sense of neighborly 
feeling or conduct.27 However, what goes against the argu-
ment to save the community using the edifice that both the 
local government and the residents commonly agreed to 
preserve is the inevitable physical dilapidation of the lilong 
houses themselves. While the residents want to protect their 
neighborhood (since it does not only mean the protection of 
their lifestyle but also their survival) they also have to toler-
ate the ever-worsening condition of a century-old building. 
On the one hand, the discourse of traditionalism helped to 
maintain the lifestyles of the older residents such as Teacher 
and Mrs. Hu and to re-assure the “cultural importance” of his 
25 Fulong Wu, “Globalization, Place Promotion and Urban Devel-
opment in Shanghai,” Journal of Urban Affairs 25, no. 1 (2003).
26 Benjamin L. Read, “Democratizing the Neighbourhood? New 
Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban 
China,” The China Journal, no. 49 (2003). And see also Jian-
gang Zhu, “Between the family and the state: An ethnography of 
the civil associations and community movements in a Shanghai 
lilong neighborhood” (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
2002); Tianshu Pan, “Neighborhood Shanghai: Community 
building in Five Mile Bridge” (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 
2002).
27 As also explored in Deborah Pellow, “No place to live, no place 
to love: Coping in Shanghai,” in Urban anthropology in China, 
ed. Gregory Eliyu Guldin and Aidan Southall (Leiden, the Neth-
erlands: Brill, 1993).
neighborhood. On the other hand, it was this discourse that 
backfired on them because they had to live in this “tradition-
ally dilapidated” condition. Anything new they brought into 
the neighborhood, including amenities for the convenience 
of life, would provide an excuse for the local government to 
come in and re-evaluate their ability to live in a historical 
neighborhood. This negotiation was something Teacher Hu 
constantly talked about. As the sociologist Louis Wirth notes 
in his classic essay in urban sociology, “Urbanism as a Way of 
Life,” or the way in which the personal familial relationship 
is replaced by a mediated transaction of a large city, we may 
understand this aspect of traditionalism as “traditionalism as 
a way of life.”28
RoB: TRAdITIoNALISM FoR SALE 
I was introduced to Teacher Hu through Rob, a 28-year-
old American expatriate whom I came to know through a 
former student of mine who was working in Shanghai. Rob 
and Teacher Hu got to know each other from the first day 
Rob moved into the Tranquil Light. “This neighborhood is 
small…we know right away when someone is moving in,” 
said Teacher Hu. Both Rob and Teacher Hu were living in 
the same branch lane and seeing each other on a regular basis 
since the frontage of Teacher Hu’s shop was opposite to the 
door leading to Rob’s room on the top floor of the build-
ing. He had a bachelor’s degree from a college in the US. 
He moved to Shanghai around three years ago. Like many 
educated Americans who speak “Standard American Eng-
lish,” he made a living by teaching English to school kids in 
the business district that was in a walking distance from his 
lilong apartment, earning enough to rent a rather spacious 
apartment about four times the size of Teacher and Mrs. Hu’s. 
Rob was attracted to the lilong neighborhood by historical 
accounts he read about Shanghai. In fact, he read one of my 
earlier writings on the romance of the lilong neighborhood 
and wanted to try to live in one ever since!
It was the “connection with the past” that inspired Rob 
to rent a room in a renovated lilong house that the original 
residents revamped to specifically rent out to foreigners in 
this neighborhood, instead of a cheaper modern room in a 
high-rise building. Unlike Teacher Hu’s apartment, which 
was dense, packed and dark because of the solid walls on both 
sides of the house that were put up to divide up the space for 
other extra renters, Rob’s apartment was bright, clean, and 
spacious – changed to be more “modern.” Unlike Teacher 
Hu’s house, which looked like it had been frozen in time for 
more than half a century, Rob’s apartment was equipped with 
broadband high-speed Internet, air-conditioner, and a flat 
screen TV. 
Rob enjoyed living there, to the point that, when get-
ting introduced to a new friend, colleague, or business collab-
orator, his first line had become “I live in an old lilong house 
in the Tranquil Light.” He never openly accepted that it was 
28 Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” American Journal of 
Sociology 44, no. 1 (1938).
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this “symbolic value” of the place that was most important to 
him, along with its central location which made it convenient 
for him to walk or bike to work. He mentioned that he was 
about to extend the contract to stay there for another year, 
and his partner might also move in with him. Rob enjoyed 
both the privacy he got from this top floor apartment, and 
all the attention from the children and other residents who 
wanted to speak to a “white foreigner” (laowai or bairen). In 
fact, Rob was not the only foreigner in the Tranquil Light. He 
was among dozens of foreigners living in other lanes. When 
I asked Teacher Hu what he thought about Rob’s romantic 
attitude toward his neighborhood, he replied, “See…even 
foreigners want to live here!”
At any given time, there were usually about 10-15 
apartments ranging from RMB3,000 – RMB5,000 per 
month (US$428 – US$700) available “exclusively for for-
eigners” to rent out. These rooms were renovated by the orig-
inal residents, who themselves had moved somewhere else, 
usually to live with their children’s families. A local senior 
resident was asked by these residents to put up a sign on the 
community’s board whenever there was a room available. This 
same senior resident was the one who had the key to all the 
available rooms, as his job was also to show the interested 
renters the rooms. He received a small commission when-
ever someone decided to rent a room, which was available 
for both a short (two weeks to three months) or long period 
could be done to a century-old house. When I asked Rob 
whether he knew that he could live in a modern high-rise 
apartment for the premium price he paid for his lilong apart-
ment, he replied, “of course I know…but this is a once-in-
a-lifetime experience…I am going to have a lot of stories 
to tell after these years in Shanghai.” Here we see another 
form of traditionalism, which benefited both the residents 
and the foreign renter. Rob was attracted by the “façade” of 
an authentic Shanghai life, which he believed to be the only 
way to access the exotic tradition.29 His upbringing might 
have influenced his decision to live there. Yet, among dozens 
of foreigners who lived in the Tranquil Light who also knew 
each other, it seemed to be that the excitement of living in a 
traditional Chinese house with modern amenities was what 
got them sold. 
The Tranquil Light’s neighborhood committee had 
little role in a community development, thus it did not have 
the authority to orchestrate the marketization of the neigh-
borhood in this way. It was the residents themselves who had 
made a careful observation of other gentrified lilong neigh-
borhoods in the city and then adopted a similar strategy to 
attract the target customers. One of the first foreigners who 
lived in the neighborhood from 2009 – 2010 told me that she 
was introduced to this community by a Shanghainese friend 
who was looking for someone to rent out her room, as she 
was moving in with her husband. Back then the rent was not 
very high since the condition of the room was almost hazard-
ous, and there was a rumor that the neighborhood might be 
torn down to make way for high-rise buildings. Apart from 
spending her own money to refurbish the room herself, she 
also had to adjust her lifestyle to fit that of the residents of the 
community. For instance, she had to learn to live with a thin 
wall through which she could listen to the TV program being 
watched next door, with a “quasi-shared” bathroom (meaning 
it was her bathroom but anyone in the building could also 
use it), and so on. But after making several adjustments, she 
found herself to be living in a “dream apartment,” according 
to her. The success of her story went viral in the social me-
dia among expatriates, which led to a staggering interest in 
the neighborhood. Since the Tranquil Light was a historical 
neighborhood, it also received direct benefit from the “Bet-
ter City, Better Life” city beautification campaign of the lo-
cal government to prepare the city for the Shanghai Expo in 
2010. The Tranquil Light basically received a series of free 
face-lifts and refurnishings from the local government, so that 
it would look presentable to the eyes of the record number of 
73 million visitors. The neighborhood also benefited from the 
presence of the foreigners, as Teacher Hu often implied, since 
it reinforced the claim about the importance of the neighbor-
hood to both the outsiders and the local government. In what 
Herzfeld calls “global hierarchy of value,”30 “the westerner’s 
29 Similar to the authenticity discourse and practice that the an-
thropologist David Grazian shows. See David Grazian, Blue Chi-
cago : the search for authenticity in urban blues clubs (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003).
30 Michael Herzfeld, The body impolitic : artisans and artifice in the 
of time (three months to one year). When I asked him why 
these rooms were “exclusively for foreigners,” he replied with 
a chuckle: “No Chinese would want to live in an old house 
like this…besides, for RMB3,000, they could live in a decent 
high-rise apartment!”
Rob did complain from time to time that there was no 
hot water or the water pressure was too low when he needed 
it. Besides, the water toilet did clog from time to time, as 
there was only so much infrastructural improvement that 
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taste” represents the universal value –in this case, through 
the discourse of heritage conservation. Moreover, the local 
government also operated a dual-track evaluation of lilong 
houses: while the original residents had to live in the houses 
in their original conditions, the foreigners were allowed to 
modify their apartments to their taste and need. The sense of 
place for Rob was the sense of being part of tradition, though 
only superficially.
XIAo WANg: “TRAdITIoNALLy, EVERyoNE WAS 
EQuALLy PooR.”
Finally, there was also Xiao Wang, a 25-year-old mas-
ter’s degree graduate from a university in Shanghai who had a 
part-time job working in a restaurant. She was not originally 
from Shanghai but from another province. Xiao Wang rented 
a room in the Tranquil Light. Her “room on the stair flight” 
(tingzijian) was not originally a room but a space used as stor-
age between two floors, which was later turned into a room. 
It was about three-fourths the size of Teacher Hu’s bedroom, 
but it basically had everything that she would need, includ-
ing a study desk, a wooden box in which she stored belong-
ings, and a tiny bed. Because she still relied on her parents’ 
financial support, she had to be economical about the living 
expense. Unlike Teacher Hu or Rob, who lived in the Tran-
quil Light because they wanted to, she lived there because it 
was the only choice: it was the only affordable place in the 
city at a distance that she could walk to work in order to save 
money. Like many university graduates in China today, she 
aspired to become successful in life, thus she was keen to learn 
English, and my offer to help her with her English was how 
we got to know each other. Xiao Wang was not very close to 
Teacher Hu. 
I visited her room a few times. Because it was so small 
(though it did have a tiny window) it was usually dark. The 
door to Xiao Wang’s room was also very small. I felt as if 
I was walking into a cave when I walked into her room. A 
small desk that was attached to the wall was where she did 
everything from studying to eating dinner, and to watching 
television shows online. A small plastic closet next to the desk 
was where everything else went. She turned a bunk space 
supported by a doubled-cross wooden lintel into a personal 
storage space, where she kept all of the books, packs of in-
stant noodles, energy drinks, as well as other things. Visit-
ing Xiao Wang’s room donned on me an entirely different 
living experience and meaning of home. Teacher Hu’s place 
may be small and dark, but at least he had the shop that was 
completely open to the lane downstairs where he basically did 
everything else except for sleeping. Although Teacher Hu had 
to come downstairs every morning to empty his urine collec-
tor (since there was no bathroom on his floor and he was too 
old to walk down to the first floor every time he needed to 
use the bathroom), I could still imagine myself living in his 
global hierarchy of value, Artisans and artifice in the global hierar-
chy of value (Chicago ; London: Chicago ; London : University 
of Chicago Press, 2004).
place. I, however, could not imagine myself in Xiao Wang’s 
room in any way. There was a window but she barely opened 
it because of the noise and mosquitos in the summer, and 
cold wind in the winter, which meant lack of sunlight as well 
as ventilation, leading to poor indoor air quality. 
“What choices do I have – none,” said Xiao Wang. 
“But, it’s OK, traditionally, everyone was equally poor, so 
why shy away from it?” Despite her strong moral position, I 
sensed that there was more to the story:
You just have to get used to it… I had a room a bit big-
ger than this size at my house in my hometown, but there 
were a couple of windows opening to a small park, which 
was nice. This room was the only one that I could afford. 
I’d tell people that I have a room in downtown Shanghai! 
(laughing)… but no, I wouldn’t bring my loved one here… 
but admit it, it is not that bad. It’s close to the university 
and everything. 
As I have already graduated I could no longer live in the 
university’s housing, and this place is the cheapest one I 
could get in the city. I could live in the suburbs and sit on 
the train for an hour to get to the city, but why would I do 
that? It’s not convenient, but where else is convenient? I 
don’t have money. Here, at least I am in the heart of the city. 
People don’t need to know that I am living here. They only 
need to know that I work in the city! Trust me, if you live 
here for a month you’ll get used to it just like me!
Characterized as migrant workers seeking temporary 
employment, the liudongrenkou (literally “floating popula-
tion”) have become an integral source of cheap labor since 
China’s “coming out” period in the early 1980s, despite the 
unwillingness of the local governing bodies to recognize them 
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as legitimate (if temporary) residents.31 The legacy of the 
high-socialist era household registration system or hukou la-
bels each citizen either as rural or urban, tying each citizen to 
their place of birth if they want the benefits of healthcare and 
education. Xiao Wang was from another part of China and so 
did not have a Shanghai hukou. So, in Shanghai, she was only 
a half citizen. Additionally, China’s post-1980s economic re-
form program shifted the role of supplying welfare housing 
from the state to private developers – ultimately providing 
the members of the liudongrenkou limited access to public 
housing, and consequently pushing them to the outskirts of 
the city.
Here I employ ethnography as a way to shed light on 
the construction of the liudongrenkou as a sociocultural cat-
egory, and to provide an account of the special challenges 
faced by this class of worker in China. For a liudongrenkou 
such as Xiao Wang, a sense of a home was all about basic 
needs. She neither wanted to engage in any of the neighbor-
hood activities, nor wanted to help promote traditionalism to 
the outsiders because, in her own words, “it doesn’t matter…
I’ll move when I find a cheaper place…there is no home for 
me in this city.” Xiao Wang spent about 16 to 20 hours a 
day outside of the room. Apart from working part-time, she 
hung out at the workplace or elsewhere in the city. “I only 
come back to sleep…you know, you see my room…it’s a 
hole…it’s not the kind of space you want to be in very much 
(laughing).” In her situation, the way in which the concept 
of home analytically works for my ethnography is rooted in 
the financial and socio-economic constraints with which a 
liudongrenkou has to deal. For the more than five million li-
udongrenkou in Shanghai who are originally from other parts 
of China traveling to the big city by themselves with the goal 
to send money home, a house is merely a space that accom-
modates the physical needs of a person. I got to know Xiao 
Wang quite well through many interviews and interactions, 
most of the time in her room. On the one hand, Xiao Wang 
almost always referred to her own background in another city 
where “everybody was poor” (dajia dou hen qiong), and that 
was the so-called “tradition” to her. On the other hand, from 
what her mother, whom I met when she came up to Shanghai 
to help her move out, told me, Xiao Wang’s life was not that 
bad when she was a child. When I asked her about the condi-
tion of poverty that she always referred to, her mother could 
not really make sense of it: “Maybe it’s something that Xiao 
Wang’s father encountered when he was sent to the country-
side, but that’s not what she had experienced directly. Xiao 
Wang was born when the family was pretty well-off already.” 
And that was the story: Xiao Wang in fact confessed to 
me that she had not really been in contact with the referred 
condition of poverty directly, but she thought that it was an 
“imagined past” that would make sense, and could help to 
take the pressure of having to maintain the “face” (mianzi), 
given her status as a non-citizen in Shanghai. I was interested 
31 Li Zhang, Strangers in the city : reconfigurations of space, power, 
and social networks within China’s floating population  (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2001).
in her story not just because it helped to paint a realistic pic-
ture of straitened living circumstances, but also because of 
the way in which an aspect from the past – whether real or 
imagined – was used as a coping mechanism to deal with the 
present.
The twists of the plot here are as follows: even though 
I did not think I could live in Xiao Wang’s place, I ended up 
renting her room after she moved out, as she eventually found 
a place across town which she could afford with just a little 
bit more money than she used to pay for the room on the 
stair flight. Since she is the only child, her family could pull 
together family’s resources to support her. Xiao Wang’s family 
put in the initial down payment for her, now a graduate with 
a job at a securities company, to pay the mortgage. I would 
end up staying in Xiao Wang’s former room for the next 10 
months of my research in Shanghai. Xiao Wang was right: it 
only took me a month to get used to it. 
coNcLuSIoN
While I would be inclined to think that the traditional 
system of lineage and kinship still matters in modern Chi-
na, my ethnography has shown that economic reforms have 
altered the social foundation of an urban neighborhood. I 
spent months in the Tranquil Light, speaking to a handful 
of people and became very close to these three people. Un-
like both Teacher Hu and Rob, Xiao Wang did not have any 
choice but to accept the home that her economic status al-
lowed her to afford. Although all the houses looked the same 
in the Tranquil Light, it was a highly class-oriented neighbor-
hood. While older residents were living in the old part of the 
lilong houses often at the ground level, foreigners who paid 
premium rents were living on the renovated higher floors. 
A floating population of unskilled laborers rented a space in 
a room “within a room” – by this I mean a room that was 
divided several times to house up to four times the number 
of original residents designated to occupy that room. For in-
stance, Xiao Wang was living in a portion of a room that was 
not meant to be inhabited by human beings. 
This situation illustrates how the discourse of history is 
often put to the service of sentimentalism – evoking a yearn-
ing for the past.32 In other words, the notion of “significant 
architectural heritage” becomes a political tool in the city of 
Shanghai with the implication that it represents the benign 
efforts of the state to preserve the history of the city for both 
the residents and the visitors. The preservation of the lilong 
façade symbolizes the efforts of ostensibly caring local au-
thorities to maintain a dialogue between Shanghai’s past and 
present. This preservation process overlooks many problems, 
ranging from macro-planning problems such as inadequate 
housing units for the working class and migrants, to urban 
infrastructural issues such as mounting spatial congestion, as 
well as safety and health hazards. Armed with this discourse 
of historic preservation, the local government utilizes the li-
long in its city branding strategies, especially through gentri-
32  Herzfeld, The Body.
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fication and the use of eminent domain.
Hence, many residents are living in a state of uncer-
tainty, in constant fear of eviction, and in a seemingly unend-
ing process of negotiation with various government agents to 
receive compensation for the foreseeable loss of their homes. 
In order to maintain their right to dwell in the houses, the 
local residents have adopted survival, monitoring, and nego-
tiating techniques, which include forming a neighborhood 
association, initiating campaigns to inform the public about 
the importance of their neighborhoods, and utilizing the im-
age of a successful gentrified neighborhood in order to seem 
supportive of the state’s “global city” discourse. Residents ex-
press their resistance by various means, utilizing all available 
channels of information. For instance, as in the case of the 
Tranquil Light, some neighborhoods rent out space to for-
eigners and use their presence to claim the neighborhoods’ 
cultural capital. These dynamic interactions among various 
actors (i.e., local governmental officials, historians and jour-
nalists, developers, architects and planners, and residents) 
from multiple levels of society (i.e., urban planning vis-à-vis 
state policy, community, and individual citizens) are played 
out in the physical space of lilong neighborhoods.
In previous studies of lilong communities, many schol-
ars have seemed to focus on the architecture of the lilong 
houses and neighborhoods, which is fascinating for a variety 
of reasons. In my ethnography, I still think that the archi-
tecture of the lilong houses and neighborhoods matters – ei-
ther because the residents have to cope with the dilapidated 
condition as in the case of Teacher Hu and Xiao Wang, or 
because the architecture itself symbolizes the romance of the 
neighborhood life, as in the case of Rob. In the current socio-
political context of China, the residents’ struggle and resis-
tance against the local government, whose goal is to maxi-
mize profits from existing land property, define the residents’ 
individual sense of home. In this ethnographic paper, I have 
shown the lives of three different groups of residents: the orig-
inal, the incoming, and the floating resident, whose sense of 
home is defined by completely different factors. On the one 
hand, we see Teacher Hu, who was not “living in the past.” 
In fact, his practices can only be understood within a highly 
contemporary framework, in which enacting or embodying 
“the past” has value in contemporary Chinese economic and 
globalized structures. On the other hand, Rob was drawn to 
the idea of traditionalism because of the symbolic value he 
associated with historical artifacts, and by way of his precon-
ception of life in a traditional Chinese neighborhood. These 
two examples work well together, because while Teacher Hu’s 
refusal to incorporate the modern lifestyle asserts a sense of 
traditionalism as a survival strategy, Rob’s traditionalism rep-
resents the ways in which embodying the “past” can be a fi-
nancial boon to a community.
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KESSEN MuSuME:  
WoMEN ANd JAPAN’S REcoRd 
INduSTRy AT WAR
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ABSTRACT
All of Japan’s popular culture industries were deeply 
involved in propagandizing the war effort during the years of 
Japan’s long, fifteen year war. The record industry tried to find 
a delicate path between the demands of the government and 
its usual practices of tailoring content for a specific audience. 
The removal by conscription of young men from the con-
sumer base put the record industry in a bind. The masculine 
doctrine of dominance over Asia, while supported completely 
by the record companies, didn’t fit well with their traditional 
sales tactics. Young people generally use pop songs to define 
their emotional selves. With the “proper” roles for women 
resticted under wartime social attitudes, images of women in 
pop songs provide an insight into both the industry’s chafing 
under government control and consumers’ attempts to main-
tain a normal life.
INTRoducTIoN
Popular music, as an industry, is always deeply pro-
pagandistic. Pop music tries to teach its audience, made up 
predominantly of young people, common sense notions of 
how their lives should ideally be lived. In the world of the 
pop song, aspirations are overwhelmingly romantic and per-
sonal, placed in a context of a “normal” society where every-
one else shares the same desires. Fulfillment comes with the 
purchase of records, which stand in as an articulation of the 
individual’s dreams, but that fulfillment must continually be 
repeated until a point is reached where the consumer out-
grows the need for this alternate voice. Though the status quo 
is always changing, the pop music industry always supports 
“the normal life.” If the status quo suddenly and dramatically 
changes, the pop music industry is thrown into confusion, 
trying to find an acceptable voice to sell to the young people 
of troubled times.
Popular culture was taken seriously as a cultural weap-
on by the government in wartime Japan. It was seen as a mo-
tivational force capable of keeping the people’s solidarity and 
support for the war effort, and as a way to make Japan seem 
appealing to foreign or conquered lands. It could also be a 
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small vestige of a “normal” cultural life. With young men 
mostly gone to the military, the body of pop music consum-
ers would have changed to being almost exclusively female. 
Government censors claimed gradually larger roles in the 
decision making processes of each company. Record compa-
nies’ adjustments in the face of such changed circumstances, 
though superficially cooperating in every way with the au-
thorities, show a deeply conflicted industry, trying desper-
ately to continue business as it had been before the war years. 
This necessarily entailed a kind of resistance to the war, not 
from any philosophical position but merely because the war 
interfered with the production of popular, commercial music. 
Tailoring cultural product to fit a perceived audience 
is the essence of all popular culture industries. With an audi-
ence dominated demographically by women, the pop music 
industry would have tried in its lyrics to reflect the real or 
imagined hopes and desires of that audience. This could po-
tentially create conflicts with government censors who were 
more directly trying to persuade young people in an ideologi-
cal manner. Ideally, pop songs are a kind of mask that con-
sumers try on. If the persona of the song fits a large audience, 
the song will be a hit record. If the persuasion is too close to 
the surface, consumers have difficulty seeing themselves in 
the song.
There is no reason to doubt the patriotism of the record 
companies, if that is taken to mean their support for the war 
effort. They cooperated with the government’s attempts to 
use music for purely propaganda purposes. That most “pure” 
propaganda did not sell well, however, sent the industry 
searching for ways to compromise, that is, to find a way to 
make hit records that would also be acceptable to government 
censors. Stated another way, the industry tried to maintain 
some aspects of prewar music culture even in wartime.
Though there are many works on the history of the 
Japanese recording industry1 and many focusing specifically 
on the war years2, none of them looks at the content of the 
songs, sticking strictly to the business strategies of the indus-
try and its relationship with the government’s propaganda 
and censorship efforts. This essay looks at the entirety of 
1 Komota, Nobuo with Yoshibumi Shimada, Tamotsu Yazawa, and 
Chiaki Yokozawa, Nihon Ryukokashi (History of Popular Song in 
Japan) (Tokyo: Shakai Shisosha, 1970), Kurata, Yoshihiro, Nihon 
Rekodo Bunkashi (Cultural History of Records in Japan) (Tokyo: 
Iwanami, 2006), Ogawa, Kazusuke, Shoka, Sanbika, Gunka no 
Shigen (Origins of Western-style Songs, Hymns and Military 
Songs) (Tokyo: Arts and Crafts, 2005)
2 Hori, Masaaki, Ikusauta ga Utsusu Kindai (The Modern Era 
as seen in War Songs), (Tokyo: Asahi SHobo, 2001), Omura, 
Koji, Nihon no Gunka: Senso no Jidai to Ongaku (Japan’s Military 
Songs: Music and the War Era) (Tokyo: Gakushu no Tomosha, 
2011), Tonoshita, Tatsuya, Ongaku wo Doin Seyo (Mobilize Mu-
sic) (Tokyo: Seiyusha, 2008), etc.
popular music on record of the war years (1931-1945) using 
Fukuda and Kato’s massive database of song titles,3 as well 
as CD reissues and the author’s collection of 78rpm records. 
In many cases, only titles could be checked, but lyrics and 
sounds were considered as much as possible. In that sense, 
both content analysis and literary critical approaches have 
been used. After a brief history of the record industry during 
the war years, focusing on images of women in pop songs, 
this essay will continue with discussion of the most common 
and important female character types that appear in popular 
music of the era.
ThE REcoRd INduSTRy ANd WoMEN IN WARTIME
At the time of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Ja-
pan’s record industry had barely entered its modern era. The 
establishment of Victor, Columbia and Polydor, with foreign 
capital and ideas of how a modern record business should 
be run, had taken place only five years before.4 Those five 
years had been enough to create a popular music culture with 
strong similarities to western countries. Like European and 
American music industries, issues of modernization, urban-
ization, “new women,” and internationalization (or not) were 
worked out in the lyrics and music of popular songs. Even 
though these issues have a strongly political nature, a popular 
song tends to avoid overt political content, focusing on ro-
mance and fashion, willingly tailoring itself to the real or per-
ceived needs of an audience made up mainly of young people, 
who consume records and songs as a way of expressing their 
identities, hopes and desires. This structure had scarcely been 
established when Japan entered into its long 15-year war era.
Record companies are nothing if not opportunistic, so 
with the eruption of war on the continent, songs with patri-
otic content experienced a sudden boom in early 1932. Par-
ticularly notable was the media frenzy surrounding the “three 
human bullets,” three army engineers who blew themselves 
up (or possibly were accidentally blown up) while trying to 
rig charges to destroy Chinese defenses outside of Shanghai. 
They quickly became icons of heroic self-sacrifice, with their 
story elaborated in all of the modern media—film, record, 
and radio—as well as more traditional media—print and 
stage. The most significant aspect of the three human bullets 
story was not military in nature. In the telling of the story, the 
mothers of the unfortunate engineers took on a large role. The 
way that they had raised their sons and their willingness to 
send their sons to war (even though they expected the worst) 
3 Fukuda, Shunji and Masayoshi Kato, eds., Showa Ryukoka Soran 
(Directory of Popular Songs of the Showa Era) (Tokyo: Takush-
oku Shobo, 1994).
4 Komota, Nihon Ryukokashi, 77.
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became exemplary, and the mothers themselves were actually 
awarded medals by the government. In Images of Women in 
Wartime, Wakakuwa Midori says that the first target of war 
propaganda must be mothers.5 Without the support of moth-
ers, and their willingness to send their sons to war, the total 
war project is not possible. Mothers feature prominently in 
popular song throughout the war era, and the songs about the 
mothers of the human bullets were hugely successful.6
Virtually contemporary with the human bullets boom, 
Tojin Okichi (Chinese Okichi) became a similar multimedia 
hit. Loosely based on a true story from the opening of Japan 
to the West in the mid-19th century, its plot of a supposedly 
Chinese woman abused and abandoned by western, in this 
case American, villains helped to support the government’s 
official version that their business in Asia was liberation from 
colonialism. Like the human bullets, this story crossed over 
music, film, stage and fiction.
As part of the frenzy surrounding the three human bul-
lets, newspapers hit on lyric and songwriting contests as a 
way of involving the public in the patriotic fervor. Kurata 
Yoshihiro, in his Cultural History of Records in Japan, lists 
thirty “main” examples between 1938 and 1943.7 With sig-
nificant prize money on offer for winning entries, lyric con-
tests would remain a significant part of the public’s experience 
of the record industry throughout the war years. Tonoshita 
Tatsuya argues that this was a calculated method of encourag-
ing people to actively spread militarist ideology, even if direct 
government involvement was not common.8 The winning 
entries seldom showed any sign of individuality or deviance 
from the established media and government line, but they 
would create at least a feeling that the music industry was 
responding to the wishes of its audience. The record industry 
was in a difficult position, choosing songs to record based 
on suppositions about the audience’s taste, which they can 
never be sure of. This “top-down” approach could easily have 
led to estrangement of that audience, which, actually, had no 
part in the process. The song contest could not only create a 
sense of audience participation and of industry concern for 
the wishes of that audience, it could be a valuable tool for 
gauging the mood of the consumers. In this case, it showed 
that the consumers (at least the ones who sent in lyrics) were 
satisfied at this point with the government’s position. There 
is no data showing the gender of the contest entrants, but it 
would also be a rare case of giving women a chance to express 
their patriotism loudly.
Hits are, by their very nature, transient, and though 
the excitement of war fever and patriotism is very real, in a 
business that is based on continued consumption of novel 
content, no hit can be sustained indefinitely. Indeed, accord-
ing to Omura Koji, the public’s preference soon reverted to 
5 Wakakuwa, Midori, Senso ga Tsukuru Joseizo (Images of Women 
in Wartime) (Tokyo: Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 2000), 82.
6 Judging solely by the number of different records released with 
this theme and on the extreme commonness of their survival to 
this day.
7 Kurata, Nihon Rekodo Bunkashi, 234.
8 Tonoshita, Ongaku wo Doin, 150-1.
kouta (a term from the popular repertory of geisha perform-
ers that simply means “songs”) and sasuraimono (songs about 
or sung from the standpoint of wandering scoundrels, stock 
characters in drama and film.)9
In 1934 the Information Department of the Interior 
Ministry expanded its censorship activities to include mov-
ies and popular music.10 Record companies were required to 
submit the lyrics of proposed recordings for approval. One 
of the biggest hits of the 1930s, “Shima no Musume” (“Island 
Girl”) (Columbia 52533 January 193311) was found to be 
unwholesome the year after its release, in 1934, and revisions 
were ordered. The song is sung on record by geisha Kouta 
Katsutaro, one of several geisha (or technically, former gei-
sha) who helped the record industry make it possible to be 
both modern and Japanese at the same time. Geisha singing 
style has its roots in traditional folk music, but as professional 
urban entertainers, geisha, like the recording industry itself, 
were willing to take chances on novel approaches. “Shima no 
Musume,” while sounding convincingly Japanese to contem-
porary ears, actually included many western touches. The ac-
companiment is by guitar, for example. Katsutaro sings about 
her lover who has gone off to sea and left her alone at the mar-
riageable age of 16. Presumably, the censors felt that the origi-
nal content would damage the fighting spirit of young men, 
making them prefer the company of someone like Katsutaro 
to the privilege of serving in the imperial military forces. The 
censors construed their duty, obviously, as purifying popular 
music, since they were reconsidering something already on 
the market. They did not try to ban the record, but they man-
aged to change future performances of the song. This would 
be the last major hit in the geisha style, although many geisha 
continued to record and have moderate success. 
The record industry, working mainly with partners in 
movies and stage entertainment, continued to create a mod-
ern culture that was, in many ways, international and cos-
mopolitan. The modern culture seen in movies or magazines, 
and heard on record, tends to have more similarity among 
various countries of the world than previous, more nation-
ally centered versions. This certainly led to some resentment 
on the part of the censors, who were nothing if not Japan-
centric. Fashions in movies set in contemporary times were 
clearly western. Hollywood movies and foreign music, and 
the attitudes expressed therein, were widely available, at least 
in the larger cities.
For the relatively isolated Japan, however, the inter-
national city of romance was not Paris or New York. It was 
Shanghai, pacified rather quickly after the events of 1932. 
Censors could allow this internationalism because it was 
clearly under Japanese guidance. The establishment of a state 
in Manchuria also encouraged Japanese citizens to look to the 
continent as a location where Japan could be most modern. 
9 Omura, Nihon no Gunka, 137-8.
10 Komota, Nihon Ryukokashi, 90; Kurata, Nihon Rekodo Bunkashi, 
217.
11 Record label, catalog number and release date will be provided 
parenthetically in the text.
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Although emigration was actually rather limited in numbers, 
in the popular imagination, Manchuria was a frontier for ag-
ricultural development (with free land!) and a laboratory for 
the social engineering of a modern state. It could also be an 
escape for Japanese who wished to avoid war fever or police 
suppression of liberal thinking.
Consequently, songs about life on the continent be-
came common in the mid-thirties. Lyricists were keen to 
drop names of streets, hotels, and nightclubs, and to throw 
in a few Chinese words, but the emotional content of the 
Shanghai songs is virtually indistinguishable from the Tokyo 
songs of the late 1920s. Specific examples of these will be 
discussed later in the essay. Shanghai was seen as a place of 
urban romantic possibilities that usually end in loneliness. 
Women cry secretly, men cannot forget that special someone, 
the horns of ships leaving port moan in sympathy.
Back in Japan, “Wasurecha Iya Yo” (“Doncha Forget 
Me”) (Victor 53663 February 1936) with Watanabe Hamako 
teasingly singing, “Don’t forget me when I’m in this mood,” 
was the biggest hit of 1936, clearing showing a preference for 
escape over topical or patriotic content. It was widely imi-
tated by other singers and record companies.
The China Incident of 1937 created another round of 
war fever, as the battles escalated to include all of China. The 
need for soldiers to fight on this huge front meant that most 
young men, exempting only students and the unfit, were con-
scripted and disappeared from daily life in Japan. Although 
musical styles changed very little, it must be assumed that the 
target audience for new records was, from this time until the 
end of the war, for the most part, young women. With the 
men gone to the armed forces, a subsequent labor shortage 
meant that women began working in more industries and at 
increased wages.12 It is not surprising that 1936-1939 were 
the peak years of the era for both number of titles released 
and total sales.13 Clearly women continued to buy records.
In 1937, the censors clarified their approach to popu-
lar song content as part of the “General Mobilization of the 
People’s Will” (Kokumin Seishin Soundo) campaign. Their 
stated purpose was not to abolish pop music, but to cleanse it 
and make it “wholesome.” Consequently, there were to be no 
defeatist topics, sad sounding music was to be avoided, and 
singing styles should be “robust.” The last could be seen as a 
reaction against the crooning style of western swing music, 
but it also must be part of the decline in songs performed in 
the geisha style. Arguably, the image of geisha was consid-
ered too feminine for the government of a country that was 
pushing a masculine image as it expanded its borders. Also, 
the geisha is clearly a type of servant, which would also be 
a negative image as representative of the culture of the new 
masters of Asia. They also included in their list a provision 
12 Sasaki, Yoko, Soryokusen to Josei Heishi (Total War and Women 
Soldiers) (Tokyo: Seiyusha, 2001), 38-40.
13 According to Fukuda and Kato, Columbia alone released more 
than 400 songs identified by the company as “popular” in 1937. 
Kurata, Nihon Rekodo Bunkashi, 227 has peak years of 1936 and 
1939 for sales.
that advertising materials for records should also encourage 
fighting spirit.14 This inclusion shows that the authorities 
were comfortable with the idea that the consumption of pop 
songs could be an expression of people’s patriotism. 
In this new mood of censorship, the Interior Ministry 
backtracked and banned “Wasurecha Iya Yo,” which it had ap-
proved in 1936. Saying that it sounded as though a prostitute 
sang it, the Minster himself criticized the song. Naturally, the 
record industry had imitated the song and its singing style 
widely, as is its usual practice with successful songs, so the 
banning can also be seen as a campaign to reduce sexiness in 
all pop songs, which is in line with the authorities’ stated pur-
pose of “cleansing” pop music. It seems likely that the com-
bination of sexualized popular culture and masses of single 
women was seen as a potentially dangerous social force.
Also banned was “Wakare no Blues,” (“Separation 
Blues”) (Columbia 29384 July 1937) sung by Awaya Noriko. 
Although the theme of sadness at the departure of a lover was 
common in the songs of this era, this one used the specific 
place name of a pier in Kobe that had been converted into a 
naval base, showing that the woman is sad that her lover has 
gone off to war. That was going too far for the censors’ new 
sense of urgency. Again, it was banned after it passed its first 
session with the censors and became a hit. 
Radio at that time did not broadcast records, only live 
music, and it was a fairly small fraction of total program-
ming time. NHK, the government broadcasting company, 
joined the campaign to cleanse popular music by beginning a 
new program called “Songs for the People” (Kokumin Kayo), 
which seems to have been intended as a wholesome rival to 
the record industry. New songs were introduced every week, 
performed several times during the week’s broadcasts, with 
the process repeated continually. This mimicked the release 
schedules of record companies. The songs’ lyrical content is 
more clearly propagandistic, with indoctrination and motiva-
tion as obvious aims. Although its rejection of jazz and other 
pop styles made it seem didactic in comparison, some of these 
songs did appear on records and some were hits.15 
With sexiness out of favor, the record industry tried a 
few new genres to appeal to consumers. The most success-
ful were two types of “continental” pop music. Tayorimono, 
songs purporting to be letters home from soldiers and usually 
addressed to mothers, were released one after another. The 
common features would be geographical reference—it is easy 
to imagine listeners getting out their maps to see what part 
of China was being referenced—and local color. Potentially, 
14 Their list, quoted in Tonoshita Tatsuya, “Kokuminka” wo 
Showa Shita Jidai (When We Sang “Songs for the People”) 
(Tokyo:Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2010), 50: The complete list: “1, 
Make jazz and popular song more wholesome, 2, Avoid express-
ing defeatism or pessimism, especially with regard to military 
subjects, 3, Avoid songs that sound sad, 4, Songs should be per-
formed with an appropriately robust style of singing, 5, Adver-
tising of popular songs should encourage the fighting spirit of 
the people, 6, Composers and lyricists should make efforts to 
cooperate with the censors.”
15 Tonoshita, “Kokuminka” wo Showa Shita Jidai, 28, 68
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these songs could also be considered damaging to fighting 
spirit. It is a small step from missing home and mother to 
wishing that the war was over and the soldier was not in the 
army. Therefore, each song includes some lyrical content de-
nying that feeling. Often the soldier will directly state that he 
will try his best in the next battle. “Shanghai Tayori” (“Letter 
from Shanghai”) (Polydor 2551 January 1938) ends with the 
soldier telling his mother to listen to the war news on the 
radio, where his exploits will surely be reported.
Of course, this is thinly disguised propaganda. Show-
ing what an ideal soldier’s letter to home should resemble is 
tantamount to instructing soldiers what to write in their let-
ters home. It also tells the home front family how to read 
and what to write back. Indeed, answer letter-songs are fairly 
common, and share the same propaganda feeling. There is 
not any individual emotion here. In fact, the lack of any emo-
tion other than a vague nostalgia for home stands out sharply. 
In a sense, these songs attempt to banish love from the family, 
or at least, to replace it with duty to the nation.
Crying, missing home, loneliness are all standard sub-
jects of popular song, so it is not difficult for professional 
songwriters and lyricists to adapt their metier to the circum-
stances of war. Indeed, failed romance may be the single most 
common subject of pop songs in all of Japan’s cultural his-
tory.16 This is a fortunate confluence of censors’ and record 
companies’ desires, where the record companies are able to 
sell lots of records without causing the censors to fear that 
they were undermining the war effort.
The other type of continental songs merely places ordi-
nary Japanese pop music conventions in exotic locations. In 
a sense they also serve as travel guides, with famous locations 
often noted as backdrops for romantic content. Again, the 
record companies can have their normal content and the East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, too.
Since the sexual attractiveness of Japanese women had 
become a contentious issue, new definitions of the ideal young 
woman began to be the topic of more and more songs.17 As 
had happened at the beginning of the decade, the patriotic 
song fervor faded after several months.18 In a large way, Asian 
women were moved into a position as a replacement for the 
sexy Japanese woman. Censorship was strict, so none of the 
Continental songs were actually overtly sexy, but there were 
fairly obsessive descriptions of dancers or girls selling flowers, 
their fashion, their beautiful black eyes and hair.
“Aikoku no Hana” (“Flower of Patriotism”) (Columbia 
29717 May 1938) rehabilitated the reputation of Watanabe 
16 A movie with that theme, Aizen Katsura (Katsura Tree of Love) 
was the box office champion of 1938. It also had a strong tie-in 
with the record industry, which would imply that record com-
panies were trying to maintain their prewar “normal” business 
practices.
17 Indeed, the Ministry of Education moved in 1939 to remove all 
mention of love from textbooks, including discussion of mar-
riage. They also banned all elements of fashion for students, 
mandating hairstyles as well as school uniforms. Wakakuwa , 
Senso ga Tsukuru Joseizo, 76.
18 Based on content analysis of Fukuda and Kato, 358-434.
Hamako (of “Wasurecha” fame)19 and this song deserves a 
closer look. It was first introduced on the Songs for the People 
radio program and crossed over to become a successful record. 
The association of women with flowers is a well-established 
tradition in Japanese literature20 but this song makes all of the 
associations quite direct. Each stanza uses one flower. The first 
is the wild cherry blossom that, with the grandeur of Mt. Fuji 
as its shield, devotes itself wholeheartedly to country. Second 
is the plum blossom that, though apparently weak, shows its 
strength by blooming in winter, overcoming adversity and 
cheering all around it. Third is the camellia, burning bright 
red with passion for protecting family and home after send-
ing the brave soldiers off to war. Last is the chysanthemum, 
symbol of the emperor, for whom women are willing to sacri-
fice all. Clearly sexiness and physical beauty have disappeared 
as ideal qualities of women, replaced by servitude to family 
and country (Ironically, there is a strong emphasis in many 
media on the need for large families, which would, theoreti-
cally, have some connection to sex). This helps to explain the 
continental woman descriptions. But if the audience for these 
records is mainly young Japanese women, what does it mean 
for sexual attraction to move overseas? It would seem to be 
destabilizing. Young Japanese women might object to sharing 
their men with Asian women, unless pan-Asian propaganda 
had worked so well that they included themselves in this im-
age.
One of the ideal female characterizations of early 20th 
century Japan was the Shojo (“young lady”) basically an up-
per middle class or above young woman who is of marriage-
able age but still in education. This character had exceptional 
beauty, loving kindness and purity. As an ideal, she was not 
normally sexualized, and was indeed, a contrast to other 
popular culture female characterizations in that respect.21 The 
ideal woman of “Aikoku no Hana” is clearly in this tradition, 
but the image had, in this era, become accessible to all young 
Japanese women, regardless of social class or educational 
level. This was the image the censors preferred. Record com-
panies’ commitment to this image was unlikely, given their 
experience of what kinds of songs sell best.
The Chinese girl appears as an object in several tay-
orimono (letter home songs) of the early war years, but she 
is given a subjective voice at the end of 1938 in “Shina no 
Yoru,” (China Nights) (Columbia 30051 November 1938) 
another big hit for Watanabe Hamako. With plenty of lo-
cal color descriptions—junks on the river while lanterns sway 
under the willows, she sings of sadly waiting for “you,” while 
knowing that there is nothing she can do to change her sad 
situation. The romantic setting is more appealing than the 
prosaic “home” of “Aikoku no Hana” (no parents to take care 
of!) but the basic position of the woman is the same, waiting 
and hoping for the best. While the authorities might have 
19 Omura, Nihon no Gunka, 139.
20 There is extensive discussion of this trope in Watanabe, Shuko, 
Shojozo no Tanjo (Birth of the “Young Lady” Image) (Tokyo: 
Shinsuisha, 2007).
21 Watanabe, Shojo, 31-58.
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approved of Japanese women identifying with colonial Asian 
counterparts, this is only possible when the Asian woman is 
equally dependent on Japanese men. When Watanabe sings, 
“I am a Chinese Girl,” the audience knows she is playacting 
and that the song occurs in a fantasy world. Indeed, the song 
is used as the title of a 1940 film starring Ri Ko Ran as a 
Chinese woman who learns to accept and love the Japanese 
occupation (and occupiers) of China.
Ri will later become the apotheosis of this “China 
Girl,” with no little irony. A Japanese woman raised in Man-
churia and fluent in Japanese and Chinese, she was presented 
to Japanese audiences as the incarnation of the Great East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. On record from 1939 and in 
many films, she played variations on this role, which she was 
simultaneously acting out in public or media space. Her per-
sonal beauty and the physicality of her acting restored a type 
of sexiness to Japanese womanhood, although displaced by 
the fiction of her Manchurian background. Clearly, the me-
dia wanted to have sex as one of the weapons in their cultural 
arsenal.
The “China Girl” created a sustainable genre that 
would continue into the wider war years of the early 1940s 
(where it might transform into Burma Girl or Indonesia 
Girl.) Like good pop music, and unlike propaganda, this 
image depended on a romantic imagination creating a space 
that the audience could vicariously enter. The continental 
girl songs clearly showed the music industry trying to assert 
its instincts. Propaganda of an indoctrination and mobiliza-
tion nature is, on the other hand, relentlessly practical and 
grounded in a familiar reality, and therefore not really suitable 
for an escapist medium like the pop song.
The reorganization of society in 1940, called the Shin-
taisei (New Order) goes a long way to shutting down the re-
cord industry.22 Use of language that had an “enemy nature” 
(meaning English, mainly) was banned, requiring several 
performers to change their names.23 Under the New Order, 
representatives of the police, posted inside the record com-
panies, were involved in all stages of decision-making about 
new songs. This resulted in an exaggeration of the tendency 
toward pure propaganda that became more and more notice-
able as the Pacific War began in late 1941. 
The lyric contest trend reached its peak with more than 
128,000 entries for the contest to write words for “Shussei 
Heitai wo Okuru Uta” (Song for the Departing Soldiers.) 
(King 40021 January 1940) This was clearly the most per-
sonal of all the lyric contest themes, since virtually all families 
would have had the experience of sending a son, brother or 
father off to war by this time.24 But there was no personal 
content in the lyric, no familial love. This was a song for pub-
lic, group performance of patriotism, not at all like the indi-
vidual experience of pop music.
Industrial restrictions also began to bite rather hard at 
this time. Production of records declined to the level of 1935 
22 Komota, 103. 
23 Kurata, 228.
24 Kurata, 230-8, Omura, Nihon no Gunka, 124.
in terms of titles released and number of records sold. Record 
player and needle production ceased completely.25 
Even before open warfare between Japan and the Unit-
ed States began, the government had begun moves to ban 
music “of an enemy nature.” In the first issue of a new music 
industry newsletter, Ongaku Bunka Shinbun (“Music Culture 
News”)26, the editors stated that the eradication of “popular 
song” was one of their aims. A representative of Columbia 
records warns that listeners may unconsciously absorb enemy 
ideology, becoming a kind of fifth column. (20 December 
1941, 10) Later, there are specific warnings about “individu-
alism” in western music. (1 May 1942) In an article in the 
weekly report of the Ministry of Information from 1943, an 
unnamed writer explained how American music is full of ide-
als that are inimical to proper Japanese thought and behavior 
and called not only for a ban on sales but also for destruction 
of the records already in Japan.27 Famously, this article also 
listed by catalog number a few hundred records that should 
be destroyed. This is quite interesting, because Victor, Co-
lumbia and Polydor continued to release a limited number of 
songs by American artists well into 1940.28 
Neighborhood cooperative groups established as part 
of the New Order were encouraged to report fans of Ameri-
can music to the authorities, but it is unlikely that this was 
a priority, because far too many of those records survived for 
there to have been a concerted effort for their destruction. 
A weekly photo news magazine had an article about turn-
ing western records into positive war resources that shows a 
fanatic taking bayonet practice against a jazz record hanging 
from a tree.29 
Colonial or continental themed songs were very com-
mon in 1940 and 1941, but by 1942, active government 
control of content was apparent and most songs were exhor-
tations, some with very specific content, such as celebrating 
victory in Singapore or Pearl Harbor, others of a more gen-
eral, “let’s all work harder for victory together” nature.
By 1944, industry output had shrunk to only about 
150 new popular music records for the whole year, well below 
half of the output of just one company, Columbia, in the late 
1930s. The last factory was destroyed in March of 1945 and 
Japan’s war era record culture came to an end.
25 Kurata, 227.
26 Reprint edition (Kanazawa: Kanazawa Bunpokaku, 2011)
27 “Beiei Ongaku wo Tsuiho” (Drive Out American Music) in 
Shuho (weekly Report) of Office of Information, Ministry of the 
Interior, 27 Jan 1943,16-20, 
28 Yamada, Takeo, American Popular Music on Japanese 78 rpm Re-
cord, (Tokyo: self-published, 2002), 69, etc.
29 Reproduced in Omura, 180; Earhart, David C., Certain Victory: 
Images of World War II in the Japanese Media (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2008), 361.
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FEMALE chARAcTER TyPES IN WAR-ERA PoPuLAR 
SoNg
Mothers
The idea of gunka (military songs) as a genre of music 
was well established in early 20th century Japan.30 Originally, 
the canon of gunka was limited to songs actually sung by 
soldiers while marching, training or working. Before records 
became common, public performances or parades by military 
bands led to recognition, if not measurable popularity, for 
many of these songs. Omura Koji argues that, despite the 
militaristic image associated with them today, in early 20th 
century Japan they were truly popular, and in some ways were 
responsible for popularizing western musical ideas.31 Similar-
ly, Hori Masaaki argues that gunka were so important cul-
turally in the early years of modernizing Japan that, without 
knowledge of them, understanding the era is impossible.32 
Over time, sentimental songs about war and soldiers’ 
experiences became known as gunka, too. For example, “Se-
nyu” (“Battle Friend”) is about shared hardships and over-
coming grief at the death of a friend in battle. Dating from 
the Russo-Japanese war, it remained well known and often 
was performed into the Pacific War years. By the mid-thirties, 
a separate sub-genre, hoso gunka (broadcast gunka) had be-
come fairly well established.33 A march beat was, therefore, 
not a requirement of gunka.34 
When the “human bullets” incident happened, all of 
the record companies were quick to try and capitalize on 
the craze. The basic strategy of record companies was to sell 
a kind of romance (or at least romantic aspiration) in the 
hope that it will become popular, with popularity measured 
in sales. The political and propaganda needs of the govern-
ment were to create fighting spirit and solidarity, which is 
another kind of popularity, though much more difficult to 
measure. Record company professionals happily tailored their 
approach to match that of the government. The first releases 
were very much like real gunka, performed by male choruses 
with march tempos. As the story was adapted to film, radio 
drama and prose, the roles of the mothers of the three soldiers, 
adding elements of normal melodrama to the story, became 
more prominent. Record companies, ever ready to milk more 
sales out of any popular subject, followed suit. “Chizome no 
Hankachi” (“The Bloodstained Handkerchief”) (Nitto 5622 
May 1932) emphasizes a conversation between one of the sol-
diers and his mother before his departure. She tells him that 
30 Ogawa, Shoka, Sanbika, Gunka, 81-93.
31 Omura, Nihon no Gunka, 1-5.
32 Hori, Ikusauta ga Utsusu Kindai, 12.
33 Tsuganesawa, Toshihiro, “Media Event toshite no Gunka, 
Gunkoku Kayo” (Military and Patriotic Songs as Media Event), 
in Senso to Guntai (War and the Military) (Tokyo: Iwanami Sho-
ten, 1999), 79.
34 Indeed, a 1942 songbook called Hyojun Gunka Zenshu (Com-
plete Collection of Standard Military Songs) (Tokyo: Nobara-
sha), includes many songs from both radio and records that have 
no direct connection with the military.
duty is more important than life, to which he answers that he 
wants to sacrifice himself for his country. This content is even 
more exaggerated in naniwabushi versions of the story. Nani-
wabushi is a musical genre of longer songs (typically requiring 
both sides of two 78 rpm records) that tell a story in more or 
less traditional language. They were still very popular among 
lower class audiences well into the 1930s. The human bullets 
story was so popular a subject for naniwabushi that Victor 
alone released three different versions. (Victor 52258-52265 
June 1932)
In all of these, the scenes between mothers and sons 
were heavily emphasized. While the above conversation is 
universal, in some versions, the mother directly told her son, 
“Please die for me.”
Wakakuwa Midori, in her book on visual images of 
women in war, emphasizes that the association of mother 
with home and peace is central to all images of women.35 
This is an essentially negative definition, as Mother is pas-
sively at home in a quiet place. The polar opposite of this, 
and by default the definition of non-mother, is far from home 
and at war. The soldier is thus the anti-mother, and an op-
positional set of characteristics follows: giving birth—killing, 
life—death, nature—civilization, private—public, anonym-
ity—honor, timelessness—historicity.36 These all have a large 
place in the lyrics to war songs.
The human bullets’ mothers seemingly choose, for pa-
triotic reasons, to deny what is normally the essence of their 
definition, a caring relationship with a child. This passive, ob-
jectified, denied and self-denying figure would dominate the 
image of “mother” in the songs of the remaining war years. 
Soldiers think of her, write to her, miss her, but she very rarely 
answers or acts in any way.
This image is likely derived rather directly from the film 
genre, hahamono (“mother film”), where the mother “must 
suffer and sacrifice,” in isolation and unable to communicate 
any of her desires to children or husbands.37 This could oc-
casionally be used to express resistance to the war, as in Riku-
gun (“Army”),38 so it is possible that popular song hahamono 
similarly express the record business’ desire to operate free of 
propaganda strictures, which is not quite the same as resist-
ing the war effort. That is, songs concerned with home and 
peace could be considered a type of resistance to war, unless 
handled very carefully. On the other hand, the prioritizing 
of peaceful home and family images may simply reflect the 
music business’ preference for strong emotional content.
In war, there is lots of suffering to go around, but pub-
lic displays of grief are officially frowned upon. The mother 
who patriotically offers her sons’ lives to the state remained a 
strong image. As late as 1943, “Wakawashi no Haha” (Mother 
35 Wakakuwa, 39.
36 Wakakuwa, 50-1.
37 Anderson, Joseph L. and Donald Richie, The Japanese Film: 
Art and Industry (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982), 
318-9.
38 High, Peter B., The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the 
Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2003), 402.
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of Young Eagles) (Victor A4485 June 1943) shows the same 
basic image, a widowed mother, proudly telling the spirit of 
her late husband that she has sent their son off to the South to 
defend Japan. Since the experience of war deaths in the family 
had become more or less universal by this time, this senti-
ment, or more appropriately, this way of dealing with grief 
by changing it into duty one can be proud of, was thought to 
be a necessary message. Mothers of soldiers, then, are isolated 
and in some ways tragic figures, whose active role has ended 
with the conscription of their sons. 
The other important image of mothers is as the wives of 
soldiers who have gone off to war. They are invariably depict-
ed as the mothers of more sons. Mentions of female children 
are extremely rare.
This mother character appears most prominently 
in several lullabies. It seems counterintuitive that lullabies 
would be released in significant numbers in wartime by a 
record industry under more or less direct control by govern-
ment authorities, but again considering that the audience for 
these records was mainly home front women, whose child-
care workload had not decreased with the acceptance of other 
war-related work, idealization of the parent-child relationship 
makes sense.
The basic setting of these lullabies is, of course, that 
the infant son will not sleep. In a typical version “Tone no 
Komoriuta” (“Lullaby of Tone [place name]”) (Polydor 2845 
November 1939) Yuki Michiko sings that she and her son 
will wait together for father’s triumphant return, that boys 
must not cry, that they must indeed smile while thinking that 
father is using his gun on a distant battlefield. The wife’s cur-
rent sacrifice, losing a husband for the duration—if he returns 
at all—is used to prepare her for a future sacrifice of this son.
This speaking voice, with rare exceptions, from mother 
to son creates another version of the communication theme 
of the tayorimono letter songs. Just as they taught soldiers how 
and what to write to family at home, and families how to 
read and react to soldiers’ letters, the lullabies teach a proper 
attitude for young mothers, centering on willing sacrifice of 
the very thing that defines a mother.
In rare cases where men performed “lullaby” titled 
songs, they transformed into a type of tayorimono. In “Kokoro 
no Komoriuta” (“Lullaby in my Heart”) (Polydor 2758 April 
1939) the singer, in the part of a soldier in the war zone, over-
hears a lullaby that sends his mind racing home, comforted 
in thoughts of family even though he is far, far away. A more 
extreme dramatic setting appears in “Senjo no Komoriuta” 
(“War Zone Lullaby”) (Polydor 2641 August 1938) where a 
soldier is singing to quiet a war orphan. This is a difficult task, 
because, being a battleground, there are “only men and no 
breasts here.” He tries powdered milk (from comfort pack-
ages sent from Japan to soldiers) to quiet the angelic baby. 
This powerful scene not only humanizes the soldier, rare in 
itself in war era songs, it allows him a feminine side, bringing 
sharp contrast to the war zone where the comforting soldier 
could very well have been responsible for the death of the 
baby’s parents. It encourages the audience to feel sympathy 
for the children of the enemy as innocent casualties of war. 
It is difficult to imagine the censor’s thinking in allowing this 
song, but it seems to prove that the record industry’s priority 
remained the sale of records (and emotions) and not simple 
propaganda.
Memory is central to all of these uses of motherhood. 
Mothers remember their sons and sons remember their moth-
ers. While prayers for soldiers fighting overseas are often men-
tioned, more important in the propaganda war were prayers 
for soldiers who have died. “Kudan no Haha” (“Mother at 
Kudan”—Kudan is the Tokyo location of Yasukuni Shrine, 
dedicated to the war dead) (Teichiku N275 April 1939) is a 
kind of manual for mothers of dead sons. In the song, sung 
by Shio Masaru, who as a male is obviously not a representa-
tive of mothers, the mother has come from far in the country 
to Tokyo to meet her son at Yasukuni Shrine. She is awed 
by the beauty of the shrine, too good for her son, she thinks 
modestly, and cries tears of joy. She tells him the news of 
home and shows him his medals. The idea that family can 
meet dead relatives at Yasukuni Shrine is an important part 
of indoctrination of soldiers, who were, after all, expected to 
die for country.
Other songs, like “Chichi wa Kudan no Oka” (“Father 
is a Cherry Blossom at Yasukuni Shrine”) (Victor J54649 
November 1939) brought the whole family into the remem-
brance theme. There is no death or loss of family in these 
songs. Mothers tell sons, wives tell husbands, children tell 
fathers about the flowers blooming in the garden at home, 
family news and most importantly, that their resolve and sup-
port for the war are unshaken. There may be private tears, but 
in public, only smiles. The father may have been transformed 
by war ideology into a flower at Yasukuni Shrine, but he is 
also transformed into his mother’s tears. This transformation 
grants him eternal life. Of course this is a propaganda at-
tempt to turn real human emotion into a mysticism that was 
merely convenient to the government and thus should have 
been offensive to the mothers of the war dead, if they allowed 
themselves to think about it.
Similar to tayorimono letter songs, there were other 
songs that related soldiers’ memories of mother. “Mabuta no 
Haha” (“The Mother I See When I Close my Eyes”) (King 
77013 March 1943) and “Haha to Heitai” (“Mothers and 
Soldiers”) (Polydor P5168 August 1941) simplified the image 
of mother that soldiers remember to someone cooking and 
waiting. For this simplified mother they can continue fight-
ing, with gratitude and nostalgia in their hearts, but not so 
much that they would doubt their duty.
One other policy-related image of mothers was the he-
roic mother who had given birth to many children. There 
were medals and prizes and recognition for large families, but 
these mothers seldom appear in song. Even “Homete Kudasai” 
(“Praise Me”) (Teichiku A4, July 1939), in which a geisha 
singer named Michiyakko specifically asks for praise for hav-
ing given birth to a son, does not mention mass production 
of sons. The very last Teichiku record released before the end 
of the war, “Kodakara Bushi” (“Big Family Song”) (Teichiku 
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X5112, January 1945) is the only clear example of this ideal. 
It is also a rare case where girls are mentioned. This would 
seem to imply that music professionals avoided the topic, 
perhaps thinking that it had limited appeal to their audience. 
Certainly, the censors would not have encouraged songs that 
presented sex as central to the nation’s needs.
Young Women
Available roles for young women to enact were similarly 
limited. As mentioned in part one, the central image was that 
of the prewar shojo, an upper class girl who was able to extend 
her days as a girl (that is, postpone marriage) because of the 
economic circumstances of her family. Freed from concerns 
about income or marriage, if only for a few years, she could 
devote her pure self to beauty, friendship and helping others. 
In her wartime incarnation, the shojo, or more properly 
musume (which literally means daughter but was the most 
common word for “girl” at the time) was as pure as the pre-
war shojo, but due to the war needs of the nation, her range of 
activities was greater. The class aspect also disappears since, in 
the absence of young men, postponing marriage was almost 
universal. In “Aikoku Musume” (“Patriotic Girl”), (Teichiku 
A002 June 1939) Hattori Tomiko cheerfully ties her hair up 
and goes to work in a factory. She listens to news reports 
on the radio and marks her map with victories, wondering 
if Big Brother has fought well. She not only helps Mom, she 
volunteers to help the wounded soldiers when they return. 
Even though she is of marriageable age, she does not think 
of herself. Like many of the mother songs, this functions as a 
manual of activities for “normal” girls. The need for laborers 
had put many young women into factories and other jobs 
that were normally the preserve of men. Stressing the volun-
teer activities helps to keep her pure, even if active in a male 
sphere.
Another similar song that was also a hit was “Otsukai 
wa Jitensha de” (“Doing Errands by Bicycle”) (Columbia 
100687 April 1943). Other than shopping at the market, 
the errands are not specified, but her cheerfulness and sim-
ple charm are very clear. This is the girl everyone wants as a 
daughter. One more blatantly propagandistic “manual” song 
was “Mura no Hyoban Musume” (“The Girl Loved by All the 
Village”) (Teichiku T3151 May 1941). Added to her cheerful 
work and general helpfulness, she is seen to pray at the shrine 
every day, which makes the village wonder if she is praying for 
that special someone.
The simplest measure of purity is, of course, sexual, so 
young women were often referred to as “otome” (“maiden”) 
in songs of this era. In “Otome Kokoro” (“Maiden’s Heart”) 
(Polydor 2794 July 1939) she emphasizes that though she is 
at an age where she thinks about her looks, she does not use 
any makeup. She is thinking about a boy, however. When a 
bomber flies overhead, she wishes she could send her thoughts 
with it to her boyfriend at the front lines.
The record industry has always been good at capturing 
and selling the moods of young people. It is easy to see these 
good girls as sublimating their sexual energy into the war ef-
fort, but they probably did not see that themselves. The otome 
records skillfully work war references, pleasing the censors, 
into dreamy girl songs that have counterparts in any era. They 
are propaganda, but only in the sense that most commercial 
pop music is propaganda. They tell girls what to think and 
feel, and how to behave, but that is what songs for young 
women always do.
The last role available for young women was bride or 
fiancée. There were not many of these songs, which seems 
odd since such a heavy emphasis was placed on having sons 
and since it is a theme that the record business should have 
been more eager to use than exhortation. Notably, in song, 
the idea of becoming a bride is connected to immigrating to 
the continent. The government had encouraged immigration, 
especially to Manchuria, as a policy to solidify colonial con-
trol, to alleviate overpopulation in some rural areas, and to 
ease tensions between sharecroppers and landowners in rural 
Japan. In its propaganda version, emigration to Manchuria 
was tacitly compared to pioneers, as they were known from 
American western films. At least that seems to be the idea 
behind references to covered wagons, as in “Hobasha no Uta” 
(“Covered Wagon Song”). (Columbia 66349 March 1934)
In “Tairiku Fufu Hayashi” (“Continent Couple’s Festi-
val Song”), (Polydor 2808 August 1939) sung in a traditional 
folk style, the bride sings with pride about coming to the 
continent as a bride, breaking new land and raising a crop. 
A daughter of Japan has made the continent productive, all 
for the sake of the country. The devotion of effort to coun-
try is a motif usually assigned to men fighting in the army. 
Since women were second-class citizens in Japan, and since 
the armed forces never established women’s corps, crossing 
to the continent may have been the most direct, active way 
for women to participate physically in the great East Asian 
project. 
In “Tairiku Hanayome no Uta” (“Continent Bride’s 
Song”) (King 47049 December 1940) she sings of giving up 
fantasies about wonderful bridal costumes. Though called 
weak by some, by raising a crop in newly broken land she will 
show real strength. Even though it is cold in Manchuria, the 
seeds she sows will bear flowers of love. 
Neither of these songs has any reference to the hus-
band. Indeed, service for the empire in Manchuria may in-
volve marriage, but the period’s official aversion to sexuality 
makes it seem like another type of military service. Also, the 
idea of leaving home to prove your commitment to home 
was common in the sasuraimono (“wanderer”) songs that 
were popular before and during the early days of the war, 
and reflect the realities of population shifts in Japan. This is, 
therefore, another example of the industry using something 
from previous practice and adapting it slightly to the censors’ 
wishes.
Though a picture from a women’s magazine of female 
students practicing with spears in anticipation of an Ameri-
can invasion is often quoted,39 there is virtually no mention 
39 Earhart, 179, for example.
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in any song of women actually fighting to defend Japan. 
Even a song with the title “Kessen Musume” (“Decisive Battle 
Girl”), (Columbia 100882 November 1944) while talking 
about firm resolve and fighting spirit, emphasizes that girls 
are “behind the gun” and ends with the “decisive battle girls 
waiting with friends for the blooming of a green Asia.” Since 
the location of the “decisive battle” had, by late 1944, moved 
to the Japanese homeland, it seems odd that girls are still be-
ing urged to wait.
The only exception among the hundreds of songs ex-
amined in this research is “Otachi wo Tsukau Onna” (“The 
Woman who Uses a Short Sword”) (Victor A4499 February 
1944) which was the theme song to a film of the same title. 
In the film, all of the men of the village have gone off to war, 
when suddenly, the village is attacked by a group of bandits. 
A young wife who was trained in swordsmanship by her fa-
ther fights them to defend her home and family. Set in early 
modern times, despite the obvious parallels to contemporary 
circumstances, this must have had enough distance from real-
ity to excuse the transgressive behavior. In the words of the 
song, “A soldier’s wife can overcome the gathering storm...
raised in a warrior’s house...spring will come, sisters!” In the 
film, she apparently returns to being just another girl at the 
end. This represents a forbidden wishful thinking that wom-
en can kill and may aid in the defense of the country, but it is 
beyond normal common sense. In any case, there seem to be 
no more examples of this.
Empire Girls
In general, real women had no voice in popular music 
of the war years. Apart from a few exceptional lyric contest 
winners, there were no female lyricists active in the music 
industry. Lyrics purporting to represent mothers, wives and 
girls were actually the work of men, with that work censored 
by other men. The ideological nature of pop music is nor-
mally hidden, but so many of the songs seem to teach “com-
mon sense” wartime behavior to women, the main audience, 
that the coercion ought to have created more resistance than 
seems apparent. 
Professional lyricists and songwriters must have chafed 
against Interior Ministry interference in their craft. They 
knew from experience what made good music and good sales. 
They had also learned that didactic content usually did not. 
The continental songs, and in particular, the image of the 
China Girl seems to have been a tactic used by the industry 
professionals to make truly popular songs that could pass cen-
sorship. Indeed, many of the bestselling songs of the era are 
from this genre. No matter how much authority says, “Be a 
good girl,” being sexually attractive is still considered a desir-
able quality. Propaganda may try to control what constitutes 
that attraction, but popularity shows how it is really received 
by an audience.
Watanabe Hamako’s “Shina no Yoru” (China Nights, 
discussed above) was such a big hit that it spawned dozens of 
imitations, in two main sub-genres. 
The most common representations of China Girls were 
as objects of desire or fascination, as subjects of a male gaze. 
Typically, these women are noticed by soldiers who write 
home about them, especially in the local market. “Shanghai 
no Hanauri Musume” (“Shanghai Flower Girl”) (King 30058 
May 1939) is typical. The description of the flower seller be-
gins with wondering about who gave her her cute earrings, 
and then moves on to list her white basket, pink ribbons, satin 
dress, and yellow shoes. In the final verse, she vanishes (into 
memory?) in a haze of smoke from sailors’ pipes. This was a 
big hit, and was naturally therefore much imitated. Flower 
girls from Northern Manchuria (King 30104 October 1939), 
Canton (King 40005 January 1940) and Nanking (King 
47001 May 1941) followed quickly along. All of them com-
mented on her cuteness or beauty, sometimes even her scent.
This was potentially dangerous content. Japanese wom-
en waiting patiently at home might have found the China 
Girl to be a potential rival. They might have been less than 
happy that the romantic possibilities of military service in a 
foreign land had not ended with the expansion of the war. 
Young men hearing this might have gotten the impression 
that Chinese girls were or should be available to them, which 
might even have been an acceptable idea to the censors, as it 
would have inflated an image of Japanese masculinity.
The professional songwriters were more likely merely 
exploiting an opportunity to use a tried and trusty theme for 
romantic pop music—unrequited love. Indeed, the character 
of the Market China Girl has some affinities with the good 
girl images in domestic themed songs, where she might be 
the girl at the cigarette store on the corner (as in “Tabakoya no 
Musume” [“Girl at the Cigarette Shop”]) (Victor 53999 June 
1937). After all, she is working, and not trying to be attrac-
tive, so she has a purity that is all the more attractive. This 
sub-genre continues as the range of Japanese soldiers’ activi-
ties expands, with one good example being “Tai no Musume” 
(“Thai Girls”), (King 57058 September 1941) where the 
soldier wants to dress the locals in Japanese clothes because 
they look so much like his sister. These all preserve a sense of 
reserve and purity on the part of the observer of the girls, no 
matter how obsessive his observation may seem.
This was less true when the subject was dancing girls. 
Dance halls had been closed in Japan in 1940 as part of the 
New Order regime, but the audience would have been fa-
miliar with the character of the taxi dancer from movies and 
popular fiction. She was often sentimentalized but there was 
no escaping the fact that she was trying to make a living from 
her physical attractiveness. She may not have been a prosti-
tute, but the difference was more a matter of degree than es-
sence. In “Shanghai no Odoriko” (“Shanghai Dancer”) (King 
47002 May 1940) she is described as dreamily crying, her 
lovely dark eyes wet. We learn in the last stanza that she cries 
as she cherishes a souvenir from her lover, a small Japanese 
flag. The dubious nature of her profession forces the audience 
to imagine a sexual connection. This is more direct in “Can-
ton no Odoriko” (“Canton Dancer”) (King 47024 September 
1940) where her black eyes are “searching for dreams” as she 
36           hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)   |   Kessen Musume: Women and Japan’s Record Industry at War Kessen Musume: Women and Japan’s Record Industry at War   |   hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)            37
sings what is in her heart. She ends up alone and sad in the 
last verse, too. These songs also found an audience in Japan. 
Perhaps the sad ending is key—the lover, Japanese or not, 
has left the dancing girl for another, possibly more pure, girl. 
Or perhaps the notion of romantic possibilities, difficult in 
wartime and largely missing from much of censored popular 
culture, was nostalgically thrilling, even if it suggests foreign 
rivals for the affections of young Japanese men.
It must be remarked that Watanabe’s “Wasurecha” had 
been banned for sounding like a prostitute’s song, while these 
dancing girl songs were not banned, even though the hint of 
prostitution is stronger. That there was a double standard of 
allowable behavior of women, between domestic and foreign, 
is not surprising in a racially charged war culture. 
The second sub-genre of the China Girl song is, like 
“Shina no Yoru,” sung in first person, with the Japanese singer 
impersonating a Chinese (or Manchurian, etc.) girl. With 
overt expressions of romance and sexual attraction banished 
in the homeland (or with an attempt at that), Shanghai, and 
later anywhere in Asia, became a romantic fantasy zone where 
prewar ideals were allowed to continue.
Even before “Shina no Yoru” there were depictions of 
Shanghai romance. “Shanghai no Machikado De” (“On a 
Shanghai Street Corner”) (Polydor 2630 July 1938) neatly 
combines romance and propaganda. The singer tells the girl 
to go back to Japan and take care of her mother, that he will 
quit his gambling sailor ways and go to north China to be-
come a pioneer. He loves her, but must seek his fortune on 
the continent, while she should wait for him in Japan. 
The woman of this situation is given voice in “Blues 
‘Shanghai-Tokyo’” (Polydor 2783 June 1939) by Yuki 
Michiko. Escaping from the flames of war, she has come to 
the blue sky of Tokyo from Shanghai. Thinking of those days 
makes her sad, and it will take time for her to recover. “Please 
be kind to me,” she sings, “until the pain in my heart heals, 
I’m a woman from Shanghai.” But she is clearly also Japanese. 
“Shina no Yoru” states directly that she is a Chinese 
girl, although she is similarly waiting and remembering. The 
audience, though knowing that Watanabe is not Chinese, is 
able to accept this performance. Clearly there is some inter-
esting racial thinking going on here. Pan-Asian ideology was 
strongly pushed in the media, but part of the Japanese under-
standing of Pan-Asianism was that the Japanese themselves 
were first among equals.40 A Japanese woman could therefore 
perform Asian-ness in a way that was acceptable to an audi-
ence mainly consisting of Japanese women. It is doubtful that 
that audience would have been willing to accept an Asian 
performer pretending to be Japanese.
In “Manshu Musume” (“Manchurian Girl”) (Teichi-
ku N207 December 1938) Hattori Tomiko’s Manchurian 
girl (she sings “I’m a sixteen-year-old Manchurian girl”) is 
just like the girls at home, looking forward to the coming of 
spring and to her marriage with a boy from a neighboring vil-
lage. The only politicized aspect is her wish that the cold wind 
40 Dower, John W., War Without Mercy: Race and power in the Pa-
cific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 203-5, etc.
would blow in Russia and not in Manchuria. The empire is all 
one here, and this girl is no threat to Japanese women. In fact, 
they can easily identify with her.
The dominant example of the China Girl is, of course, 
Ri Ko Ran. Subject of books,41 stage plays, documentaries, 
and even manga, her career is fascinating as much for the 
high quality of her singing and acting as it is for the strange 
racial/ethnic politics embodied in her performances. The 
facts of her biography are less important than the presenta-
tion of her character in the media. Film, record, and print 
media were well integrated, and crossovers among them by 
various performers were extremely common.
Shortly after her film debut in Manchuria, Ri (actually 
a Japanese woman named Yamaguchi Yoshiko) began her ca-
reer in Japanese films, on records, and on stage. Since she was 
actually a Japanese person choosing to pass as Manchurian, 
her “stage” was all of her public life. Public relations cam-
paigns pushed her image as a Japan-loving Manchurian to 
solidify support for the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
project that was central to government propaganda about 
the war. Thus, stories about her appeared in newspapers and 
magazines in Japan before anyone there had had a chance to 
see or hear her perform.
This prior “knowledge,” which was actually a manage-
ment-created fiction, established belief in the character called 
Ri Ko Ran. This is the same strategy that the government was 
continually following as it reported war news to the populace. 
The fiction was thorough, and therefore believable. Or it was 
believable because it felt good. Neither the government nor 
her managers fooled everyone, but they fooled most of the 
audience.
By a matter of months, Ri’s record debut preceded her 
debut in Japanese movies. Her early recordings for Teichiku, 
with titles like “Saraba Shanghai” (“Farewell Shanghai”), 
(Teichiku A028 September 1939) were fairly typical conti-
nent songs, but sales were not good. After her appearances 
in Byakuran no Uta (“Song of the White Orchid,” 1939), 
Shina no Yoru (“China Nights,” 1940, with Watanabe Hama-
ko’s song recycled for the theme music) and Nessa no Chikai 
(“Promise in the Desert,” 1940) she had become an estab-
lished movie star. She moved to Columbia records, and with 
several songs written by popular composer Hattori Ryoichi, 
became a star recording artist, too.
In those three movies, and in many other later roles, 
she played the part of a continental woman, either Manchu-
rian or Chinese, who at first resists and hates the Japanese. In 
the course of the plots, she learns that she has been mistaken 
about Japanese motives and character and learns to love and 
support them. She has a romantic relationship with a Japa-
nese star, although the ending is not always happy. According 
to Yomota Inuhiko, the physicality of her acting was identi-
fied with an “Asian earthiness” and compared to “the litheness 
of a small animal, active and erotic.” 42 It is in sharp contrast 
41 Yomota, Inuhiko, Ri Ko Ran to Hara Setsuko (Ri Ko Ran and 
Hara Setsuko) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011) for example.
42 Yomota, 19-20.
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to the shojo character and ideal.
Her first Columbia record, and a big hit, was “Akai 
Suiren” (“Red Lotus”). (Columbia 100101 September 1940) 
She says directly “I’m a Chinese girl,” and goes on to describe 
the flowers outside of her window, where she is waiting for 
her lover. In the last stanza, she sings, “You, as a Japanese boy, 
are a cherry blossom. I am a white lily. Though our flowers are 
different, our thoughts are one. We await a blossoming morn-
ing for Asia.” Though not overtly sexual, this is more direct 
than any of the other China Girl songs. Clearly, her success 
in popular movies established a basis for this. She had be-
come “our” Asian girl for Japanese audiences, who, naturally, 
saw more commonality than difference in the rather familiar 
storylines. The character she played, like the audience, was 
convinced by Japanese propaganda.
She followed “Akai Suiren” with a big production 
number called “Koa Sannin Musume” (“Three Girls of East 
Asia”) (Columbia100218 December 1940). She represented 
Manchuria, Byakko (a minor artist who seems to have been 
planned as a Chinese version of Ri) represented China, and 
Okuyama Ayako represented Japan. The song uses the same 
conceit about different flowers growing together and comple-
menting each other, but it was not popular. The romantic 
boy-girl aspect seems to have been a necessary component for 
any success of her songs. Her later hit records are almost all 
in that vein. Yomota finds that “despite the romantic, even 
sentimental nature of the material she was given, the songs 
are lifted by a mystical quality.”43 This is likely caused by as-
sociation with knowledge of her physical image.
Her perfect Japanese ability (“proof” of her perfect as-
similation) makes it acceptable for her to have a romantic 
relationship with a Japanese man. It is the consummation of 
pan-Asianism pushed by government and media. In another 
sense, it is also a return by the record industry to successful 
prewar ideas. Japan, by modernizing, became more interna-
tional, and that international aspect was useful as an ideal for 
young people to embrace. It brought with it a western con-
sumerism that suited the film and music industries perfectly. 
An East Asian version of internationalism solved the problem 
of lack of respect for Japan on the part of westerners.
Ri Ko Ran was the ultimate modern Japanese woman 
(and not a shojo), which really means, no one could know just 
what she really was. Her malleable identity, freely changing 
from Chinese to Manchurian to Taiwanese to Japanese, also 
questioned the very concept of home, which could only have 
confounded the wishes of the censors, who, after all were try-
ing to emphasize what the soldiers were fighting for.44 She 
could easily be interpreted as representing a deeply disguised 
antiwar sentiment, namely that Japan would be better off 
marrying Asia than fighting there.
43 Yomota, 132.
44 Washitani, Hana, “Ri Ko Ran Nichigeki ni Arawareru” (Ri Ko 
Ran Appearing at Nichigeki Theatre) in Ri Ko Ran to Higashi 
Ajia (Ri Ko Ran and East Asia) ed. Yomota Inuhiko (Tokyo: 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2002), 47-52.
ThE PoSTWAR LIFE oF WAR ERA PoP SoNgS ANd 
AN INduSTRy REBoRN
Ri Ko Ran transitioned smoothly from her continental 
pseudo-identity into a new role as Yamaguchi Yoshiko, Japa-
nese actor and singer. She would go even farther, becoming 
Shirley Yamaguchi to represent Japan in several Hollywood 
movies.
During the postwar American occupation, the public 
broadcast system had a novel idea for a pro-democracy music 
program. On Nodo Jiman (“Proud of my Singing”) amateurs 
performed songs in a type of gentle competition. Only the 
most innocuous songs of the preceding eight years were ac-
tually performed. 45 Despite having been popular in terms 
of sales, songs with patriotic content were self-censored out 
of memory. Though they had once had important emotional 
resonance for consumers, they, too, were victims of war. In-
deed, the lack of acceptable “oldies,” or the need for a new 
popular canon, led to a very active and eclectic music indus-
try in the postwar years.
The Japanese record that occupying American service-
men were most likely to have taken home to America as a 
souvenir was a new release of Watanabe Hamako’s “Shina no 
Yoru.” It was often packed in an album with “Tokyo Boogie-
Woogie.” Its propaganda nature was lost on Americans, unless 
the ideal female collaborator image had somehow been com-
municated without translation into English.
The record companies continued what they had been 
doing for most of the war years—trying to cooperate as far as 
possible with the censoring authorities while simultaneously 
seeking to bring back the business practice of the prewar mu-
sic industry.
After the American occupation ended and record com-
panies became free to do as they wished without censors for 
a change, real gunka, meaning songs that soldiers and sail-
ors actually sang while working and marching, experienced 
a small boom. They are mostly associated today with right 
wing fringe groups that play them from sound trucks on pa-
triotic holidays. The rest of the patriotic songs are gone from 
popular memory. 
-----
Translations are mine, and may differ from other translations 
published elsewhere.
Nihon Rekodo Bunkashi~Showa SP Ban Jidai Kiroku Dai-
zenshu (Japan Record Culture History~ Showa Era 78rpm 
Record Databook) (Tokyo: Daicel Chemicals Corp., 1990) 
was, along with Fukuda and Kato below, regularly consulted 
for dating records. 
45 Ueda, Yasuo, “ Bangumi ‘Nodo Jiman’ no Media Bunka Ken-
kyu—Maiku ni Utau Nihonjin” (Broadcast Program ‘Proud of 
my Singing’—Japanese Face the Microphone) in Communication 
Kenkyu (Communication Research) no. 36 (Sophia Universit=y), 
online at www.infor.sophia.co.jp/sophiaj/Communications/CR-
no36-ueda.pdf accessed 28 March 2012, 29, 32.
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ThE LIFE ANd LEgAcy oF 
KASAI MASAE: ThE MoThER 
oF JAPANESE VoLLEyBALL
HELEN MAcNAUgHTAN · SoAS, uNIVERSITy oF LoNdoN
ABSTRACT
Nakamura (nee: Kasai) Masae (July 14, 1933 – Octo-
ber 3, 2013) was Captain of the Japanese women’s volleyball 
team, popularly nicknamed the “Oriental Witches” (Tōyō no 
Majo) that won the Gold Medal at the 1964 Tokyo Olym-
pics. This victory propelled Kasai into the Japanese media 
spotlight and she spent the remainder of her life actively 
promoting the sport. Kasai was an instrumental figure in the 
emergence of volleyball as a popular sport for women of all 
age groups across Japan. Following an interview by the author 
in May 2012, Kasai sadly and unexpectedly passed away in 
October 2013. This article reflects on her remarkable life, her 
commitment to the sport of volleyball, and her legacy as one 
of Japan’s most famous sporting personalities to date.1
1 I use two key sources for the personal perspective taken in this 
article. The first source is Kasai’s memoir-style book:  Masae 
Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru (Tokyo: Gakken, 1992), and the 
second source is a semi-structured interview I conducted in 
Japanese with her on 30th May 2012. For the full record of this 
interview, see Helen Macnaughtan, “An interview with Kasai 
Masae, captain of the Japanese women’s volleyball team at the 
1964 Tokyo Olympics”, Japan Forum, 24:4 (2012): 491-500. 
Although she changed her surname to Nakamura when she 
married, she continued to be widely known under her maiden 
name of Kasai, so I have chosen to refer to her by this surname 
ThE MAKINg oF AN “oRIENTAL WITch” ANd ThE 
ROAD TO OLyMPIC VICTORy
Kasai was born in Yamanashi prefecture in 1933, and 
started playing volleyball at school aged thirteen. In 1951, 
while playing in a tournament for her high school team, 
she was scouted by a recruiter from Nichibō Corporation, 
who noticed her height and potential on the court.2  At that 
time, Nichibō was one of the Big Ten cotton spinning cor-
porations and had established a reputation for having one of 
the strongest corporate volleyball teams in Japan, so when 
offered employment in the company Kasai described it as be-
ing “like a dream”.3 Although corporate sports teams were 
originally established as a recreational activity and to promote 
in this article.
2 At 174cm in height she was very tall for a Japanese woman at 
that time.
3 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 183. Volleyball was a key recreational 
activity, together with other hobby and educational initiatives, 
that was invested in by large Japanese textile companies as a way 
not only of keeping young girls busy and occupied during non-
working hours within factory residential compounds but also as 
a way of promoting the physical health and wellbeing of young 
female workers. See Helen Macnaughtan, Women, Work and the 
Japanese Economic Miracle: the case of the cotton textile industry, 
1945-75 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005)
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worker physical wellbeing, by the early post-war decades they 
were evolving to promote skills such as teamwork and or-
ganisational commitment amongst employees. They were 
also increasingly being used for corporate public relations as 
Japanese companies sought to establish competitive strength 
not only in a growing economy but in expanding national 
sports leagues.4 After graduating high school, Kasai entered 
Nichibō employment in Spring 1952 at their Sekigahara fac-
tory, but was relocated a month later to their Ashikaga fac-
tory, Nichibō’s strongest factory volleyball team at that time. 
The following year, in a strategy aimed at strengthening their 
competitiveness in national volleyball, Nichibō united its 
factory teams to form a new headline corporate team called 
Nichibō Kaizuka, and Kasai joined this team in 1954.5  Re-
cruited for her sporting skills, Kasai did not work on the fac-
tory floor doing shift-work like the majority of young females 
employed in Japanese textile companies (including Nichibō) 
at this point in history. Instead, she was employed in the 
company’s office until 3pm daily when she would leave her 
desk to attend several hours of volleyball practice.6 Kasai and 
her teammates were company employees, but over time they 
would evolve to become competitive amateur sportswomen 
playing for the Kaizuka corporate team.
The Nichibō Kaizuka women’s volleyball team was 
coached by a man called Daimatsu Hirofumi. Born in 
Kanagawa prefecture in 1912, he entered employment at 
Nichibō in 1941, having played volleyball at both high school 
and university. However, shortly after joining Nichibō he was 
called up by the Japanese army and during WWII fought in 
China, Burma and Rabaul, Papua New Guinea. This wartime 
experience had a profound effect upon him and would af-
fect his ideas on volleyball training. Rejoining Nichibō after 
the war ended, he was chosen in 1953 to become the man-
ager of the newly created Nichibo Kaizuka team, and would 
go on to coach this team for the next twelve years. In 1957, 
Daimatsu chose Kasai to be captain of the team, and together 
4 For more on the corporate history of volleyball within the textile 
industry see Helen Macnaughtan, “The Oriental Witches: 
Women, Volleyball and the 1964 Tokyo Olympics”, Sport in 
History, 34:1 (2014), 134-156
5 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 183-4
6 The majority of young female textile employees at this point 
in history in Japan were recruited out of middle school rather 
than high school like Kasai, who was clearly recruited specifically 
for her volleyball skills. Special recruits such as Kasai were 
often assigned administrative rather than factory work and had 
volleyball training daily, but they did continue to undertake 
work for the company so can be considered amateur players right 
up until the Olympics.
they would prove to be an extraordinary duo that went on 
to establish the Nichibō Kaizuka team not only as the stron-
gest women’s volleyball team in Japan for several consecutive 
years, but also the strongest team in the world by the time of 
the 1964 Olympic Games.
In the 1950s, the goal of the Nichibō Kaizuka team 
was to be the best women’s volleyball team in Japan. In 1958, 
the team accomplished the unprecedented feat of winning all 
four of Japan’s top volleyball tournaments – the Inter-City, 
the Corporate Team, the National Sports Festival, and the 
All Japan tournaments. In 1959, the stakes were raised again. 
In May of that year Tokyo was awarded the rights to host 
the 1964 Olympic Games. This was historically significant 
as Tokyo had been due to originally host the 1940 Summer 
Olympics, but after Japan’s invasion of China this right was 
instead passed to Helsinki, and later cancelled altogether due 
to WWII.7 Japan was subsequently not invited to London 
in 1948 for the first post-war Games. The granting of the 
1964 Olympics to Tokyo was therefore very symbolic, and 
inherently political;  an acceptance that Japan was back on 
the post-war world stage, and had risen from the defeat of 
WWII in under twenty years to be able to host the Olympics 
and be seen as a leading modern, technological and peaceful 
nation.8 The Tokyo Games were therefore significant as the 
first Olympics to be held in Asia, but, less well known, were 
also the first Games to include women’s ball games and team 
sports, including volleyball.
Volleyball as a sport was growing in popularity after 
WWII, not only in Japan but worldwide. The International 
Volleyball Association was established in 1947, and the world 
championships were held the first time for men in 1949 and 
for women in 1951, but at this point in time limited only to 
European countries. A decade later, in 1959, the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) decided that men’s volleyball was 
to be an Olympic sport, so in 1960, Japan resolved to send 
teams for the first time to the world championships held that 
year in Brazil in order to test the international competition. 
The Japan Volleyball Association (JVA) had limited funds at 
this point, so funded a Japan men’s team, but asked Nichibō 
to fund their Kaizuka team’s trip, as they were the strongest 
women’s team in Japan having won the domestic national 
championships. The Japanese men’s team took eighth place in 
7 See Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics: 
Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement. (London: 
Routledge, 2006)
8 Christian Tagsold, “The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as Political 
Games”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 23-3, June 8, 2009
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the world competition, but the women’s team unexpectedly 
won second place after playing the Soviet Union in the final. 
After winning second place in Brazil, Nichibō subsequently 
decided to fund the team on a European expedition in 1961, 
where they went on to play and win 24 consecutive games.9 
Following this success on the volleyball court in Brazil and 
Europe, the team set their sights on the next world champi-
onships scheduled for Moscow in 1962. Kasai commented 
that after returning from Brazil, she and her teammates be-
gan to train for longer hours than before, from 3pm in the 
afternoon until 2 or 3am daily. With Coach Daimatsu at the 
helm, they had their sights firmly set on not just maintaining 
their status as the number one team in Japan, but potentially 
becoming the number one team in the world.
Daimatsu’s notorious approach to training no doubt 
greatly contributed to the team’s unexpected success in vol-
leyball in Brazil in 1960. The coach became infamous for 
his highly disciplined and strenuous training regime for his 
volleyball players and was nicknamed “Demon Daimatsu” 
(Oni no Daimatsu) by the Japanese media. His instructive 
phrases used during training sessions at Nichibō were later 
immortalised in the titles of his own publications:  Follow 
Me (ore ni tsuitekoi) published in 1963, and If you try, you 
will succeed (naseba naru) published in 1964. After observ-
ing his team’s defeat at the hands of the Soviet team in 1960, 
Daimatsu devised several new techniques for volleyball play. 
These techniques included moves such as: “move and attack” 
(idō kōgeki), “falling leaves serve” (konohaochi sābu) and “time 
lag attack” (jikansa kōgeki). But his most infamous move was 
the technique known as “receive and rotate” (kaiten reshību) 
which would become the signature move of the Nichibō Kai-
zuka team. Reflecting on the difference in physical stature 
between the Japanese and USSR women’s teams, Daimatsu 
was convinced that agility and speed were the key to defeat-
ing the Soviet champions, and so he devised a move, often 
likened to a jūdo move in nature, whereby a player could 
receive the ball without touching their bottom on the floor 
and then rotate immediately into a defensive position. This 
“receive and rotate” was a difficult technique to master. Some 
players damaged their spine and kidneys as their bodies hit 
the floor hard during the learning process. Later in his life, 
Daimatsu reflected that his training regime and techniques 
had indeed been harsh, but also commented that volley-
ball was not about physical techniques alone and required a 
“fighting spirit” (konjō).
In October 1962, at the volleyball world champion-
ships in Moscow, the Japanese women’s team (the Nichibō 
Kaizuka team) again met the USSR women’s team in the fi-
nal, and in a surprise upset beat the Soviet world champions. 
Commenting on that victory, the Russian media described 
the Japanese team as “Oriental Witches” who had used some 
form of “magic” in their victory. The Japanese media trans-
lated this into Tōyō no Majo and ran with it, resulting in a 
popular nickname for the team that has remained to this day. 
9 Masahiko Sawano, Joshi Barēbōru no Eikō to Zasetsu, (Hokkai 
Gakuen University, 2008): 161
When asked about the nickname and how she felt about be-
ing called a “witch” in interview, Kasai said that she and her 
team mates did not take any offence at the name and that it 
had simply been used by the Soviets to describe their play, 
which had included the never before seen techniques devised 
by Daimatsu. Although delighted with their victory in Mos-
cow, Kasai and others in the team were intent on retiring 
from volleyball after these championships, because they were 
of marriageable age. At this time in history, most Japanese 
women married by the age of 25, and indeed it was perceived 
as socially more difficult for women to find a marriage part-
ner after that age.10 The eldest in the team, Kasai was already 
29 years old when she played in Moscow, and her ability to 
marry was playing on her mind. However, Japanese volleyball 
was already on a path that was leading to the 1964 Tokyo 
Olympics. 
When it was announced in April 1962 that women’s 
volleyball would be an Olympic event for the first time at To-
kyo, the Nichibō Kaizuka team were intensely questioned by 
the Japanese media. Kasai recollects that she was decisive in 
her response at that time, stating that she had already decided 
to retire after Moscow later that year. However, after their 
victory in Moscow, Kasai comments that she felt persuaded 
from all sides to continue playing and aim for the Olympics. 
She records that this was not an easy decision given her age 
and the hard training that would lie ahead between 1962 and 
1964, by which time she would be 31 years old. However, 
the public expectation was immense, and the team received 
some 5,000 letters from fans urging the “Oriental Witches” 
to continue. In early 1963, the team members got together 
and most decided to stay until the Olympics. Kasai decided 
to give up her ambitions to marry for the time being and to 
aim for the gold medal at the Tokyo games.11  In interview, 
Kasai recollected that she decided to continue because she felt 
that the public at that time would “not allow her to retire”, 
and that the only way to respond to the public’s expectation 
that the national team could win the gold medal was to try 
and deliver that victory for them.
Despite his strict and “demon like” reputation, 
Daimatsu clearly felt a strong sense of personal and paternal-
istic responsibility for his female players. Conscious that they 
could only endure a few years of his harsh training regime, as 
well as conscious of their ages, Daimatsu had also intended to 
retire after the 1962 world championships, thereby allowing 
his players the opportunity to retire and be free to poten-
tially get married. When questioned by the media in 1962, 
Daimatsu commented that although he was confident that 
they could win the Olympics in two years time if all players 
continued, many players were of marriageable age, and thus 
he could not comment on the team’s viability for Tokyo.12 
However, as noted, there was immense pressure for the in-
situ team to continue, not least from the Japanese Olympic 
10 Yoko Tokuhiro, Marriage in Contemporary Japan (Routledge, 
2010): 3-5
11 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 72-3
12 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 59
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Committee, who were reluctant for such a successful team to 
disband. Daimatsu agreed to stay another two years as coach 
of the national women’s team until the Olympics. After these 
decisions in 1962, Kasai recalled Daimatsu’s instructions to 
his team: 
We have two years, so let’s do the very best that we possibly 
can. We cannot betray the expectations of the public. As we 
have decided to carry on playing, I would like to make us 
the team that can take gold. In order to do that, practice will 
have to be severe and we’ll have to challenge each other to 
our very human limits. 13
During Daimatsu’s twelve-year stint as coach of the 
Nichibō Kaizuka team they were the strongest volleyball team 
in Japan, winning 175 consecutive games. In the build-up to 
the Tokyo Olympics, his training techniques steadily gained 
attention both nationally and internationally, and his train-
ing regime was documented in a short film which later won 
the Grand Prix at the 1964 Cannes Film Festival.14 However, 
his approach was not without critics. In March 1964, the 
magazine Sports Illustrated carried an article titled “Driven 
beyond Dignity” written by a Western journalist who had 
visited the Nichibō Kaizuka team in training. The following 
is excerpts from that article, which was fiercely damning of 
both Daimatsu’s demeanour and his training regime: 
I had come to see the sensational Nichibo Kaizuka women’s 
volleyball team: world champions, winner of 137 consecu-
tive contests since 1960 and the favorite to retain its upstart 
mastery over the powerful Communist bloc—long the hot-
bed of world volleyball—at October’s Tokyo Olympics…. 
…Whisked to a cluttered reception room jammed with 
souvenirs and trophies, I met the coach, Hirofumi Daimat-
su. Diamatsu,[sic] 43, is a short, lean, muscular man with 
a shaggy crew cut over cold features. Talking softly through 
an interpreter, he told about his team…. “There is time for 
nothing else. The players know absolutely no other life. 
They do it because they choose to. The preparation for win-
ning is a personal, individual challenge. It is accepted with-
out question.”
[The gymnasium] is a bleak, chill, poorly lit building heated 
by three small charcoal pots. The girls are already on the 
floor. They are big, strong, rangy, averaging around 5 feet 7. 
Their fingers are heavily taped and they wear knee and el-
bow pads. Engaged now in a playful, boisterous scrimmage, 
they move the ball with an astonishing acrobatic dexterity 
and slam it across the net with a jarring power, screaming 
in shrill unison at every “kill.”  The scrimmage switches to 
a warmup drill in which an assistant drives them through 
a grueling, nonstop half hour of dives, rolls and tumbles. 
Then Diamatsu takes over. He mounts a platform at center 
13 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 72 
14 Nobuko Shibuya (director), Le Prix de la Victoire, Grand Prix, 
Short Film Category, Cannes, 1964 
net, flanked by a huge wire basket filled with balls, tended 
by a girl assistant. The squad queues in separate lines at op-
posite ends of the gym’s rear wall, facing the net.
Diamatsu signals, and in rapid rotation the girls charge 
toward the net, crisscrossing from their respective corners. 
With the ball girl feeding him swiftly, silently, Daimatsu 
swings his fist in a swift, rhythmic motion, slamming the 
balls first to one side and then the other as the girls come 
charging in. The balls are aimed deliberately short so that 
the girls must hurl themselves headlong in a desperate, of-
ten futile attempt to retrieve and keep them in the air. They 
land jarringly on their chests and shoulders, then roll out 
and recover with a sprawling, judo like somersault. As each 
girl recovers, she dashes back to the wall to charge in imme-
diately for the next retrieve, sometimes as many as six times 
before the next girl comes hurtling in.
An hour of this and the girls are sweat-sodden, soiled and 
gasping with the exertion. After two hours Daimatsu, ex-
pressionless, his arm still swinging like a piston, closes the 
range. He now imparts a vicious spin to the ball. A heavy-
set girl lumbers in, overcharges, slams onto her shoulder 
and grimaces in pain as she hobbles drunkenly back to the 
wall, where she bends in agony. Daimatsu, his motion un-
broken, is now gibing softly.
“If you’d rather be home with your mother, then go. We 
don’t want you here.”  
[After observing the training until after midnight, the article 
goes on to recount the next morning]
At 9 a.m. the next morning, barely eight hours after the girls 
had staggered back to their dorms, I visited the mill office 
and, incredibly, they were already at work. Dressed in neat 
blue smocks, they have been here as usual since 8, demurely 
fingering the abacus board, filing, answering the telephone. 
Daimatsu sits nearby at his office manager’s desk, engrossed 
in accounts. That these serene young women are one and 
the same with the wild-eyed creatures I had seen just a few 
hours ago brutalizing themselves almost beyond human 
dignity seemed truly unbelievable…. The team’s captain, 
tall, graceful Masae Kasai, smiles shyly from her desk. Little 
stories like hers tell the big one. Two years ago, at age 28, 
Masae was in love and engaged to a young man from Osaka. 
She had a choice: marriage and a home, or a continuation 
of the daily torture under Hirofumi Diamatsu. She chose 
the latter, for at the 1964 Olympics the glory of Japan will 
flicker again, and glory is everything. Perhaps Masae had 
said it all the previous night when I asked her about the 
team’s chances at the Olympics. “You must understand,” she 
said gravely. “We have never experienced defeat. We must 
win.” 15
15 Eric Whitehead, “Driven Beyond Dignity”, Sports Illustrated, 
March 16, 1964, accessed August 6, 2013, http://sportsillustrated.
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While there is more than a hint of Western sensa-
tionalist reporting in this article, Daimatsu’s volleyball play 
was considered “dangerous” and was banned in many high 
schools across Japan by 1964 as young girls tried to emulate 
the moves of the “Oriental Witches”. On the other hand, Ka-
sai and her teammates were fiercely loyal to Daimatsu and 
dedicated in their practice under his formidable leadership. 
Kasai commented in interview that she and the team were 
happy to take direction from him, despite the well-reported 
severity of his training regime, because they trusted him. She 
commented that he had a “great human nature”, and that 
she herself held a lot of trust and respect for him as a person, 
but that there was also a close bond between him and the 
team. Kasai said that every time their team won, they were 
further convinced that his hard training regime was right, and 
were all prepared to practice hard again in order to win again. 
Daimatsu’s bond with his players was extremely strong, and 
none of the players have ever said anything negative about 
him in any interviews.16 The Japanese media were also capti-
vated by the Daimatsu-Kasai partnership by 1964. 
The pressure intensified massively on the Japanese 
women’s volleyball team in the lead-up to the 1964 Games. 
After defeating the Soviets in 1962 and becoming world 
championships it became headline news across Japan, and 
almost a fait accompli for the forthcoming Olympics in 
the minds of the Japanese press. For Kasai and her team it 
must have felt as though there was little option other than 
to win. Kasai recorded how the press commentary in 1962 
after their win over the Soviets included statements such as 
“victory is confirmed for the Tokyo Olympics” and “the bril-
liant achievement by the Oriental Witches decides public 
mood for a gold medal win by the Witches at the forthcom-
ing Olympic Games”. Kasai also describes how after the 1962 
win it was much more difficult, as world champions, to be 
“chased” by the Soviet team rather than “to chase” and that 
she felt immense pressure to deliver.17
As the Olympics progressed in October 1964, the Japa-
nese public were buoyed by medal results, particularly in judo, 
athletics and wrestling, and this increased the pressure on the 
women’s volleyball team. By late afternoon, on October 23, 
1964, people and taxis were disappearing off the streets across 
Japan, and the telephone switchboard operated by Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation almost ground to a 
halt, as everybody rushed to be near a television set to watch 
the final of the women’s volleyball. To say that a gold medal 
was expected for Japan was an understatement. One of the 
team members had commented anxiously the previous day 
that, “if we lose, we might have to leave the country”.18 At 7 
pm, the excitement emanating from the Komazawa indoor 
sports hall in Tokyo began its televised broadcast across Ja-
cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1075740/index.htm
16 Sawano, Joshi Barēbōru no Eikō to Zasetsu, 162
17 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 64-5
18 Sankei News Archive, Osaka no 20 Seki (31), Kaiten Reshiibu 
‘Tōyō no Majo’ Sekai ni Kōfun to Kandō,  October 20, 2011, 
accessed August 7, 2012, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/west/west_
sports/news/111020/wsp11102010010002-n1.htm
pan. The Japanese and Soviet teams arrived on the court, 
with the Soviet players looking a physically opposing pres-
ence and height. The Japanese players won the first two sets 
decisively: 15–11 and 15–8, and in the third set were lead-
ing 13–6, but then lost points consecutively as the pressure 
of winning became closer to reality. When the score reached 
14–13, Daimatsu requested a time-out to talk to his team. 
After play resumed, the Japanese served the ball and an over-
the-net foul from a Soviet player secured the elusive fifteenth 
point and served up Olympic history. The 4,000 spectators in 
the auditorium all stood up with thunderous applause, while 
the six players on the court stood upright for a moment then 
cried and embraced each other.19
This final match was, in the end, a decisive victory for 
Kasai and her team, winning in three straight sets (15-11, 
15-8, 15-13).20 As a new sport, it was the first gold medal 
in women’s volleyball in Olympic history, and the first gold 
medal in a women’s event in 28 years for Japan.21 It was also 
the end of an Olympic Games that had put Japan back onto 
the international stage after their WWII defeat, and a sport-
ing event that served to unite and restore the spirit of a nation 
and its people. For Kasai and her team mates it was the end 
of a personal journey that had taken them from playing the 
sport as young employees in a corporate team to representing 
their nation at the first Summer Olympics ever to have been 
held in Japan. Describing the moment the whistle blew in 
that final match, as her team mates cried and came to hug 
her, Kasai recalls how she was choked with deep emotion, and 
filled with tears but that she tried not to cry “until her mission 
as team captain finished”.22 While receiving the gold medal 
in the awards ceremony and watching the Japanese flag raised 
with the national anthem, she felt very emotional and moved, 
and very glad that she had been able to meet the expecta-
tions of the Japanese people. She recorded that, if she had 
quit two years previously, she would not have felt that deep 
emotion nor received the gold medal, and was happy that 
she had made the decision to continue.23 Commenting on 
the victory after the match to the media, Kasai made a rather 
personal statement, commenting: “I would like to choose a 
happy life as a woman from tomorrow, with all my experience 
of volleyball up until tonight”.24
19 The Yomiuri newspaper’s morning edition on 24th October 
1964 described the victory moment as the ‘moment of ecstasy’ 
Yomiuri Online, Ano Hi Ano Toki: 10 gatsu 23 nichi, 1964 nen 
‘Tōyō no Majo’ ga Kinmedaru Kakutoku, October 23, 2011, 
accessed August 8, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/otona/
history/october/20111011-OYT8T00803.htm
20 The final results in the women’s volleyball competition at the 
1964 Tokyo Olympics were, in winning order: Japan, USSR, 
Poland, Romania, USA and South Korea. Although the Japanese 
men’s volleyball team was not expected to win a medal, they took 
the bronze medal.
21 Maehata Hideko won gold in the 200 metres women’s 
breaststroke at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, making her the first 
Japanese woman to win an Olympic gold medal
22 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 90
23 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 90-91
24 Yomiuri Shinbun, Ano Hi Ano Toki: 10 gatsu 23 nichi, 1964 nen 
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KASAI’S LIFE AFTER ThE 1964 VIcToRy: VoLLEy-
BALL ANd MoThERhood
Despite a seemingly decisive victory, the emotion of the 
gold medal win and the decision to continue to that Olym-
pics had clearly been a difficult personal decision for Kasai. 
Cited in the Yomiuri newspaper the day after the win, Ka-
sai confessed that she had the feelings of any “normal young 
woman”. She told how a good friend of hers from high school 
had come to the competition with her daughter to cheer on 
the team. Seeing her friend with an 8-year-old daughter, Ka-
sai said she felt mixed feelings, thinking that if she had not 
continued with competitive volleyball she might have been in 
the audience with a child like her friend. She was conscious 
that her father, who had passed away in July of that year, had 
wanted to see her as a bride.25
After the Olympic victory, it is not an exaggeration to 
say that Kasai became something of a national celebrity in 
Japan. Although her wish was to retire immediately after the 
Olympics, she played in subsequent friendly games against 
Romania and in China, and recorded that she was busy at-
tending a lot of celebratory events.26 Daimatsu was also busy 
appearing on TV and giving lectures, but he took his “pa-
ternalistic duties” very seriously and made time to visit the 
parental homes of his team in order to help their families 
seek potential marriage partners for his players. Soon after 
the Olympic victory, Daimatsu and the team met the then 
Prime Minister, Satō Eisaku, whereupon Kasai mentioned 
her inability to marry due to her years of volleyball train-
ing, and Daimatsu asked for the PM’s help in introducing 
potential husbands for his players.27 Kasai was then famously 
introduced to an officer from Japan’s Self Defence Force, ar-
ranged by Prime Minister and Mrs Satō, whom she would 
later marry. In January 1965, Daimatsu announced his deci-
sion to retire from Nichibō Corporation. Although he was 
asked to stay on as the manager of the national team after 
the Olympic victory, he refused the offer, and Kasai and five 
other players announced their resignations the following day 
once Daimatsu’s resignation had been accepted by Nichibō.28 
Even after these official retirements from the sport, the Japa-
nese media continued to follow the lives of the players, par-
ticularly with regard to their possible marriage moves. Kasai 
recorded how she was followed around by the media all the 
time after the Olympics, and that it was difficult to meet up 
with her fiancé without the media noticing.29 Kasai’s wed-
ding to Nakamura Kazuo in May 1965 made national media 
headlines. The Japanese prime minister and his wife attended 
the wedding as official matchmakers and he gave a speech 
at the wedding commenting: “I think Kasai Masae is more 
well known in Japan than me”. The newlywed couple were 
‘Tōyō no Majo’ ga Kinmedaru Kakutoku
25 Yomiuri Shinbun, Ano Hi Ano Toki: 10 gatsu 23 nichi, 1964 nen 
‘Tōyō no Majo’ ga Kinmedaru Kakutoku
26 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 33
27 Sawano, Joshi Barēbōru no Eikō to Zasetsu, 162
28 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 35
29 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 24&33
interviewed on television following their ceremony, and were 
followed around by the Japanese media on their honeymoon 
to Hakone.30
Although Kasai officially retired from the Olympic and 
Nichibō teams in 1965, she would never really retire from her 
involvement with or promotion of the sport of volleyball. In 
her memoir she reflected that, even though she and her team-
mates were expected to marry and become kateijin (member 
of a household), they couldn’t forget about volleyball which 
had defined their youth. She wrote that they tried to take any 
opportunity to get together to enjoy playing – in fact more 
than just “enjoy” they wanted to still “compete and win”.31 In 
1965, Daimatsu was asked to help establish a national vol-
leyball team in China by the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou 
Enlai, and Kasai went with Daimatsu to China to train both 
men’s and women’s national teams. Among those who partici-
pated in this training was Yue Wai Man, the Chinese volley-
ball coach who would later lead the Chinese women’s team to 
five world titles. In the same year, Kasai and other ex-Nichibō 
players also formed Fuji Club, a team which went on to win 
the national tournament in 1965 and 1966, though the club 
was later dissolved as Kasai and her team mates got busy with 
motherhood and families.32 After marrying in May 1965, Ka-
sai and her husband initially lived with her husband’s parents 
in Kawasaki, but set up their own home in 1968 when her 
husband was transferred to Chiba. She gave birth to their first 
child, a boy, in July 1966, then a daughter in March 1969 
and a second son in April 1970. She recorded that her babies 
and home life were her major interest in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. In her memoirs she recorded that she definitely 
didn’t want to be a kyoiku mama (education mother) and im-
print on her children, but rather, raise them as free spirits, but 
later reflected that before she knew it she had, in reality, been 
pulled into being a kyoiku mama.33
However, in 1973, she was asked to feature in a week-
ly television programme called Saturday Deportes (Doyō 
Deporute),34 in which a six-a-side team of “Oriental Witches” 
would be pitted against various nine-a-side amateur mama-
san (mother’s) volleyball teams. In her memoirs, she recalled 
that she asked herself whether it would be okay for her to 
return to volleyball, reflecting that her children were a little 
more off her hands, and her mother in law was healthy. Ask-
ing herself whether she could do it, she told herself that of 
course she could play at any age, as there were women older 
than her playing mama-san volleyball. So at 39 years of age 
she called upon her “witch sisters” and formed a team after a 
30 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 50-53
31 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 99
32 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 98
33 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 137&143. Kyoiku mama was a 
popular term and social phenomenon from the 1960s to 1980s 
in Japan. The domestic partner to the “salaryman”, an “education 
mother” had the key responsibility (and somewhat obsessively 
portrayed role in the media) of raising successful children within 
the competitive Japanese education system.
34 Deportes is the Spanish word for sports.
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seven year absence from volleyball. 35 The popularity of this 
television programme greatly contributed to the spread of the 
sport to Japanese women of all ages during these years.
From the mid-1970s, over the next two decades, Kasai 
was a coach for various teams, including some in the mama-
san league, and widely promoted the sport by giving lectures 
across Japan. In 1982, she began to coach volleyball classes 
for Itō-Yōkadō club, a volleyball school that would subse-
quently spread across Japan, and in 1988 she coached classes 
for a mama-san club in Edōgawa-ward, Tokyo. In 1991 she 
brought a volleyball team over from China to play against 
the Edōgawa club and was influential in promoting nine-a-
side volleyball for elderly people in China. She sat on the 
board of the JVA and was Vice-Chair in 2003-4, charged 
with strengthening Japanese women’s volleyball. At 70 years 
of age, forty years after her victory in 1964, Kasai went to 
the 2004 Athens Olympics as the manager of the Japanese 
women’s team. Attending the Games for the first time since 
she had captained her team to the inaugural Olympic volley-
ball title, she was quoted as saying: 
“The memory of returning to the Olympics is amaz-
ing. I was stunned by the great reaction of the spectators 
and the fans. There are quite a few Japanese followers here 
so it is quite emotional. I’m very proud of what this team has 
achieved over the past year and hopefully we can continue 
with some of that great form here at the Olympics. The team 
is still in the process of improving but for an inexperienced, 
young side they are achieving remarkable things.”36
Kasai and Daimatsu continued their partnership in the 
sport after retiring from the Olympic and Nichibō teams. In 
1968, Kasai supported Daimatsu when he stood as a Mem-
ber of Parliament for the Liberal Democratic party. Daimatsu 
won his seat and served until a subsequent election defeat in 
1974, when he returned to volleyball coaching, but died in 
1978 at only 57 years of age. Kasai was shocked at his sudden 
death, and in her 1982 memoirs recalled how at his funeral 
she had imagined what he would be saying to her and her 
team mates, writing:
“You have all become wonderful mothers. Continue to en-
joy and play volleyball for me. Continue to meet without 
me.”
She also recalled her last good bye to her teacher:
“Even though you will go to heaven, I will continue your 
leadership in volleyball, without you, and maybe you will 
create another witches team in heaven”.37
35 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 138-40
36 Fédération Internationale de Volleyball, Two Volleyball Greats 
take in the Olympic spectacle, August 21, 2004, accessed February 
1, 2014, http://www.fivb.org/EN/volleyball/competitions/
olympics/2004/men/Press/Press_21.asp?sm=30
37 Kasai, Okāsan no Kinmedaru, 147
Daimatsu was long viewed after the Olympic gold 
medal victory as a national hero in Japan. Inducted into the 
Volleyball Hall of Fame in 2000, his record notes that he 
was “the coach who revolutionised training for all women’s 
sports”.38 Kasai, too, was inducted into the Volleyball Hall of 
Fame in 2008. Contemporary academic and media debates 
on sports training in Japan continue to refer to Daimatsu’s 
legacy.39 While he certainly left a legacy of sports training ide-
ology, I would argue that Kasai’s influence on the sport of 
volleyball was more pervasive, and resulted in the widespread 
popularity of the sport across Japan, particularly for women.
ThE LEgAcy oF ThE WITchES’ VIcToRy FoR WoM-
EN’S VoLLEyBALL 
The growth of volleyball, particularly as a sport for 
women, was immense following the 1964 Olympics victo-
ry by the ‘Oriental Witches’, with volleyball now not only 
a “medal promising” competitive sport, but emerging as a 
growing social phenomenon.40 The sport was portrayed  in 
two popular series, “V is our Sign” and “Attack No.1” which 
both started as cartoon series (manga) in rival girls’ magazines 
in 1968. They were both launched in 1969 as television se-
ries, and “V is our Sign” in particular became a hit series, with 
its plot focused on a fictional Witches team.41 Less obvious 
than the popular dramatisation of the series, but, I would 
argue, even more influential and long-lasting, was the spread 
of the sport to women of all ages in Japan, notably the es-
tablishment of mama-san volleyball. Previously the domain 
of young women, volleyball became an acceptable and acces-
sible sport for older, married, Japanese women as well after 
the 1964 victory. Kasai commented in interview that, prior 
to the Olympics, Japanese housewives (shufu) concentrated 
on housework and looking after children, reflecting that it 
was “unthinkable” that a housewife would engage in sports 
or have a job or hobbies outside the home. After the Olym-
pics, however, women of all ages were inspired to take up the 
sport, and as leisure activities became more acceptable amidst 
a growing and affluent Japanese middle-class, teams for older 
women emerged most prominently organised by PTA groups 
and by local government community centres across Japan. 
In 1970 a mama-san volleyball national competition was 
38 Volleyball Hall of Fame, accessed August 20, 2013, http://www.
volleyhall.org/daimatsu.html
39 For example, see Japan Times, Severe sports training methods 
became taibatsu in time, June 2, 2013, accessed August 20, 2013, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2013/06/02/baseball/
severe-sports-training-methods-became-taibatsu-in-time/#.
UhhQtt9wYdU
40 Sawano, Joshi Barēbōru no Eikō to Zasetsu, 143-4
41 ‘V is our Sign’ (the V standing for Victory) was created as a 
cartoon series by Shiro Jinbo and Akira Mochizukiin, requested 
by the publisher of a girls’ magazine in response to the popularity 
of  ‘Attack No.1’ created by Chikako Uraga which had begun 
earlier that year in a rival publication. In 1969, ‘V is our Sign’ 
became a televised drama series, while ‘Attack No.1’ begun as 
a televised animated series, and later in 2005 re-launched as a 
drama series.
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launched by the JVA in cooperation with sponsorship from 
the Asahi Newspaper, and the mama-san clubs remain popu-
lar throughout Japan today, with national competitions held 
annually, and the sport split into various leagues including 
veteran leagues defined by age categories: Isoji for the over 
50s, Kotobuki for the over 60s and Ofuku for the over 70s. 
By 2009 there were 771 mama-san volleyball teams across 
Japan with over 11,000 players.42 Although for many women 
across Japan, mama-san volleyball is a leisure activity or hob-
by, the top “V-league” competition is a serious national league 
and includes players who have retired out of competitive cor-
porate or other teams. Indeed the term mama-san itself has 
evolved to be somewhat misleading. Players in the V-league 
are required to be 35 years or older in age but it is not a 
requirement that they be married or indeed be a mother. Al-
though there is criticism that the term mama-san continues 
to locate Japanese women and sport within gendered norms 
of maternity and ideal female roles, 43 at the same time it is 
evident that the growth of mama-san volleyball did open up 
sporting activities to women of all ages during the decades 
following the Tokyo victory. Volleyball remains the most 
popularly played sport today for Japanese women, and the 
growth of mama-san volleyball also inspired the emergence 
of other mama-san clubs in sports such as basketball, table 
tennis, badminton, and more recently a rapid growth in ma-
ma-san soccer.
LooKINg FoRWARd To ToKyo 2020
After the 1964 gold medal victory, the Japanese wom-
en’s volleyball team won the Olympic silver medal in Mexico 
in 1968 and in Munich in 1972. They then went on to win 
the gold medal for the second time in Montreal in 1976. 
However, after taking the bronze medal in Los Angeles in 
1984, the team’s ranking continued to go down and went 
into a slump. They failed to qualify for the Sydney Olympics 
in 2000 for the first time since 1964. After missing the Syd-
ney Games, they competed at Athens in 2004 (with Kasai 
as manager) and Beijing in 2008, both times losing in the 
quarter finals. The decline of textiles as a key industry in Ja-
pan from the 1970s led many to speculate that perhaps the 
glory days of corporate sports and women’s volleyball might 
have come to an end in the 1980s and 1990s. It is certain-
ly true that with the decline of the industry, the domain of 
competitive women’s volleyball gradually no longer resided 
in corporate teams from the textile companies. 44 Nichibō, 
now renamed Unitika Ltd., took the decision to dissolve 
42 Sasakawa Sports Foundation, Supōtsu Hakusho: supōtsu ga mezasu 
beki mirai, February 15, 2011
43 One Japanese author argues that mama-san volleyball has been 
the key sport for married women in Japan, and that while it did 
liberate them from their isolated domestic life, it has also served 
to perpetuate their role as housewives. See Haruko Takaoka, 
“Katei Fujin Supōtsu Katsudō ni okeru “Shufusei” no Saiseisan: 
barēbōru no hatten katei to seido tokusei o chūshin ni”, Research 
of Physical Education 53(2), December 10, 2008, 391-407
44 Sawano, Joshi Barēbōru no Eikō to Zasetsu, 162
its corporate volleyball team in 2000.45 Indeed, Japan’s eco-
nomic problems after the 1990s meant that many sports had 
to shift their emphasis from corporate teams to sports teams 
comprising other forms of sponsorship. However, at the same 
time, competitive women’s volleyball in Japan has retained its 
“corporate sport” nature, albeit with the type of corporations 
having changed over time, moving from the textile firms, to 
electronics firms and now increasingly to firms in the service 
sector.46
At the London Olympics in 2012, after twenty eight 
years without an Olympic win, the Japanese women’s vol-
leyball team took the bronze medal. At a press conference 
held in London on August 12, 2012, the team manager Ma-
nabe Masayoshi commenting on the bronze win noted the 
“triumph of teamwork” and commented that the strength 
of Japanese women’s volleyball lies in the solidarity of their 
team members and in persistent pursuance of technique, 
because with an average height of 1.75 metres the Japanese 
have the lowest height out of all the 12 teams that competed 
in London.47 This statement resonates with the commentary 
that surrounded the Japanese team in the 1960s. At 79 years 
of age in August 2012, Kasai was also quoted in the Japa-
nese press on the day of the bronze win, congratulating the 
team and commenting that after twenty eight years without 
a medal she was happy the Japanese team was getting steadily 
stronger after a long slump period.48
One year later, on September 7, 2013, the IOC an-
nounced that Tokyo had won the bid to host the 2020 Olym-
pic Games. Kasai sent a message to Japanese volleyball fans 
stating: “I hope Tokyo 2020 will be successful and will bring 
many dreams and hope. I am pretty sure that I am the happi-
est person to welcome the return of the Olympics Games to 
Tokyo.” Sadly, less than a month later, on October 3, 2013, 
Kasai died in Tokyo from an intracranial haemorrhage. Her 
sudden death was reported by all the major media channels 
across Japan, and reflected her status as one of Japan’s most 
beloved and renowned athletes.49 Obituary reports comment-
ed that she was an iconic and respected sportswoman who 
45 Nichibō changed its name to Unitika in 1969, following a 
merger with Nippon Rayon.
46 See Hiroyuki Kurosaka and Sumie Ōyama, “Kigyō Chīmu no 
Hensen kara Nihon Keizai ga mieru: barēbōru Nihon rīgu o 
rei toshite’, Seikatsu Kagaku Kenkyū, 17, 1995, 47-55. Current 
women’s volleyball teams competing nationally, from which 
Japan’s national team draws players, include teams such as the 
Toray Arrows (owned by a chemical fibre company) and the 
Hisamitsu Springs team (owned by a pharmaceutical company). 
When Unitika ended their team in 2000 all their team members 
moved to the Toray team, but have since all retired.
47 Yomiuri Online, Mottomo shinchō hikui barējoshi, kono tsuyomi 
de ‘dō’ kakutoku, accessed August 15, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.
co.jp/olympic/2012/news/ballgame/volley/1/20120812-
OYT1T00571.htm
48 Sanspo News, Joshi barē ni 28nen buri dōmedaru!  Kankoku ni 
setsujoku, accessed August 12, 2012, http://www.sanspo.com/
london2012/news/20120811/vol12081119390005-n3.html
49 Kasai’s death was reported in the Nikkei, Yomiuri, Asahi, Sankei 
and Mainichi newspapers as well as on the main television 
channels in Japan.
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had widely contributed to volleyball education across the 
country, and had actively supported the 2020 Tokyo Olym-
pic bid. The Nikkei Shimbun recorded the following: 
“It is with great sadness that the Japan Volleyball Associa-
tion announced the passing of Masae Nakamura (née Ka-
sai) on Thursday. She was 80 years old. Yuichiro Hamu, 
the President of Japan Volleyball Association, commented, 
“We are all deeply shocked to hear the sudden death of Ms. 
Nakamura (Kasai). Our thoughts are with her and her fam-
ily at this most difficult time of loss. We have no words to 
express our gratitude for her effort to the development of 
volleyball in Japan. In particular, she led the Japanese wom-
en’s volleyball team to the gold medal at Tokyo Olympics in 
1964. She was the person who established the foundation 
of volleyball in Japan. I promise that we won’t give up our 
effort to make volleyball popular in Japan to respond to Na-
kamura’s wishes.”50
The Fédération Internationale de Volleyball also issued 
a press release the following day stating:
“It is with great sadness that we received the news of the 
passing of the volleyball legend Masae Nakamura. On be-
half of the FIVB and the volleyball community around the 
world, I pass on our sincere condolences to her family and 
the Japan Volleyball Federation. She was a leader of her time 
and set the bench mark not only for Japanese volleyball but 
volleyball around the world.”51
When the selection of the 2020 Olympic Games was 
announced in September 2013, the IOC President Jacques 
Rogge had commented that:
“…in the end it was Tokyo’s bid that resonated the most 
with the IOC membership, inviting us to “discover tomor-
row” by delivering a well-organised and safe Games that will 
reinforce the Olympic values while demonstrating the ben-
efits of sport to a new generation.”52
Fifty years after hosting Tokyo 1964, one might argue 
that, as a nation, Japan has more on its plate than just the 
Olympics to deliver by 2020. After two decades of economic 
stagnation and the 3/11 Triple Disaster, the optimism that 
existed in 1964 appears less than evident in 2014. Abenomics 
has yet to prove that it can deliver on its own 2020 pledges, 
50 Nikkei Shimbun, Nakamura Masae san ga shikyo barē “Tōyō no 
Majo” shushō, accessed October 4, 2013, http://www.nikkei.
com/article/DGXNASDG0302F_T01C13A0CC0000/
51 Fédération Internationale de Volleyball, Volleyball world 
mourns passing of Japanese great, accessed October 6, 
2013, http://www.fivb.org/en/media/viewPressRelease.
asp?No=43106&Language=en
52 Olympic.org, IOC selects Tokyo as host of 2020 Summer Olympic 
Games, accessed, February 6, 2014, http://www.olympic.org/
news/ioc-selects-tokyo-as-host-of-2020-summer-olympic-
games/208784
while the focus on the Tokyo Games may serve to divert re-
sources from—and deepen the gap between—the capital city 
and an ailing rural Japan, not least in the tsunami-damaged 
north-eastern prefectures of Japan, while the question of the 
full impact of the Fukushima nuclear disaster rumbles on.53 
On the other hand, hosting an Olympics Games can never 
be relied upon to provide resolution to all the concomitant 
ills facing a nation, but could, as in 1964, once again provide 
a sense of unification or boost national spirits. What is cer-
tain is that the Japanese women’s volleyball team have their 
sights set on recovering their momentum in the sport at an 
international level, and both the team and the Japanese media 
will no doubt be recalling the famous 1964 victory of Kasai 
and her team mates. In that sense, Kasai’s legacy will not fade 
anytime soon, and her unbridled passion and optimism for 
the sport will remain. It is therefore only fitting to end this 
article with Kasai’s own spontaneous reflections on her life, as 
recorded in my interview with her in May 2012.
“The gold medal changed my life a lot. My subsequent 
forty-eight years have been a really happy life. Many people 
who watched TV that day and cheered for the volleyball 
team in the Olympics have now passed away. But I am still 
remembered by a lot of people when I attend volleyball 
classes and activities all over Japan. The fact that the Olym-
pics were held in Japan had a huge impact. People all over 
Japan watched the games on TV. Even people who didn’t 
have a TV watched them somewhere. The viewing rate of 
our final match is still unbeatable. It has been forty-eight 
years since then, but I am still recognised everywhere – in 
the train, on the streets or in the department store. I’m very 
grateful. I think that I am the luckiest volleyball player in 
the world.”
53 Peter Matanle, “Why the 2020 Olympics won’t solve Japan’s 
problems”, Prospect Magazine, October 7, 2013, accessed 
February 2, 2014, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/
politics/2020-olympics-japans-problems/#.UvYoajbisdU
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ABSTRACT
The Maldives Monetary Authority granted the first 
banking license ever conferred on an Islamic bank in the 
Republic of the Maldives in 2011. This article examines the 
stages that preceded the initiation of Islamic banking in this 
Indian Ocean archipelago nation and culminated with the 
opening of the Maldives Islamic Bank. The article describes 
banking and company law for non-Islamic (conventional) 
banks, outlines the powers of the Maldives Monetary Author-
ity and the countervailing mechanisms of political account-
ability and judicial review available to banks. The article then 
details the legal and regulatory framework specific to Islamic 
banking, examines the development (essentially occurring 
since 2009) and the current state of the prudential regula-
tion of Islamic financial institutions, with special attention 
accorded corporate governance and the two-tiered system of 
Sharī’ah Advisory Councils charged with new product de-
velopment and the enforcement of Sharī’ah compliance by 
Islamic financial institutions in the Maldives.
I. INTRoducTIoN: ThE INAuguRATIoN oF
ISLAMIc BANKINg IN ThE MALdIVES 
A) A Belated Beginning 
Two considerations render surprising the fact that this 
jurisdiction never hosted Islamic banking (“IB”) before 2011: 
the character of Maldivian polity and the age of IB globally. 
Firstly, the state and constitutional identity of the Maldives is 
unequivocally Sunni Muslim. The Constitution of the Mal-
dives 20081 stipulates that the state religion is Islam [s 10(a)] 
and that “No law contrary to any tenet of Islam shall be en-
acted in the Maldives” [s 10(c)]. Only Muslims may become 
citizens [s 9(c)]. Members of the People’s Majlis (the Mal-
dives’ Parliament) must be Sunni Muslim [s 73(a)3]; the same 
is true of other high office. Although official and unofficial 
statistics are not wholly reliable on this issue, it seems clear 
that the population is (or at any rate approaches) total ho-
1 Dheena Hussain, trans., “Functional Translation of the 
Constitution of the Maldives,” accessed October 2, 2013, 
http://www.maldivesinfo.gov.mv/home/upload/downloads/
Compilation.pdf. 
ISLAMIc BANKINg IN ThE 
MALDIVES
BANKING LAW, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE OF A NEW SECTOR
48           hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)   |   Islamic Banking in the Maldives Islamic Banking in the Maldives    |   hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)            49
Dr. Scott Morrison (BA New York University 1994; MA 1997, MPhil 1999 and PhD 2004 Columbia University) qualified as 
barrister at the English Bar in 2012. He is an Associate Professor of international law at Akita University in Japan. His current 
research deals with the corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions. He has held academic appointments in Turkey 
(2003-2004), in the Middle Eastern Languages and Cultures, and Religion Departments at Columbia University (2004-2007), 
in the Maldives (2007-2008), at New York University (2008), Zayed University in Dubai (2009-2010), and at the Centre for 
Islamic Studies at Oxford University (2010-2011).
mogeneity in self-identification of the Maldivian body politic 
as Muslim.2 The pre-Republican political history of this atoll 
nation is one of a chain of sultans and sultanas, broken briefly 
by periods of colonial rule by the Portuguese and the Dutch, 
and punctuated by a period as a British protectorate (1887-
1965);3 the British era ended when in 1976 the Royal Air 
Force decamped from the island Gan (on the southernmost 
atoll, and now the second largest island by population) where 
it had maintained an airfield.4
Secondly, IB and Islamic financial institutions (“IFIs”) 
globally have by now a rather lengthy history and -- while 
still in its adolescence in some respects -- IB is now quite 
established in a wide variety of jurisdictions. IB as a modern 
adaptation of moral and legal principles expounded in the 
scriptural and legal texts and intellectual traditions of Islam 
has existed in recognizable form in the Arab Gulf since the 
mid-1970s;5 the wealthiest of the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil (“GCC”) countries number among those nations who 
have hosted IFIs, such as the United Arab Emirates, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. In Southeast 
Asia, the Malaysian government enacted the Islamic Bank-
ing Act 1983 which together with the Financial Institutions 
Act 19896 regulated IB in the context of a jurisdiction with a 
dual banking system.7 Malaysia has been an evident influence 
on the development of the IB sector in the Maldives; as will 
be demonstrated below with respect to the two-tiered system 
of Sharī‘ah Advisory Councils (“SAC”). Pakistan undertook 
legislative reform to usher in interest-free banking in the late 
1970s although these efforts did not come to fruition until 
early in the current century.8 As in the case of its South Asian 
2 N.a., “Indian Ocean Societies, Islam in” states the figure is 
100%, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (2003), accessed October 
3, 2013, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/
acref/9780195125580.001.0001/acref-9780195125580. Under 
“religions” the CIA World Fact Book only states: “Sunni Muslim 
(official)” accessed October 3, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mv.html.
3 The Commonwealth, “Member countries,” accessed October 
2, 2013, http://thecommonwealth.org/ourmembercountries/
maldives/history. 
4 RAF, “RAF Timeline,” accessed October 2, 2013, http://www.
raf.mod.uk/history/rafhistorytimeline197079.cfm. 
5 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 71. Experimentation with IB 
occurred in Egypt and Pakistan as early as the 1940s, 70.
6 Shanthy Rachagan, “Islamic Banking in Malaysia,” Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 20:2 (2005): 88, 91.
7 Valerie Low, “One Country, Two Systems: Banking in Malaysia,” 
Journal of International Banking Law 13:7 (1998), 236.
8 State Bank of Pakistan, Islamic Banking Department, accessed 
regional neighbour Pakistan, IB has only belatedly appeared 
in the Maldives – belatedly when compared with the dates 
of its appearance in other societies where Muslims by nearly 
comparable levels predominate. In both Pakistan and the 
Maldives an official Islamic religious identity, codified by the 
constitution, and the identification of substantial majorities 
in the population with the faith, have not sped the formation 
of IB or IFIs – as a sector that can complete with convention-
al interest-based banking – as rapidly as an observer might 
anticipate.  
The explanation of the relative tardiness of Islamic 
banking and finance in Pakistan and the Maldives probably 
lies in politics; in the case of the Maldives it is interesting to 
note that although the regime of President Maumoon Gay-
oom (1978-2007) relied upon an Islamic religious ideology 
to support itself,9 effective progress toward IB did not occur 
until the administration of the first democratically elected 
government, led by President Mohammad Nasheed – who 
assumed power in 2008. President Nasheed’s administration 
terminated on February 7, 2012 resulting in a transfer of 
power that took place under what subsequently became and 
still are disputed circumstances; on February 8, Mr Nasheed 
claimed duress, although subsequent enquiries have not ac-
cepted his portrayal of the events of February 7.10 Although 
he never challenged the constitutional status of the Maldives 
as an Islamic state, President Nasheed was widely perceived to 
diminish the public importance of Islam or -- to put the point 
less innocuously in the Maldivian context -- to be a secular 
person and leader, if not one bent on marginalizing Islamic 
faith; or so his political opponents contended.11 In point of 
fact President Nasheed had emphasized the symbiotic rela-
tionship of Islam with commerce and the economy at the 
October 2, 2013,  http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/ibd.htm.
9 As evidenced by his televised statements, as personally observed in 
the country by the author, July 2007-May 2008. Also, President 
Gayoom’s published speeches and writings: Maldives, a Global 
View: Excerpts from President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s Speeches, 
1979-1987 (Male’: Maldives Department of Information and 
Broadcasting, 1990) and Maldives: a nation in peril (Male’: 
Ministry of Planning Human Resources and Environment Male’ 
Maldives, 1998).
10 BBC.co.uk, “Maldives report rejects Nasheed coup claims,” 
August 30, 2012, accessed October 2, 2013, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-asia-19417339.
11 N.a., “Translation: ‘President Nasheed’s devious plot to destroy 
the Islamic faith of Maldivians,’” Minivan News, January 20, 
2012, accessed October 2, 2013, http://minivannews.com/
politics/translation-president-nasheed%e2%80%99s-devious-
plot-to-destroy-the-islamic-faith-of-maldivians-30991.
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World Islamic Economic Forum12 and attended with some 
fanfare the opening ceremony of the first licensed Islamic 
bank in the Maldives, the Maldives Islamic Bank (“MIB”).13 
B. The Anatomy of a (Conservative) Revolution: IB in the 
Maldives 
During the last few years of President Gayoom’s ad-
ministration, there was substantial popular support for IB 
among Maldivians, according to local informants.14 Under 
President Nasheed political support emanated not only from 
the administration itself, but also from the outer fringe of 
national politics, including from an Islamist party called 
Adhaalath;15 the name of that party means ‘justice’ in Dhi-
vehi, the national language. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
also promoted IB.16 The first publicly reported governmental 
negotiations with international banks dealing in the IB sector 
took place in May 2007 when the Finance Ministry stated 
that the MMA had been seeking to establish IB for one year. 
The Minister indicated that he anticipated a joint venture be-
tween the government and the Islamic Corporation for the 
Development of the Private Sector (“ICDP”), with which a 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) had already been 
concluded. The Deputy Managing Director of the Maldives 
Monetary Authority (“MMA”), Ibrahim Naeem, said that in 
the Maldives Islamic banks would not lend to tourist ventures 
or casinos,17 in  recognition of some of the political sensitivi-
ties around IB.  
12 N.a., “President Speaks at the 6th World Islamic Economic 
Forum,” Miadhu, May 20, 2010, accessed October 1, 2010, 
http://www.miadhu.com/2010/05/local-news/president-speaks-
at-the-6th-world-islamic-economic-forum; Laura Restropo 
Ortega, “Islam and commerce are synonymous,” Minivan News, 
May 20, 2010, accessed October 1, 2010, http://minivannews.
com/business/%e2%80%9cis lam-and-commerce-are-
synonymous%e2%80%9d-president-nasheed-7360.
13 Abdul Latheef, “Opening of MIB provides opportunity to 
shape development according to Islamic principles-Pres,” 
Miadhu, March 8, 2011, accessed October 3, 2013, http://www.
miadhu.com/2011/03/local-news/opening-of-mib-provides-
opportunity-to-shape-development-according-to-islamic-
principles-pres. 
14 Personal communications with the author (autumn 2007). Two 
such informants were as he then was Dean of the Faculty of 
Shari’ah and Law, Fayyaz Ali Manik (who subsequently became 
a member of the Shari’ah Committee of MIB); also Ismail Athif, 
a local businessman. Being resident in Male’, the author lacks 
similar evidence from other islands.
15 Then Finance Minister Gasim Ibrahim stated: “Two days back, 
Adhaalath Party sent a letter wanting to hold discussions on 
creating an Islamic Bank. Since Maldives is a 100% Muslim 
country, there are people who want to work with Islamic banks. 
They would benefit from this.” N.a., “Maldives to have Islamic 
Bank,” Miadhu, May 9, 2007, accessed October 1, 2013, http://
www.miadhu.com/2007/05/local-news/maldives-to-have-
islamic-bank-2276. 
16 N.a., “Islamic Bank would very soon be opened in the Maldives,” 
Miadhu, December  31, 2009, accessed October 3, 2013, 
http://www.miadhu.com/2009/12/local-news/an-islamic-bank-
would-very-soon-be-opened-in-the-maldives.
17 Above, note 15.
In April 2008, the MMA announced that it became a 
member of the international harmonisation and standards-
setting body the Islamic Financial Services Board (“IFSB”).18 
The MMA also established an Islamic Banking Unit.19 The 
Governor of the MMA explored tie-ups with Bahrain; the 
largest Bahraini bank, among others, expressed some interest 
in investment in IB in the Maldives.20 The MMA entered a 
partnership with Noor Islamic Bank of Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), with plans of creating Noor Islamic Bank in 
the Maldives as a joint venture together with the Treasury and 
the Maldives Ministry of Finance, and the ICDP.21 In July 
2008 the parties signed an MOU to this effect.22 However, 
it is evident that the MOU did not bear fruit; subsequent 
MMA Governor Fazeel Najeeb stated that no parties had 
made formal applications to the MMA for bank operating 
licenses as of February 2009. He sought to parry objections 
received from the IDB that the MMA was obstructing ef-
forts to introduce IB.23 In June 2010, the MMA confirmed 
(without naming the parties) that two applications for an IB 
license in the Maldives had been received: one proposing a 
public-private partnership (“PPP”) between a multinational 
company and the Maldives government, and the other for a 
PPP between a UAE company and the Maldives government. 
The Finance Minister Ali Hashim blamed both the govern-
ment and the applicants for delay.24
In the Islamic financial and banking services sector, 
viewed on a global scale, there are two distinct poles: the 
GCC and Malaysia. Although there is a great deal of overlap 
and cooperation concerning the core contracts and what is 
permissible, there are distinctions and disagreements at times, 
and even some rivalry when it comes to establishing or de-
fending or augmenting international reputations as a leader 
of ideas and standards in IB. What occurred next constituted 
a swing in the direction of Southeast Asia -- away from the 
18 N.a., “Maldives gains membership of IFSB,” Miadhu, April 
1, 2008, accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.miadhu.
com/2008/04/local-news/maldives-gains-membership-of-
ifsb5938. 
19 N.a., “Islamic Banking to commence soon – Governor,” 
Miadhu, February 16, 2008, accessed October 1, 2013, http://
www.miadhu.com/2008/02/local-news/islamic-banking-to-
commence-soon-governor-5432. 
20 Ibid.
21 N.a., “Noor Islamic Bank, partners establish first Islamic bank 
in the Maldives,” Gulf News, July 22, 2008, accessed October 
3, 2013, http://m.gulfnews.com/noor-islamic-bank-partners-
establish-first-islamic-bank-in-the-maldives-1.119586. 
22 N.a., “Islamic banking to commence within months,” Miadhu 
July 8, 2008, accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.miadhu.
com/2008/07/local-news/islamic-banking-to-commence-
within-months-7011. 
23 N.a., “MMA no obstruction to Islamic Banking in Maldives – 
Governor,” Miadhu, February 27, 2009, accessed October 1, 
2013, http://www.miadhu.com/2009/02/local-news/mma-no-
obstruction-to-islamic-banking-in-maldives-governor-9427.
24 N.a., “Two banks applies [sic] for licenses to establish an Islamic 
bank in the Maldives,” Miadhu, June 22, 2010, accessed October 
1, 2013, http://www.miadhu.com/2010/06/local-news/two-
banks-applies-for-licenses-to-establish-an-islamic-bank-in-the-
maldives.
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Arab states -- and a harbinger of things to come. In Octo-
ber 2010 the MMA signed a Memorandum of Agreement 
(“MOA”) with the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute 
Malaysia (“IBFIM”), the purpose of which was the joint de-
velopment of IB in the Maldives, together with the wider 
objective of encouraging the harmonisation of regulatory 
frameworks for the growth of Islamic finance. The Deputy 
Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia’s Central Bank) 
YBhg, Dato’ Mohd Razif Abd Kadir, witnessed the agree-
ment -- signalling the involvement of the Malaysian bank-
ing authorities at a high level.25 Then in December 2010, the 
Central Bank of the UAE signed an MOU with the MMA 
“for cooperation and exchange of information on banking 
supervision, technical assistance and training, as well as for 
combating money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/
CFT).” The UAE offered to help the Maldives bring itself 
“in line with the international standards relating to exchange 
of information between banking supervisory authorities” and 
offered training to MMA staff in the UAE.26 The UAE, acting 
through Noor Islamic Bank, had not succeeded in partnering 
with what would become the MIB, as the Malaysian parties 
had. However the UAE sought continued involvement with 
IB in the Maldives in an advisory and supportive capacity. 
The series of events and the (from a purely financial point of 
view) disproportionate interest in the Maldives reflects the 
fact that the commitment to IB, and the desire to lead or act 
as a pioneer in the industry are also salient considerations.
At the opening ceremony of the MIB on March 7, 
2011, the Maldivian President said that the process of set-
ting up an Islamic bank had in fact been under way at the 
commencement of his administration but that it had been 
halted due to political resistance that was bent on opposing 
the entry of foreign investment and foreign companies into 
the country. He stated that it was the local business commu-
nity who favoured an open economy which, when combined 
with the democratic change in both regime (and regime type) 
became the decisive catalysts that culminated in the first ap-
pearance of IB in the Maldives. 
II. MALdIVIAN BANKINg LAW ANd REguLATIoN
A. The Law: Its Recently Accelerated Development
The Maldives Monetary Authority Act 198127 ( the 
“1981 Act”) accorded statutory recognition to the Maldivian 
Rufiyaa (“MVR”) as the national currency (s 12), which it 
remains; it also instituted the MMA, conferring upon it the 
25 N.a., “IBFIM In Pact To Set Up First Islamic Bank In Maldives,” 
Miadhu, October 22, 2010 accessed October 1, 2013, http://
www.miadhu.com/2010/10/local-news/ibfim-in-pact-to-set-
up-first-islamic-bank-in Maldives. 
26 N.a., “UAE Central Bank signs MoU with Maldives Monetary 
Authority,” Miadhu, December 20, 2010, accessed October 
1, 2013, http://www.miadhu.com/2010/12/local-news/uae-
central-bank-signs-mou-with-maldives-monetary-authority. 
27 law no. 6/81, accessed October 3, 2013, http://www.mma.gov.
mv/laws/mmaact-english.pdf. 
functions of a central bank: printing, issuing and regulating 
currency and its value, regulating banks and banking, and 
advising the government (s 3 and s 4). The MMA regulates 
monetary and fiscal policy, liquidity, provisioning and for-
eign currency exposure limits,28 and the capital requirements 
to which banks operating in the Maldives are subject. The 
2010 Act provides for the prudential regulation of Islamic 
and any other banks by explicit reference to a repertoire of 
legislative techniques: authorisation (licensing), capital ad-
equacy and large exposure requirements, foreign currency 
exposure limits, corporate governance, bank operations, and 
accounting, auditing and reporting requirements/publication 
and disclosure. These techniques encompass both protective 
and preventive measures: both prior authorisation and ex post 
facto revocations of licensing or other sanctions or penalties 
are expressly granted as powers held by the MMA. The 2010 
Act is drafted in an open-textured style which provides the 
MMA ample discretion.
As companies, banks in the Maldives are subject to the 
provisions of the Maldives Companies Act 199629 (the “1996 
Act”). That act requires private companies to have a mini-
mum of two directors, whereas public companies require five 
directors (s 45); a company secretary is mandatory in either 
case (s 46). The court may pierce the corporate veil, and may 
hold directors personally liable, in case of illegality, fraud, and 
by other operation of law (s 74). Registration as a company 
in the manner stipulated by the 1996 Act is one of the condi-
tions precedent for a domestic company to receive a banking 
license [s 4(b) the 2010 Act].
B. MMA regulations
The MMA is unambiguously the regulator of core 
banking in the Maldives. It is the body solely vested with 
the power to license banks [s 3(a)]30, or to revoke those li-
cences (which are otherwise open-ended in time) after issue. 
The MMA keeps the statutorily mandated public registry of 
banks. Mergers and acquisitions require prior approval of the 
MMA [s 21 ss (a) and (b)]. 
The MMA implements and as necessary adjusts and 
provides guidance and standards concerning capital require-
ments.31 As in some other jurisdictions, in the Maldives a 
prohibition on banks participating in trades is in force. Banks 
may not participate “as an agent, partner, or co-owner in 
wholesale or retail trade, manufacturing, transportation, ag-
28 MMA, ‘Prudential Regulation No 11-2009 Foreign Currency 
Exposure Limits No. 11-2009 “FX exposure limits.”’ Available 
on the MMA webpage, accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.
mma.gov.mv/laws.php.
29 law no. 10/96, accssed October 8, 2013, http://www.trade.
gov.mv/downloads/4dbe5307765de_Company%20Act%20
(English).pdf.
30 Except as noted all statutory citations in this paragraph are to the 
2010 Act.
31 MMA “Prudential Regulation No. 01-2009 ‘Capital Adequacy’” 
and “No. 06-2009 ‘Limits on Inter-Bank Exposures,’” accessed 
October 1, 2013, http://www.mma.gov.mv/laws.php. 
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riculture, fisheries, mining, building, insurance underwriting 
or other commercial activities” (s 26(a) the 1980 Act). The 
number of industries and trades comprising the Maldivian 
economy is -- as a result of myriad factors including its geo-
graphic character and location, its position in world trade and 
the global economy, as well as governmental policy decisions, 
and national history – constrained, with tourism and fishing 
foremost among the major economic and employment sec-
tors: as the World Bank indicates “[m]arine resources play 
a vital role, with tourism and fishing the main drivers of 
growth.”32 Banks in the Maldives may not invest in compa-
nies engaged in commercial activities (s 31 of the 2010 Act); 
the collaboration with the Bank Negara in Malaysia in this 
connection is evident in that in Malaysia the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 1989 also bans banks from engag-
ing in “wholesale or retail trade, including import and export 
trade” (s 32).
A fit and proper persons test [s 16(c) the 2010 Act] 
applies to bank officials and major shareholders, as well as 
conservators and receivers.33 The 2010 Act defines a fit and 
proper person as “a person who is regarded as honest and 
trustworthy and whose professional qualifications, back-
ground, experience, financial position, or business interests 
qualify that person, in the judgment of the MMA and in 
accordance with its regulations, to be an owner, administra-
tor, conservator, or receiver of a bank” (s 115). The 2010 Act 
specifies grounds upon which an individual will automati-
cally be deemed unfit including: bankruptcy, professional 
disqualification or a court or agency order judging a person 
as unfit (s 115 the 2010 Act.) Conviction of an imprisonable 
criminal offence has the same effect “unless such convention 
was based on his political activities” [s 115(a) the 2010 Act]. 
On this point, some mention should be made of the political 
history of recent decades in the Maldives. The nearly three 
decade administration of Maumoon Gayoom, which had 
started with a coup d’état later perpetuated by uncompeti-
tive elections, gave rise to a political opposition movement 
spearheaded by Mohammad Nasheed, who helped found the 
Maldives Democratic Party (“MDP”). As a result of the his-
tory of political organising and protest that preceded regime 
change, elected officials in the new government (even up to 
the level of the Presidency) had been political prisoners un-
der the ancien régime,34 necessitating the carve out for politi-
cal prisoners. The same cast of bank personnel in an Islamic 
bank plus those involved in rendering judgments concerning 
Sharī‘ah compliance must satisfy the fit and proper persons 
test for conventional banks as outlined above. 
S 29 of the 2010 Act touches upon the issue of related 
32 World Bank.org, “Maldives” (2013), accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/maldives.
33 MMA, “Prudential Regulation No. 09-2009 ‘Fit and Proper 
Requirements,’” accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.mma.
gov.mv/laws.php.
34 As there is no contemporary political history written on the 
Maldives, the collective source for the summary of the recent 
political developments is personal observation, and reading of 
the Maldivian, Indian and other international press.
persons, and how they are identified for the purpose of ap-
plying loan and transaction limits. The MMA defines “related 
persons” as “any person who is related to an administrator by 
marriage, blood or kinship up to the second degree, including 
children of the administrator, and any other person residing 
in the administrator’s household who is dependent on the 
administrator for his support” or on any person with a quali-
fying holding in the bank, or any employee of the bank.35 
The related persons test is formulated in the same section as: 
Two or more persons will be considered to be related if one 
person has the ability, directly or indirectly, to control the 
other person/s or to exercise significant influence over the 
financial and operating decision of the other person/s, or 
if both persons are subject to common control or common 
significant influence.36
The latter of these two tests is psychological and the 
former is based on familial or kinship ties or cohabitation. 
While the latter test might seem to obviate the former, the 
better view is likely that if any of these conditions are met, 
the persons are deemed related, and the addition of familial 
or kinship ties creates a presumption of relatedness without 
the need to enquire further into the particular facts. 
The MMA has separate guidelines concerning the 
bank’s treatment of such persons: the granting of loans and 
other banking operations to a related (or to any single) bor-
rower.37 The prudential guidance on large exposure limits is, 
as in other jurisdictions, designed to reduce the chance of 
insider fraud and the transmission of funds to false or nomi-
nee borrowers. MMA guidance on corporate governance in 
conventional banks includes a flat ban of conflicts of interest 
which, while inclusive, may be insufficiently detailed to pre-
vent and punish the intended mischief.38 The 2010 Act in-
cludes measures against money laundering39 and terrorism,40 
and pyramid schemes (s 67). The duty to preserve banking 
confidentiality is qualified on the basis of combating these 
global (and potentially local) issues, and in service of MMA 
prerogatives concerning the exchange of information be-
tween banks, credit bureaus and supervisory bodies in other 
countries (s 44). As in Malaysia, the exclusions to the bank’s 
duty not to disclose customer information are placed upon a 
35 Part I s 4 ss 12 (n 39); also MMA, unofficial English translation, 
“Prudential Regulation No. 03-2009 ‘Limits to Loans to Related 
Persons,’” accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.mma.gov.mv/
laws.php.
36 MMA, Regulation No. 03-2009, above, n 35.
37 MMA, “Prudential Regulations No. 04-2009 ‘Transactions with 
Related Persons,’” and “02-2009 ‘Single Borrower and Large 
Exposure Limits,’” accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.mma.
gov.mv/laws.php.
38 Part III (1)c: MMA, “Prudential Regulation No. 10-2009 
‘Corporate Governance,’” accessed October 1, 2013, http://
www.mma.gov.mv/laws.php.
39 Compare Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law, (London: 
Oxford University Press, second edition 2002), 72.
40 Compare with the UN International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999.
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statutory footing.41 
The countervailing rights of banks to redress against 
the MMA and their power to seek review of the MMA’s deci-
sions do not correspond to or match the rights and powers 
of the MMA, whilst the 2010 Act (s 66) allows for judicial 
review of the decisions of the MMA [including refusals to 
grant a banking license or revocations of a license – s 66(a)]. 
The scope of judicial review itself is restricted by the 2010 Act 
to “whether the decision of the MMA was adopted in accor-
dance with lawful procedures, or was arbitrary or capricious, 
or was otherwise contrary to law” [s 66(c) ss 2]. 
In summary, the power of the MMA both as enumer-
ated in the 2010 Act or by means of its exercise of residual 
duties and discretion demonstrates that the political decision 
was taken to cede substantial oversight of the banking in-
dustry to this body. The 2010 Act has the important effect 
of strengthening the hand of Maldivian banking authorities 
against the potentially overbearing or coercive influence of 
large international banks. 
C. The MMA and IB 
Maldivian legislators gave some forethought to IB 
when they drafted the 2010 Act.42 In a rough gloss on IB, 
the 2010 Act states that: “Islamic banks shall aim to provide 
banking services and engage in financing and investment 
operations on a non-interest basis in all forms and cases” 
(s 10). This formulation evinces an intention of holding a 
firm line against the pragmatic or expedient accommoda-
tion of conventional banking by Islamic banks operating in 
the Maldives. Windows for IB are explicitly permitted (s 11 
the 2010 Act). The exclusion from participating in trade and 
other commercial activities does not apply expressly to IB [s 
26(b) the 2010 Act]. A similar exemption is granted to IB in 
that such banks may expressly provide finance to commercial 
and industrial activities [s 31(a) the 2010 Act]. The necessity 
of these loopholes is a result of the ‘participation’ or ‘profit 
and loss sharing’ basis upon which the major transactions in 
IB are conducted. Islamic banks may take deposits, offer in-
vestment products, leasing (ijarah), debit/credit cards, safety 
deposit boxes, money transfers, and letter of credit facilities 
(s 11 the 2010 Act); they may also function as trustees, based 
on wakalah or agency agreements in Arab and Islamic law.43 
The MMA’s overarching regulation that supplements 
the 2010 Act is the Islamic Banking Regulations 201144 (the 
“2011 Regs”) which came into force the month before the 
41 Malaysia Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 s 97 and 
s 99. Contrast English common law basis: Tournier v National 
Provincial and Union Bank of England  [1924] 1 KB 461 (CA).
42 s 115, definitions,  accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.mma.
gov.mv/laws.php. 
43 In what is likely a translation error, s 11(d) the 2010 Act states 
“Grant loan or debt based [sic] on contracts acceptable in Islamic 
Sharī‘ah.” This section references services “as being appropriate 
to be carried by Islamic banks” [11(j)]. 
44 Link to the Act, accessed October 1, 2013, http://www.mma.
gov.mv/laws.php. 
licensing of the MIB. These regulations broadly stipulate 
that “All operations of Islamic banks shall comply with all 
the requirements of Islamic Sharī‘ah” [s 5(b) 2011 Regs]; this 
subsection ignores the fact that Sharī‘ah is not monolithic, 
but is rather multifarious and sometimes contradictory. Such 
pluralism might be seen as a strength of Islamic law (in view 
of the sheer size and diversity of locales in which it has his-
torically applied in whole or, more often, in part), with the 
existence of distinct (but largely overlapping and congruent) 
schools of law (madhāhib). Defining terms the 2011 regs state 
Islamic Sharī‘ah means, the Holy Qurān and the ways pre-
ferred by the learned people within the community and fol-
lowers of the Sunnah in relation to criminal, civil, personal 
and other matters found in the Sunnah [s 27(a)]
The Sunnah encompasses both the Qur’ān, and the ha-
dith – the words and actions of the Islamic Prophet Muham-
mad. This definition of Sharī‘ah effectively recasts the issue 
of mandatory compliance to all requirements – of a mixed 
or contradictory legal code. By doing so, it appears to solve 
one problem (the impossibility of compliance with an entire 
code, some provisions of which are inconsistent with others) 
but at the same time creates another problem. The definition 
at s 27(a) supposes the existence of a hierarchy of both delin-
eations of the content of Sharī‘ah, and interpretations of that 
content. The concept of ‘preference’ invoked here implies a 
choice of ‘ways’; ‘ways’ in this context in turn implies particu-
lar rules. Therefore by exercising preference the authorities 
decide what rules Sharī‘ah consists in and which interpreta-
tions of those set of rules (and more broadly principles) ought 
to be ‘preferred’ (over others) and therefore applied. The invo-
cation of the learned observer, as it was, and the faithful fol-
lowers of the Sunnah thereby answers the ambiguity created 
by s 5(b), but creates another source of uncertainty: who are 
the learned and the faithful adherents of the Sunnah? How 
are they identified? MMA guidance alludes to the written 
material of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh),45 which could pro-
45 s 9(c) “Guidelines for the Approval of Islamic Products by the 
Sharī‘ah Council of MMA,” accessed October 1, 2013, http://
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vide a further basis for resolving disputes regarding interpre-
tation. However, determinations must also be made about 
which written material – for example, hadith (the exemplary 
actions of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad) – is relevant and 
should be followed. In summary, the issue of authority and 
interpretation reduces to an issue of corporate governance: 
the selection of the learned and the conditions under which 
they rule on Sharī‘ah compliance.
Sharī‘ah compliance necessitates a distinctive set of 
standards regarding the sources and determination of religious 
authority, undergirded by norms and standards of corporate 
governance. An additional explanation for the asymmetry 
between treatments of corporate governance in conventional 
and Islamic banks is the centrality of a supplementary body 
in IB, which the 2010 Act terms a Sharī‘ah Committee [s 
10(c)] (the “Committee”). The success or failure of IB in the 
Maldives as elsewhere largely hinges upon the knowledge, 
diligence and effectiveness of the Committee. It must consist 
in at least three “members from among Islamic doctrinal spe-
cialists, who have previous experience in the area of Islamic 
financing” [s 13(a) the 2011 regs]. The previous experience 
required of Committee members is “a formal qualification” 
or the possession of “necessary knowledge, expertise or ex-
perience; in the area of Islamic jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh) 
or Islamic transaction/commercial law (fiqh al-mu’amalāt)” 
[s 14(a) the 2011 regs]. The Islamic bank’s board appoints 
the members of the Committee subject to MMA approval 
[s 13(b) the 2011 regs]. Members of the Committee must, 
like administrators and major shareholders of conventional 
banks, satisfy the same fit and proper persons test as set out 
in the 2010 Act. 
The essential function of the Committee is the de-
sign and enforcement of new ‘products’ that comply with 
Sharī‘ah. Products are the base unit of analysis throughout 
the review process. Standard form products furnish banks of 
all kinds several  advantages with respect to efficiency and 
marketing,46 and offer a marginal decrease in transaction 
costs due to economies of scale and reduced compliance and 
enforcement costs. Following the example of Malaysia, the 
MMR has implemented a two-tier system of corporate gov-
ernance, which is the channel through which new products 
receive review and prior approval before an individual Islamic 
bank can offer them to their customers or to the public. In 
addition to the Committee, the MMA has established a high-
er-level tribunal called the Sharī‘ah Council (the “Council”), 
which serves as a reference and advisory body to the MMA.47 
The Council is responsible for validating all Islamic banking 
and finance operations to ensure their compatibility with 
principles and laws of Sharī‘ah. In addition, it advises MMA 
on any Sharī‘ah issues relating to Islamic financial activities 
or transactions of the Authority.48 
www.mma.gov.mv/laws.php. 
46 Cranston, above, n 39, 133.
47 s 6, above, n 45.
48 s 7, above, n 45.
Bank management is obligated to refer all Sharī‘ah is-
sues to the Committee and is in turn bound by their deter-
minations.49 The Committee reviews and may propose new 
products at the level of the head office. It then submits all 
products that they themselves have approved in summary 
form to the Council [s 10(a) and 10(b)], the Secretariat of 
which determines whether or not the submission qualifies as 
a new product [s 10(e)]. ‘New’ products include those never 
approved by the Council and those already approved by the 
Council for other banks, or those products that combine or 
hybridise products available at the same or another bank [s 
11(a) and (b)]. However, “as long as there are no material 
changes” to a product (relative to the products already avail-
able at the bank whose Committee is making the submis-
sion) re-submission and endorsement by the Council is not 
required [s 8(b)]. If the Secretariat decides that the submitted 
product is a new product, then that product must be for-
warded to the full Council (s 10). There is no avenue of ap-
peal regarding this determination. The Council must approve 
the product before the bank may offer it to (prospective) cus-
tomers.50 
In summary the written regulatory standards and pru-
dential and corporate governance of IB in the Maldives is 
more highly developed and systematic than that governing 
the conventional banking sector. The 2010 Act constitutes a 
major shift toward a sounder, more modern and more sophis-
ticated banking industry. Given the relative novelty of this 
Act and all MMA published standards and guidance it would 
be premature to assess here the efficacy of the framework, and 
there do remain lacunae in the areas of corporate governance 
– of conventional banks in particular. 
III. ThE BANKINg ANd FINANcIAL SERVIcES LANd-
SCAPE
A. The Banking and Financial Services Environment prior 
to the MIB
The Capital Market Development Authority 
(“CMDA”) of the Maldives was established in 2006. In 
addition to regulating the capital market, it also regulates 
pension funds, the Maldives Stock Exchange, the Securities 
Depository and credit rating agencies. The head of Islamic 
Finance at the CMDA observed that the banking system 
has not served the whole population of the country “in an 
even-handed way,” with rural customers (outside of Male’) 
poorly served, if at all by banks.51 The Maldives consists in a 
49 [s 16 (g) 2011 Regs] The section references in the remainder 
of this paragraph are to the “Guidelines for Approval of Islamic 
Products” (above n 45).
50 The  “Guidelines for Approval of Islamic Products” (ibid) 
outlines the review process at the level of each tier, by means of 
flow charts and detailed procedures. 
51 Aishath Muneeza, in n.a., “The Maldives Edge Towards 
a Fully Fledged Islamic Capital Market,” New Horizon, 
January 1, 2012, accessed October 24, 2013, http://
www.newhorizonislamicbanking.com/index.cfm?section 
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series of atolls, each composed of a number of islands, many 
of which are uninhabited and which are separated by many 
miles of the Indian Ocean. The population is divided among 
201 populated islands, only two of which have populations 
over 10,000; 142 of these islands host populations under 
1,000, with more than half of these being occupied by fewer 
than 500 people.52 Compounded by the absence of swift and 
economical means of travel (with seaplanes the only viable 
option in many cases), supplying branch or even automated 
services across such an expanse is costly. The overwhelming 
concentration of wealth and economic activity takes place in 
Male’. The foreseeable rewards from a retail bank’s perspec-
tive have not warranted investment in the development of a 
banking structure in other islands or atolls. The World Bank 
undertook the Maldives Mobile Phone Banking Project in 
2008 (with a closing date of December 31, 2013) to help 
redress unequal banking access.53
When the MIB entered the Maldives banking scene 
there were six banks: the Bank of the Maldives Plc (in opera-
tion since 1982, partly owned by the government and regard-
ed as the national bank); a branch of the State Bank of India 
(opened 1974); Habib Bank Limited (opened 1976); the 
Bank of Ceylon (opened 1981); a branch of the Hong Kong 
Shanghai Banking Corporation commonly known as HSBC 
Bank (opened 2002); and a branch of Mauritius Commercial 
Bank Ltd (opened 2008).54 For much of its modern history, 
then, the Maldives was served by 2 or 4 banks, with two re-
cent entrants from abroad since 2000, prior to the opening 
of the MIB. 
The Maldives is the only upper middle-income level 
country in South Asia; it has a GNI per capita (Atlas method) 
of US$5,750, whereas its closest rival in this world region is 
Sri Lanka at US$2,920.55 The population qualifies the Mal-
dives as a microstate, with just fewer than 299,000 in total, 
with more than one third resident in Male’.56 Compared 
to the developed world the financial resources available to 
Maldivians for deposit and investment is not very enticing 
to global banks, and these demographic and developmental 
factors surely help explain the limited banking infrastructure; 
and the monopoly Indian or Maldivian state banks held for 
decades. With the exception of HSBC all conventional banks 
in the Maldives are either domestic – or regional, with head 
offices in neighbouring Indian Ocean countries (India, Sri 
=features&action=view&id=11254   
52 Maldives Department of National Planning, 
“Graph  PP  26:  Number  of  inhabited  Islands  by   
size of population, 2000 – 2006,” accessed October 28, 2013, 
http://www.planning.gov.mv/publications/Population%20
and%20Housing%20Census%202006/graphs/PP26.htm. 
53 Worldbank.org, accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.
worldbank.org/projects/P107981/maldives-mobile-phone-
banking-project?lang=en&tab=overview. 
54 Above, n 51.
55 World Bank.org, above, n 32.
56 As of the last census (2006), Maldives Department of National 
Planning accessed October 14, 2013, http://www.planning.
gov.mv/publications/Population%20and%20Housing%20
Census%202006/home.htm.
Lanka, and Mauritius). 
The chief precedent to Islamic finance or banking 
before the MIB was Islamic insurance (takaful) offered by 
Amanah Takaful, a company incorporated in Sri Lanka. It 
operated under a conventional insurance license, in lieu of 
any takaful law or regulation. The legislation, regulation and 
the prudential guidelines cited in section II are all of recent 
origin. The conventional banking law itself is under five years 
old, and to all appearances promulgated in contemplation of 
an expansion of the banking sector into IB. The gap available 
for the MIB to fill is a wide one, because of the constraints 
on the banking sector and its infrastructure historically in the 
Maldives, the novelty and unfamiliarity of the regulatory en-
vironment created by recent legislation and prudential gov-
ernance, and as a result of the popular desire for the services 
that an Islamic bank can provide -- in a country where de-
mand for many years went unmet. 
B. Maldives Islamic Bank Pvt Ltd
The MIB is a private limited company. ICDP – which 
is a subsidiary of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and 
is based in Jeddah – holds an 85% stake. The government 
of the Maldives holds the remaining 15%.57 The Chairman 
of the Board of Directors of the MIB58 is Khaled Moham-
med Al-Aboodi, CEO and general manager of ICDP59 and 
a Saudi national. According to the CEO (a Malaysian na-
tional) the bank entered the market with capital of MVR150 
million (US$9.7 million at current exchange rates).60 The 
current total share capital is MVR165 million (US$10.72 
million).61 The MIB states that it “shall participate actively in 
the development and promotion of an Islamic economic and 
financial system in the Maldives to run parallel with the exist-
ing conventional system as its contribution to the betterment 
of the economic well-being of the ummah generally.”62 The 
‘ummah’ refers to the community of the Muslim faithful; it 
can refer to a transnational community or, as is likely here, to 
the community in a single country. The bank positions itself 
as a parallel system, although it cannot be denied that the 
relationship implies some competition particularly since the 
market for banking deposits and customers is constrained. 
The effort to raise awareness about IB may tap into a pool 
of customers not previously patronizing banks, although the 
57 MMR, “Financial Institutions Directory,” accessed October 14, 
2013, http://www.mma.gov.mv/fi.php?itm=6.
58 “The MIB Annual Report” (for year concluding 31 December 
2011), accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.mib.com.mv/
downloads.
59 ICDP webpage, accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.icdidb.
com/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://961c134
6524442245db81ce090d55790. 
60 JJ Robinson, “Maldives First Islamic Bank Opens for Business,” 
Minivan News, March 7, 2013, accessed October 28, 2013, 
http://minivannews.com/news-in-brief/maldives-first-islamic-
bank-opens-for-business-16875. 
61 MIB webpage, accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.mib.
com.mv/pages/view/about-us-introduction.
62 Above, n 60.
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population unaccustomed to banking is more likely to reside 
outside of Male and thus may not be within the catchment 
area of the MIB.
As in other jurisdictions legislative and tax reforms are 
necessary for IB to compete with conventional banking. Be-
fore the opening, the MIB’s CEO Harith Harun noted the 
existence of laws prohibiting the foreign ownership of land, 
which would cramp bank operations; he also noted the exist-
ence of a “disadvantageous” 15 percent tax on the transfer of 
property. 63 That tax remains in effect.64 
As yet, the MIB has done little to increase the availabil-
ity of banking services outside Male’. While the MIB prom-
ises E-banking, for now it only has two ATMs, located in 
the head office in Male’.65 The MIB at present offers the core 
products of an Islamic bank, murabaha, istisna and mushar-
aka; remittance services; and shipping, motorbike, phone, 
consumer goods and construction financing. In specific re-
gard to the fishing industry, the MIB offers murabaha vessel 
financing. Considering the services the MIB provides, as well 
as its fee structure, it is apparent that it is working to respond 
to local needs. For example: motorbikes are the chief form 
of motorized transport in Male’, and mobile telephone sub-
scriptions number over 530,000 – with market penetration of 
163%66 -- so financing these implements of daily life is a valu-
able contribution. Facilitating the construction and purchase 
or lease of fishing boats also responds to the stated objectives 
of the bank with respect to the fishing industry. The MIB also 
offers home financing by means of diminishing musharaka.
On the finance side of Islamic banking in the Maldives, 
the CDMA seeks to develop an Islamic securities market, and 
is working to develop a legal framework to facilitate private 
and public issues of Sharī’ah-compliant instruments, with a 
view towards emulating the Malaysian Islamic Capital Mar-
ket model.67 The CDMA’s objectives for 2011-2014 also 
include the establishment of a Shari’ah Advisory committee 
to advise on an Islamic capital market, to develop and pro-
mote Islamic capital products, and to raise public awareness 
of Islamic finance. The training and education of personnel 
and compliance officers, who are responsible for generational 
projects, as much as any other consideration, may decide the 
success or failure of IB in the Maldives. Although there may 
be tension between the outside consultants, and questions 
that the Malaysian and the Emirati authorities would answer 
differently, the involvement of those with longer experience 
63 Ibid
64 Doingbusiness.org (under auspices of the World Bank), “Paying 
taxes in the Maldives,” accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.
doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/maldives/paying-
taxes.
65  MIB webpage, “MIB launches ATM service in Maldives,” dated 
March 14, 2012, accessed October 28, 2013, http://www.mib.
com.mv/posts/view/mib-launches-atm-service-in-maldives. 
Remainder of the paragraph draws on the MIB webpage.
66  As at 2011 year’s end, by Zulekha Ibrahim, “Communications 
Authority of the Maldives Report,” accessed October 28, 2013, 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Documents/events/
wtim2012/015INF-E_doc.Pdf.
67  Interview of Fatimath Shafeega, CEO of CMDA (above, n 51).
in Islamic banking and finance is also a major change from 
the past when banking in the Maldives was the domain of a 
more limited range of players. 
IV. coNcLuSIoN
Far from creating demand for IB, and relieved of the 
necessity of doing so, the MIB entered a market which had 
been waiting eagerly for a bank that would allow a wide swath 
of Maldivian society to conduct their financial and banking 
affairs in a manner more consistent with their religious and 
moral beliefs. The MIB has therefore capitalized on a new 
market, and one where enthusiasm for IB exceeded knowl-
edge about IB. That market is located, however, in a regula-
tory environment with a short history and a rapidly changing 
character. 
The Maldives poses some difficult challenges to con-
ventional banks, and Islamic banks encounter additional 
challenges due to the trading and commercial nexus, and 
the corporate governance difficulties attendant to Sharī‘ah 
compliance. There is no instant solution to the shortage of 
skilled bank employees and knowledgeable Sharī‘ah advisers 
from the Maldives. The inequality of banking access is a still 
greater challenge requiring further investment and ingenuity, 
although one which technological fixes (employing mobile 
phone and broadband) are beginning to meet. Lastly, the im-
portance of the MIB as a local and domestic enterprise, and 
one which responds to the needs of Maldivians should not 
be ignored. 
Whatever the shortcomings of the MIB and the legal 
and regulatory environment in which it is located, the com-
mencement of IB in the Maldives and the symbolism attach-
ing to the MIB responds to more than purely economic or 
commercial needs and begins to address the desires and aspi-
rations of a people.
(All photos in this article are courtesy of the President’s Of-
fice. Taken at the opening ceremony of the Maldives Islamic 
Bank, in Male’, Maldives, on 7 May 2011.)
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ABSTRACT
On April 23, 1975, South Korea ratified the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). With 
the decision to ratify the NPT, President Chung Hee Park 
imposed significant constraints on his clandestine plans to 
develop nuclear weapons. Considering Park’s deep distrust of 
the United States and increased provocations by North Korea 
in the early 1970s, this decision had tremendous implications 
for South Korea’s security. While this decision has important 
implications for the future of nuclear proliferation, most 
studies on South Korea’s nuclear weapons program thus far 
have focused on how Park began his nuclear weapons pro-
gram and do not address this issue. After the close examina-
tion of South Korea’s decision to ratify the NPT, I argue that 
the U.S. pressure was the main constraint to South Korea’s 
nuclear program. In addition, I assert that Park’s intention 
with nuclear weapons program changed over time, which is 
why many scholars have been perplexed about whether he 
truly intended to develop nuclear weapons or not. 
INTRoducTIoN 
 
On April 23, 1975, South Korea ratified the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). With 
the decision to ratify the NPT, President Chung Hee Park 
imposed significant constraints on his clandestine plans to 
develop nuclear weapons. Considering Park’s deep distrust of 
the United States and increased provocations by North Korea 
in the early 1970s, this decision had tremendous implications 
for South Korea’s security. While some experts argue that 
South Korea made further attempts to develop nuclear weap-
ons after 1975, the nation has continued to be a member of 
the NPT since ratification and still has not developed its own 
nuclear weapons. Why did Park decide to ratify the NPT in 
the middle of his ambitious plan to develop nuclear weapons? 
What implications does the case of South Korea reveal for 
U.S. policy makers? While these are research questions that 
have important implications for the future of nuclear non-
proliferation, most studies on South Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program thus far have focused on how Park began his nuclear 
weapons program and do not address these questions.1  
1 Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, ed., 
The Nuclear Tipping Point : Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear 
Why SouTh KoREA RATIFIEd 
ThE TREATy oN ThE NoN-
PRoLIFERATIoN oF NucLEAR 
WEAPoNS (NPT) IN 1975 
IMPLIcATIoNS FoR ThE FuTuRE oF NoN-PRoLIFERATIoN EFFoRTS
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To answer the questions outlined above, I seek to ex-
plain why South Korea decided to ratify the NPT in 1975 
when its clandestine plans to develop nuclear weapons had 
achieved a certain degree of success. By closely examining 
the history of South Korea’s nuclear weapons program and 
President Park’s intentions behind the program, I argue that 
the U.S. pressure was the main constraint to South Korea’s 
nuclear program. In addition, I assert that Park’s intention 
with nuclear weapons program changed over time, which is 
why many scholars have been perplexed about whether he 
truly intended to develop nuclear weapons or not. In the 
early stages of South Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Park 
sincerely hoped to develop nuclear weapons because he be-
lieved that the U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea was 
inevitable. As South Korea’s enhanced nuclear knowledge and 
capabilities gave Park increased bargaining leverage against 
the United States, however, Park changed his position and 
used the program as a bargaining tool to ensure continued 
U.S. commitments to South Korea. 
There are some challenges in assessing President Park’s 
intentions behind his nuclear weapons program. First, South 
Korea in the 1960s and 1970s was under Park’s authoritar-
ian rule. Park executed constitutional reforms to allow his 
third term in 1969 and declared martial law in 1972, which 
made Park the ultimate decision maker in South Korea. This 
one-man system makes analyzing Park’s intentions more dif-
ficult. Even Park’s close associates at the time often debate 
over Park’s intentions behind the nuclear weapons program.2 
Second, there are few sources covering the political decision 
making process in South Korea during this time. Not only 
was the media strictly controlled by the state, but govern-
ment officials were also not free to express their opinions. Of 
the relevant documents that do exist, many remain classified. 
There is also a challenge with assessing the effectiveness of the 
Choices. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); 
Chul-ho Cho,  “1970 nyŏndae choban Pak Chŏng-hŭi ui dok-
jajuk haekmugi gaebalgwa Han-Mi kwan’gye [Park Chung Hee’s 
Unilateral Development of Nuclear Weapons in the Early 1970s 
and South Korean-US Relations].” Peace Studies, Vol. 9 (Decem-
ber 2000).; Sung Gul Hong,  “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s 
Nuclear Option.” The Park Chung Hee Era. Byung-kook Kim 
and Ezra Vogel, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); 
Young-Sun Ha, Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea, 
(Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983); Wookhee Shin, 
Sunŭng kwa chŏhang ŭl nŏmŏsŏ : Yi Sŭng-man kwa Pak Chŏng-
hŭi ŭi taemi chŏngch’aek [Beyond Compliance and Resistance: 
The Policies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee toward the 
United States], (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2010).
2 Don Oberdorfer,  The Two Koreas: a Contemporary History, 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 73-74.
NPT using the case of South Korea. As Christopher Way and 
Karthika Sasikumar note, the NPT commands near-universal 
adherence, and its signatories have not pursued nuclear weap-
ons with very few known exceptions.3 These facts make it dif-
ficult to test whether signing the NPT makes any difference 
in a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons.  
While the aforementioned challenges present some dif-
ficulties, it is not impossible to examine why South Korea 
decided to ratify the NPT in 1975. Former South Korean 
government officials have shared their experiences with South 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and various scholars have 
closely examined President Park’s leadership style and deci-
sion making processes. A careful assessment of these relevant 
studies and documents helps enlarge the understanding of 
Park’s decision to ratify the NPT in 1975. To achieve its in-
tended objective, this paper proceeds as follows. First, the pa-
per examines the history of South Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program. This section seeks to explain why the South Korean 
government began the program in the early 1970s and exam-
ine steps that Seoul pursued to acquire nuclear weapons capa-
bility. Second, the paper analyzes factor(s) that may have led 
to South Korea’s ratification of the NPT in 1975. This sec-
tion identifies potential constraints to South Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program and applies each factor to the case of South 
Korea. Third, the paper assesses President Park’s intentions 
behind the nuclear weapons program. This section looks into 
studies on President Park’s leadership style and various com-
ments by Park’s close associates to figure out whether Park 
truly intended to develop nuclear weapons or not. The fourth 
section then analyzes implications this research has on policy 
makers in South Korea and the United States.  Finally, the 
last section concludes the discussion of South Korea’s nuclear 
weapons. 
ThE hISToRy oF SouTh KoREA’S NucLEAR WEAP-
oNS PRogRAM 
The Beginning of South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program 
(early 1970s)
To understand the history of South Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program, it is necessary to analyze how the program 
began. In this regard, South Korea-U.S. relations in the late 
1960s and early 1970s played an important role as South Ko-
3 Christopher Way  and Karthika Sasikumar, “Leaders and Leg-
gards: When and Why do Countries Sign the NPT?”, Note 
De Recherche Working Paper 16, McGill University Research 
Group in International Security  (2005). 
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rea was heavily dependent on the United States for its own 
security. In the 1960s, South Korea-U.S. relations were in a 
period of relative closeness as President Park fully supported 
the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War by dispatching 
South Korean troops to aid in the war effort. In return for his 
decision, Park received increased economic and military assis-
tance and public gratitude from the Johnson administration. 
These developments helped Park stabilize his domestic power 
base by strengthening South Korea’s economy and ensuring 
U.S. commitment to South Korea’s security. Park continued 
to demonstrate his confidence in South Korea-U.S. relations 
by increasing troop commitments to Vietnam despite North 
Korea’s hostile reaction to Park’s involvement in the Vietnam 
War.4 South Korea-U.S. relations took a sharp turn, however, 
when 31 armed soldiers from North Korea attacked the Blue 
House and tried to assassinate Park on January 21, 1968. 
President Park was furious about this event and requested 
U.S. support for a major military retaliation against North 
Korea. The Johnson administration rejected this request and 
stated that the United States would not participate nor allow 
any retaliation. (At the time, not only was the United States 
heavily involved in the Vietnam War, but it also was engaged 
in secret, bilateral negotiations with North Korea over the re-
lease of the Pueblo crew who had been captured by the North 
Korean Navy on January 23, 1968.5) The South Korean gov-
ernment was shocked by the “unduly mild and selfish U.S. 
responses,” and the feeling of betrayal towards the United 
States dominated the minds of policy makers in Seoul.6
The Nixon Doctrine intensified such feelings of be-
trayal towards the United States. On July 23, 1969, President 
Nixon announced a shift in U.S. foreign policy by sharing 
his intention to reduce U.S. commitments in Asia during an 
informal press conference in Guam.7 Then, on November 3, 
1969, President Nixon made this doctrine official through 
his address to the nation. In a speech known as “the great si-
lent majority,” he called on U.S. allies “to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”8 
It is known that Park was initially relaxed about the Nixon 
Doctrine, but became very concerned when the U.S. gov-
ernment informed him about its troop withdrawal.9 When 
Ambassador Porter notified President Park of the U.S. deci-
4 Tae Yang Kwak, “The Nixon Doctrine and the Yushin Reforms: 
American Foreign Policy, the Vietnam War, and the Rise of Au-
thoritarianism in Korea, 1968-1973,” The Journal of American-
East Asian Relations 12:1 (Spring-Summer 2003): 37.
5 Ibid., 39. 
6 Princeton Lyman, “Korea’s Involvement in Vietnam,” Orbis 12 
(Summer 1968): 570-571. 
7 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Gros-
set & Dunlap, 1978), 394-395.
8 Richard Nixon, Richard Nixon: Speeches, Writings, Documents, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 181.
9 “Henry Kissinger provides President Richard M. Nixon with 
a summary of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman General 
Earle Wheeler’s conversation with South Korean President Park 
Chung Hee,” Declassified Documents Reference System (Gale Data-
bases), Memo, (White House, Secret, Issue Date: Nov 25, 1969, 
Date Declassified: Jul 28, 2003). 
sion to withdraw troops, Park became enraged. Stating that it 
was too early to withdraw the U.S. troops from South Korea, 
President Park strongly disagreed with Washington’s unilat-
eral decision. He also insisted that the United States did not 
have the right to reduce troop levels from South Korea.10 The 
South Korean government publicly denounced the U.S. deci-
sion. Accusing the United States of making “a breach of inter-
national faith,” an anonymous high-ranking aide of President 
Park asserted that “President Johnson, former Secretary of 
State Rusk, a commander of United States military forces in 
South Korea and an American Ambassador to South Korea all 
promised that the United States would not pull troops out… 
now they are talking about pulling their forces out… and we 
are very disappointed.”11 
Moreover, the South Korean government insisted that 
it was not yet capable of defending itself from North Korea 
and needed more time to build its capacity. The aforemen-
tioned high-ranking official claimed that 1975 would be the 
earliest date by which the United States could safely withdraw 
its forces from Korea.12 He emphasized that South Koreans 
did not wish the United States to stay in Korea forever, but ar-
gued South Korea needed more time to become stronger. He 
also noted that President Nixon was seeking to reduce U.S. 
forces from South Korea when Communist China was in-
creasing its support to North Korea and warned Washington 
that the power vacuum created by the U.S. troop withdrawal 
could lead South Korean people to “consider an alternative 
commitment.” suggesting a possibility of South Koreans tak-
ing a drastic precautionary measure.13 
In response to the worsening relationship between 
South Korea and the United States, President Park began to 
consider alternatives to ensure the security of South Korea. In 
his January 1971 press conference, Park quoted from a Chi-
nese military treatise, Sunzi’s The Art of War, and argued that 
South Korea should not “assume the enemy will not come, 
but rather [should] rely on one’s readiness to meet him.”14 
Therefore, Park stated, South Korea should find ways to de-
ter against the provocations from North Korea. In explaining 
how to achieve such deterrence, Park said that “the only meth-
od… is to develop South Korea’s national power.”15 This is the 
evidence to show that the application of the Nixon Doctrine 
to South Korea had significantly altered Park’s threat percep-
tion and that Park began thinking about measures to improve 
South Korea’s capacity to defend its own territory and people 
against external threats. 
10 Cho, “1970 nyŏndae choban Pak Chŏng-hŭi ui dokjajuk haek-
mugi gaebalgwa Han-Mi kwan’gye [Park Chung Hee’s Unilateral 
Development of Nuclear Weapons in the Early 1970s and South 
Korean-US Relations],” 199.
11 Philip Shabecoff, “Seoul Protests U.S. Plan for Withdrawal,” 
New York Times, June 17, 1970. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Chung Hee Park, Pak Chŏng-hŭi Taetʻongnyŏng yŏnsŏl munjip 
[Compilation of Speeches by President Park Chung Hee], (Seoul: 
Office of the Secretary to the President, 1971), 51. 
15 Ibid. 
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President Park seemed to have found his answer in 
nuclear weapons program. On November 10, 1971, Park 
called his close aide, Won-chul Oh of the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry, and told him that “our national security 
is vulnerable because of the U.S. troop withdrawal. To be-
come secure and independent, we need to free ourselves from 
dependence on U.S. nuclear umbrella… Can we develop 
nuclear weapons?”16 This is generally interpreted as an order 
to start developing nuclear weapons, not simply a question.17 
Geun-hye Park, the current president of South Korea and the 
daughter of Chung Hee Park, also recollected that her father 
launched the nuclear weapons program when the United 
States unilaterally withdrew its troops in 1971 despite his re-
peated requests to Washington to reconsider the decision.18
Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Weapons and the Ratification of 
the NPT (early – mid 1970s)
After making the decision to develop a nuclear weapons 
program, Chung Hee Park created the Agency for Defense 
Development (ADD) to begin research and development 
on nuclear weapons design and explosion technologies and 
made the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) 
to assist the ADD with efforts to import nuclear reprocess-
ing technologies and facilities from abroad. In May 1972, 
a South Korean delegation of scientists and bureaucrats led 
by Hyong-sop Choe made a visit to France to seek nuclear 
reprocessing technology.19 France had significant economic 
interests in selling their nuclear technologies, thus the two 
nations considered each other to be partners. The delegation 
succeeded in making an agreement with France on the sale of 
nuclear reprocessing and fuel fabrication technology. In late 
1973, the ADD submitted a secret plan to develop nuclear 
weapons. This plan proposed to develop a plutonium bomb 
of 20 kilotons, which was similar in size to the bomb dropped 
on Nagasaki, and estimated that $1.5 to $2 billion would be 
required to carry out this plan.20 The most difficult hurdle for 
South Korea was the acquisition of weapons-grade fissile ma-
terial. To overcome this problem, South Korea collaborated 
with France in the mid-1970s to produce the technical design 
of a reprocessing plant to manufacture fissionable plutoni-
um.21 At the same time, KAERI was negotiating a separate 
deal with Canada to construct a heavy-water reactor called 
CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) reactor to acquire 
spent fuel required for the production of fissionable pluto-
16 Joongang Ilbosa, Sillok Pak Chŏng-hŭi Sidae Tʻŭkpyŏl 
Chʻwijaetʻim [Joongang Ilbo’s Special Coverage Team], Sillok 
Pak Chŏng-hŭi [The Chronicles of Park Chung Hee], (Seoul: 
Joongang M&B, 1998), 260-261.
17 Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” 483. 
18 Yong-won Yu, “Park Geun-hye Chŭngŏn: Aboji ui chugum kwa 
haek kaebal [Park Geun-hye’s Testimony: Father’s Death and 
Nuclear Development],” Wolgan Chosun (April 1992), 228-229. 
19 Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” 489. 
20 Ibid., 491. 
21 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: a Contemporary History, 69.  
nium.22 
While South Korea was actively seeking the capability 
to develop nuclear weapons, India tested its nuclear weapons 
on May 18, 1974. This event suggested Washington increased 
possibilities of nuclear proliferation and greatly alarmed U.S. 
policy makers.23 Suddenly, preventing further nuclear pro-
liferation became a high-priority in the United States, and 
U.S intelligence officials began intelligence analysis to iden-
tify countries with ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. In 
December 1974, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Richard 
Sneider sent a highly classified intelligence assessment to Sec-
retary of State Henry Kissinger and said that South Korea 
had “decided to proceed with the initial phases of a nuclear 
weapons development program.”24 This led to an interagency 
study in Washington, which concluded that South Korea 
could develop a limited nuclear weapon and delivery system 
within ten years.25 With this conclusion, the United States 
began to put pressure on other nuclear supplier nations to 
prevent South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons capa-
bilities.26 For example, the United States pressed both France 
and Canada to get South Korea ratify the NPT. 
When Canada acceded to the U.S. demand and placed 
the ratification of the NPT as a condition to South Korea, 
Park took measures to ratify the NPT to demonstrate its 
“peaceful intentions” with the purchase of Canadian reac-
tor.27 On March 14, 1975, Foreign Minister Dong-jo Kim at-
tended the 2nd Foreign Affairs Committee of the 91st National 
Assembly Meeting and stated that “by becoming a member 
of [the NPT], South Korea promises not to acquire, produce 
and transfer nuclear weapons.”28 During this meeting, South 
Korean national assemblyman Young-kwan Choo asked why 
South Korea was ratifying the NPT when the North did not 
ratify the treaty and what would happen if North Korea uni-
laterally develops nuclear weapons.29 Foreign Minister Kim 
answered that he did not believe North Koreans possessed the 
22 Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” 491. 
23 Immediately after India’s nuclear test, the U.S. National Security 
Council produced a classified assessment that re-examined U.S. 
non-proliferation strategy and analyzed influences on potential 
proliferators such as Japan and Pakistan. See “U.S. Non-prolifer-
ation Policy,” Digital National Security Archives, (U.S. National 
Security Council, Secret, Report, Excised Copy, NSSM 202 Re-
lated, c. May 23, 1974).
24 “U.S. Ambassador Richard Sneider updates Secretary of State/
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger on evidence that 
South Korea plans to proceed with the initial phases of a nu-
clear weapons development program,” Declassified Documents 
Reference System (Gale Databases), Cable, (U.S. Department of 
State, Secret, Issue Date: Dec 2, 1974, Date Declassified: Jun 23, 
2010).
25 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: a Contemporary History, 69-70.
26 Ibid., 70. 
27 Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” 492. 
28 “The 2nd Foreign Affairs Committee at the 91st National Assem-
bly Meeting,” South Korea’s National Assembly Knowledge Man-
agement System, March 14, 1975, <http://likms.assembly.go.kr/
record/index.html> (accessed on June 5, 2013).
29 Ibid.
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ability to develop nuclear weapons at the time.30 While there 
were some discussions about the ratification of the NPT at 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, this issue was not discussed 
extensively at the plenary session. Notes regarding the 4th Ple-
nary Session of the 91st National Assembly Meeting state that 
opposition leaders were occupying the main chamber during 
the session, thus the ruling party members moved to a differ-
ent venue and passed 26 agendas including the ratification of 
the NPT.31 Korean newspapers noted that opposition leaders 
were occupying the main chamber to demonstrate their op-
position toward the revision of the South Korean criminal 
law.32 An unintended consequence of this protest was that the 
ratification of the NPT was not debated at the main session 
of the National Assembly meeting. In any case, it is necessary 
to note that Park’s initial reason to ratify the NPT was to get 
CANDU reactors to make fissionable plutonium necessary to 
make nuclear bombs. In later sections, I seek to demonstrate 
that Park’s intention behind his nuclear weapons changes dra-
matically after the ratification of the NPT in 1975.  
 
South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program after the Ratifi-
cation of the NPT 
After the ratification of the NPT, direct U.S. pressure 
to South Korea increased. The U.S. government’s declassified 
documents suggest that there was a bureaucratic concurrence 
in Washington on pushing South Korea not to proceed with 
its plans to build plutonium reprocessing plant.33 The United 
States threatened that purchasing reprocessing plants could 
“jeopardize U.S. peaceful nuclear assistance, particularly a 
pending Export-Import Bank loan for the KORI-II, [South 
Korea’s] second U.S.-built power reactor.”34 In August 1975, 
Ambassador Sneider met with Hyong-sop Choe, then the 
Minister of Science and Technology, to convince Seoul to 
stop its efforts to build nuclear reprocessing plant.35 When 
U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger met with Presi-
dent Park on August 25, 1975, Schlesinger pushed Park into 
giving up his nuclear weapons program.36 In January 1976, 
a group of U.S. officials visited Seoul to discuss the cancella-
tion of the French reprocessing deal and promised U.S. com-
30 Ibid. 
31 “The 4th Plenary Session at the 91st National Assembly Meeting,” 
South Korea’s National Assembly Knowledge Management System, 
March 19, 1975, <http://likms.assembly.go.kr/kms_data/re-
cord/data1/91/091za0004a.PDF> (accessed on June 5, 2013).
32 “Ruling Party and Opposition Leaders Face One Another at 
the National Assembly’s Main Chamber for the Revision of the 
Criminal Law,” Dong-a Iblo, March 19, 1975. 
33 “Memorandum to Secretary Kissinger from Jan M. Lodal and 
Dave Elliot concerning the U.S. approach to South Korea’s in-
tentions to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France,” 
Declassified Documents Reference System (Gale Databases), Memo, 
(National Security Council, Secret, Issue Date: Jul 24, 1975, 
Date Declassified: Jun 13, 1995).
34 Mitchell Reiss,  Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-
proliferation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 89.
35 Joongang Ilbosa, Sillok Pak Chŏng-hŭi [The Chronicles of Park 
Chung Hee], 269.
36 Ibid.
mitment to assist South Korea’s nuclear development for the 
peaceful use. It is known that the U.S. officials threatened 
to end military assistance if South Korea did not give up the 
program.37 President Park finally declared that South Korea 
would not import reprocessing facilities from France. Fur-
thermore, the plan to import NRX (National Research Ex-
perimental) reactor from Canada came to an end. 
This, however, was not the end of Park’s nuclear weap-
ons program. When President Ford reconfirmed the U.S. se-
curity commitment to South Korea, Park temporarily ended 
his nuclear weapons program.38 When President Carter active-
ly pursued the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in South 
Korea, however, Park resumed the program. KAERI’s nuclear 
reprocessing program changed its name to the Chemical Fuel 
Replacement Project, and South Koreans decided to inde-
pendently develop NRX reactor. Despites Seoul’s efforts to 
conceal its nuclear weapons program, intensified surveillance 
by the U.S. intelligence officer made it almost impossible for 
South Korea to reprocess the spent fuel from light-water re-
actors. Robert Steller, a science attaché in the U.S. embassy 
in Seoul and a CIA agent with expertise in nuclear weapons, 
made unannounced visits to nuclear plants in South Korea to 
keep an eye on South Korea’s reprocessing activities.39 Such 
difficulties did not stop the Park government from pursuing 
nuclear weapons capabilities. Covert operations continued to 
seek nuclear capabilities, and Dr. Dong-hoon Kim, who was 
involved in the nuclear weapons program, suggested that the 
native NRX reactor was to be completed by 1981.40 Accord-
ing to Park’s close associates, if Park was not assassinated in 
1979, South Korea could have acquired plutonium necessary 
for the nuclear bombs by 1985.41 These potential develop-
ments, however, all ended with the assassination of President 
Park on October 26, 1979.                                     
FAcToR(S) ThAT LEd To SouTh KoREA’S RATIFIcA-
TIoN oF ThE NPT
Was the U.S. pressure the sole reason for South Korea 
to ratify the NPT? To fully understand the history of South 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it is necessary to further 
examine the factors that led to South Korea’s decision to ratify 
the NPT. There are several potential factors that constrain 
a state’s nuclear weapons program. Dong-joon Jo and Erik 
Gartzke suggest that technologies to manufacture nuclear 
weapons, acquisition of nuclear fissile materials and econom-
37 Ibid., p. 271.
38 Yu, “Park Geun-hye Chŭngŏn: Aboji ui chugum kwa haek kae-
bal [Park Geun-hye’s Testimony: Father’s Death and Nuclear De-
velopment],” 228-229. 
39 Dr. Chul Kim, who was in charge of developing nuclear fissile 
material, revealed that Steller was a CIA agent and made unan-
nounced visits to the nuclear industrial complex in Daeduk to 
keep an eye on South Korea’s nuclear program. See Joongang Il-
bosa, Sillok Pak Chŏng-hŭi [The Chronicles of Park Chung Hee], 
271- 273.
40 Ibid., p. 274. 
41 Ibid., p. 275.
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ic capacity are factors that allow, but do not necessarily cause, 
a state to develop nuclear weapons.42 This suggestion also 
means that the absence of these factors could constrain a state 
from developing nuclear weapons. Jo and Gartzke further as-
sert that international counter-proliferation efforts could be a 
constraint.43 Jacques Hymans then states that the number of 
institutionalized veto players presents significant constraints 
over a state’s ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.44 I ap-
ply these potential constraints to the case of South Korea to 
see which factor(s) played a restraining role in South Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. 
The first factor is concerned with the technologies to 
develop nuclear weapons. I argue that this factor did not nec-
essarily constrain South Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In 
his cable to the U.S. embassy in Seoul in March 1975, Kiss-
inger stated that “interagency study on South Korean nuclear 
capability… indicates that [the South Korean government] 
could develop limited nuclear weapons and missile capabil-
ity within ten year time frame.”45 Furthermore, by the begin-
ning of 1976, South Korean scientists were known to have 
possessed the theoretical knowledge and technical expertise 
to build nuclear explosives.46 While the scientists in South 
Korea may have acquired technologies to develop nuclear 
weapons in the 1970s, the key hurdle for them was to ac-
quire nuclear fissile materials, which is the second potential 
constraint to South Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In this 
regard, South Korea certainly lacked indigenous capability. 
South Korea sought to overcome this constraint by negotiat-
ing with France to purchase a plutonium reprocessing plant 
and working with Canada to construct a heavy-water reac-
tor using natural uranium. While both France and Canada 
were willing to sell their plants to South Korea for economic 
reasons, the United States fiercely opposed these plans. Due 
to strong U.S. pressure, the French deal was cancelled, and 
Canada reassured the United States that Canadians would 
ensure South Korea to abide by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and NPT regulations. Given 
that reprocessing plutonium became very difficult by the can-
cellation of the French deal and with the IAEA safeguards 
placed on the Canadian reactors, I conclude that U.S. pres-
sure significantly constrained South Korea. 
The third factor to assess is economic capacity. While 
South Korea in the 1970s was not considered to be a devel-
oped nation, it did not lack economic capacity necessary to 
42 Dong-joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:1 (2007): 
167-194. 
43 Ibid., 169. 
44 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and 
Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese 
Bomb,” International Security 36:2 (Fall 2011): 154-189. 
45 “Cable from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarding South 
Korean plans to develop nuclear weapons and missiles,” Declas-
sified Documents Reference System (Gale Databases), Cable, (U.S. 
Department of State, Secret, Issue Date: Mar 4, 1975, Date De-
classified: May 27, 1997).
46 Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, 
89.
develop nuclear weapons. For example, constructing a French 
plutonium reprocessing plant was expected to cost $51 mil-
lion over four years. This amount of investment would not 
have been burdensome to South Korea.47 Young-sun Ha, a 
South Korean scholar who assessed South Korea’s economic 
capacity to build nuclear weapons using the UN Secretary 
General’s 1967 report on proliferation, suggests that econom-
ic costs of a nuclear weapons program did not pose a major 
barrier to proliferation.48 The fourth potential constraint to 
South Korea’s nuclear program is the presence of domestic 
veto players. This constraint did not play a significant role 
in South Korea for two reasons. First, South Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program was a top secret that only a few govern-
ment officials knew. Second, as mentioned above, President 
Park took several measures to strengthen his authoritarian 
power in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, it was 
systematically very difficult for government officials and in-
tellectuals to oppose Park’s decision. Moreover, between 1975 
and 1977, the South Korean National Assembly demonstrat-
ed strong support for the development of a nuclear weap-
ons program, which could be a product of the measures that 
strengthened Park’s authoritarian rule or of South Korean 
politicians’ genuine interest in developing nuclear weapons.49 
In any case, unlike Japan, South Korea faced almost no do-
mestic veto players in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.     
The fifth factor to consider is external pressure against 
proliferation. While the lack of nuclear fissile materials con-
strained South Korea to a certain degree, external pressure 
contributed the most to South Korea’s ratification of the 
NPT. As mentioned above, the 1974 nuclear test by India 
alarmed Washington greatly. When the U.S. intelligence 
found out that South Korea was pursuing nuclear weapons 
program, Washington moved quickly to dismantle the pro-
gram. In December 1974, Ambassador Sneider sent a cable 
to Kissinger and notified that “evidence…justifies strong pre-
sumption that the [South Korean Government] has decided 
to proceed with the initial phases of a nuclear weapons de-
velopment program.”50 Sneider referred to the South Korean 
government’s efforts to “diversify its nuclear reactor sources” 
and to “acquire a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant” as the evi-
dence to support his claim.51 
With this conclusion, the United States employed a 
two-pronged strategy to stop South Korea’s nuclear weap-
ons program. On the one hand, Washington directly pressed 
South Korea. In February 1975, Ambassador Sneider called 
47 Ibid., 91. 
48 Ha, Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea. 
49 Young-sun Ha assessed the records from the South Korean Na-
tional Assembly to see the debates among South Korean politi-
cians at the time. Ibid. 
50 “U.S. Ambassador Richard Sneider updates Secretary of State/
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger on evidence that 
South Korea plans to proceed with the initial phases of a nu-
clear weapons development program,” Declassified Documents 
Reference System (Gale Databases), Cable, (U.S. Department of 
State, Secret, Issue Date: Dec 2, 1974, Date Declassified: Jun 23, 
2010). 
51 Ibid.
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on South Korea’s acting foreign minister Sin-yong No “to 
urge [South Korea’s] early ratification of [the] NPT.”52 The 
U.S. government also threatened to terminate all civilian 
nuclear energy cooperation and to end the bilateral security 
and political relationships.53 On the other hand, the United 
States pressed France and Canada to set South Korea’s rati-
fication of the NPT as a condition for the sale of nuclear 
technology.54 When France and Canada were persuaded by 
the United States, Park ratified the NPT in April 1975. These 
developments do not reveal whether Park’s true intention was 
to develop nuclear weapons or he simply hoped to use it as 
a bargaining leverage, but it demonstrates that U.S. pressure 
was the main constraint that led to South Korea’s ratification 
of the NPT. In regards to the constraint posed by the lack of 
nuclear fissile materials, South Korea certainly did not pos-
sess independent materials, but it is important to note that 
South Korea was very close to reaching a deal with France to 
acquire a plutonium reprocessing plant. Since the U.S. pres-
sure ultimately blocked this deal, I argue that U.S. pressure 
was a de facto constraint to South Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program that led to South Korea’s ratification of the NPT in 
April 1975. 
ASSESSINg chuNg hEE PARK’S INTENTIoNS BE-
hINd ThE NucLEAR WEAPoNS PRogRAM
As mentioned above, assessing President Park’s inten-
tions with South Korea’s nuclear weapons program is not an 
easy task. The paucity of materials which show Park’s decision 
making process is a serious limitation. However, it is not im-
possible to make an informed speculation about Park’s inten-
tions. To achieve this end, I first analyze Park’s leadership style 
and his security dilemma and then discuss the evolution of 
Park’s intentions behind his nuclear weapons program. 
Chung Hee Park’s Leadership Style
Understanding Park’s leadership style is an important 
element in assessing existing materials regarding Park’s deci-
sion to pursue nuclear weapons. An extensive review of litera-
tures on President Park’s leadership suggests a widespread no-
tion shared by scholars; Park was a pragmatic leader.55 Hyug 
52 “Cable from Seoul to the Secretary of State on Ambassador’s 
2/26/75 call on Acting Foreign Minister Sing-Yong to urge early 
ROK ratification of the non-proliferation treaty,” Declassified 
Documents Reference System (Gale Databases), Cable, (U.S. De-
partment of State, Confidential, Issue Date: Feb 26, 1975, Date 
Declassified: Mar 14, 1996). 
53 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, ed., The Nuclear Tipping Point, 
263.
54 Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” 499. 
55 Joongang Ilbosa, Sillok Pak Chŏng-hŭi [The Chronicles of Park 
Chung Hee]; Wookhee Shin, Sunŭng kwa chŏhang ŭl nŏmŏsŏ : 
Yi Sŭng-man kwa Pak Chŏng-hŭi ŭi taemi chŏngch’aek [Beyond 
Compliance and Resistance: The Policies of Syngman Rhee and 
Park Chung Hee toward the United States].; Ha-sang Hong, 
Chusik Hoesa Taehan Minʼguk CEO Pak Chŏng-hŭi [Republic of 
Korea, Inc. CEO Park Chung Hee], (Seoul: Kugil Media, 2005); 
Baeg Im argues that Park was strategic, not ideological.56 
Carter Eckert suggests that Park was pragmatic by noting 
that he “took advantage of the opportunities afforded by the 
expansion of the Japanese empire” and became a professional 
soldier in the Japanese army.57 Im shares Eckert’s view and 
states that such opportunistic characters demonstrate that 
Park was a pragmatist who sought to maximize benefits that 
his actions could produce.58 In addition, Park was a goal-driv-
en leader who did not vacillate when faced with opposition. 
Park’s close associates have commented that Park always made 
a clear goal before making a policy and often had a great de-
termination to execute his policy.59 This leadership style was 
evident in Park’s decision to dispatch South Korean soldiers 
to Vietnam in the 1960s. While this decision generated fierce 
opposition and criticism among South Koreans, Park was 
determined to dispatch troops and to enhance South Korea-
U.S. relations, which led to military and economic assistance 
necessary for South Korea’s development. Lastly, Jong-ryum 
Kim, Park’s Chief of Staff from 1969 to 1978, stated that 
Park almost never made an impulsive decision.60 In the inter-
view with Ha-sang Hong, Kim suggested that President Park 
was very cautious in making a policy decision and considered 
various options before finalizing a decision.61 
Chung Hee Park’s Security Dilemma 
As Mitchell Reiss notes, South Korea’s primary concern 
throughout its history after the end of the Korean War was to 
defend itself from North Korea’s potential invasion.62 While 
South Korea had as much territory as and bigger population 
than North Korea, its military strength was inferior to the 
North. To compensate for this imbalance, South Korea relied 
heavily on the United States for its security. Recognizing the 
need to rely on the United States, Park did not hesitate to 
make a decision to support President Johnson’s efforts in the 
Vietnam War and consequently succeeded in securing Ameri-
can military and economic support throughout the 1960s. 
However, this particular security structure was unstable be-
cause unlike Japan, which possessed a geostrategic impor-
Tae-gwang Kim, Pak Chŏng-hŭi sŭt’ail : Pak Chŏng-hŭi ch’ŏrŏm 
kkum kkugo, il hago, tojŏn hara [Park Chung Hee Style: Dream, 
Work, Challenge like Park Chung Hee], (Seoul: Gloseum, 
2011); Young-sop Ahn, ed., Pak Chŏng-hŭi lidŏsip chaejomyŏng 
ŭl wihan sido [An Effort to Re-evaluate Park Chung Hee’s Lead-
ership], (Seoul: Sunin, 2010).  
56 Ahn, ed., Pak Chŏng-hŭi lidŏsip chaejomyŏng ŭl wihan sido [An 
Effort to Re-evaluate Park Chung Hee’s Leadership], 278-279.
57 Carter Eckert, “Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change 
in Late Colonial Korea,” The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-
1945, Peter Duus, ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996), 33. 
58 Ahn, ed. Pak Chŏng-hŭi lidŏsip chaejomyŏng ŭl wihan sido [An 
Effort to Re-evaluate Park Chung Hee’s Leadership], 279.
59 Hong, Chusik Hoesa Taehan Minʼguk CEO Pak Chŏng-hŭi [Re-
public of Korea, Inc. CEO Park Chung Hee], 217.
60 Ibid., 226. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, 
98. 
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tance to the U.S. maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacific, South 
Korea did not possess inherent importance to the United 
States. This became evident to the South Korean government 
when the United States began to withdraw its troops from 
South Korea in 1948 and when former Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson implied that the Korean Peninsula lay out-
side the defense perimeter of the United States in his January 
1950 speech.63 According to Victor Cha, “even after the Tru-
man administration committed to defend the South after the 
North’s invasion in June 1950, Korea remained a remote, un-
known, alien place that was strategically important to defend, 
but intrinsically meaningless to Americans.”64 
Such inherent insignificance of South Korea to the 
United States did not escape the minds of South Korean lead-
ers. Consequently, both President Syngman Rhee, the first 
president of South Korea, and President Chung Hee Park 
employed various diplomatic tools to ensure U.S. security 
commitments to South Korea. In this regard, the Cold War 
structure and the fear of the spread of communism provided 
strong rationale for U.S. security commitments to South Ko-
rea throughout the 1960s. This security structure, however, 
seemed to have dramatically changed with President Nixon’s 
decision to adopt the Nixon Doctrine and to enhance U.S.-
China relations. When the Nixon Doctrine directly affected 
South Korea with U.S. unilateral withdrawal of forces in 
South Korea, Park felt a necessity to search for an alternative 
solution to ensure South Korea’s security. In this regard, while 
Park decided to pursue nuclear weapons in the early 1970s, it 
is important to note that U.S. security guarantee was a fun-
damentally preferred option for Park. I argue that Park was 
pragmatic enough to understand that not only did the South 
Korea-U.S. alliance ensure South Korea’s security, but it also 
significantly benefited South Korea’s economy, which was a 
critical factor in the South’s competition against the North. 
Therefore, I argue, Park only pursued nuclear weapons in the 
early 1970s because he was convinced that the United States 
would abandon South Korea. 
Chung Hee Park’s Intention in the Early 1970s
When Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 was announced, 
Park employed measures to discourage Nixon’s plans to dra-
matically improve U.S.-China relations. Park insisted that he 
could impose measures to tighten his political control, which 
led to the declaration of a martial law in 1972, and threatened 
to pull South Korean troops out of Vietnam, Park’s prime bar-
gaining leverage against the United States at the time.65 When 
63 National Archives, “Teaching With Documents: The United 
States Enters the Korean Conflict,” <http://www.archives.gov/
education/lessons/korean-conflict> (accessed May 25, 2013). 
64 Victor Cha,  “Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-
ROK Alliance,” Michael Armacost and Daniel Okimoto, ed., 
The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia (Stanford: The 
Walter H. Shorensteign Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), 
121. 
65 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Re-
lations of the United States, 1969-1976. Vol. 19., (Washington: 
these measures failed to stop Nixon’s decision to visit China 
and failed to prevent the U.S. decision to unilaterally with-
draw forces from the Korean peninsula, I argue, Park decided 
to search for an alternative measure to ensure South Korea’s 
security: the development of nuclear weapons.66 Why did the 
development of nuclear weapons become Park’s solution to 
South Korea’s security dilemma? Details on his decision mak-
ing process is unknown, but his comments to a close associate 
provides an insight into his strategic thinking at the time. The 
aforementioned comments by Park to Won-chul Oh show 
that nuclear weapons development became Park’s choice be-
cause he had two objectives. On the one hand, he sought to 
strengthen military capabilities to deter North Korea’s poten-
tial aggressions, and nuclear bombs were the ultimate weapon 
that could achieve this goal. More importantly, however, Park 
wanted South Korea to be independent from the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella. These are reasons why nuclear weapons program 
was chosen over other potential choices, such as increasing 
the number of conventional weapons. 
Another potential explanation for South Korea’s behav-
ior during this time period is that Park did not really intend 
to develop nuclear weapons, but sought to use South Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program as a bargaining leverage against the 
United States. Considering President Park’s leadership style 
and South Korea’s economic and security situations at the 
time, however, I argue that Park had a serious intention to 
develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. While economic 
capacity was not necessarily a constraint to South Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program, it was nonetheless an expensive, 
difficult program that necessitated an enormous amount of 
money and energy. Given Park’s goal-driven and pragmatic 
leadership style and South Korea’s economic size at the time, 
it is difficult to imagine Park would allocate such a tremen-
dous amount of resources to simply acquire a bargaining le-
verage against the United States. Therefore, I conclude that 
Park began his nuclear weapons program with a serious inten-
tion to pursue the atomic bomb. 
A Dramatic Change in Chung Hee Park’s Intention in 1975
While President Park had a serious intention to devel-
op nuclear weapons in the early 1970s, the evidence suggests 
that his initial intention dramatically changed in 1975. After 
the United States discovered South Korea’s ambition to de-
velop nuclear weapons in 1974, U.S. officials began employ-
ing strict measures to discourage Park’s ambition. The United 
States pressed South Korea for early ratification of the NPT 
and made efforts to prevent France from exporting a pluto-
nium reprocessing plant to South Korea. While these efforts 
United States Government Printing Office, 2010), 316.
66 Former Ambassador Donald Gregg also suggested that Park 
started the secret nuclear weapons program, because Park lost 
faith in the United States. See Tae-ho Kwon, “Former Ambas-
sador Donald Gregg Discusses Park Chung-hee’s Legacy,” The 
Hankyoreh, May 13, 2011, <http://www.pacificcenturyinst.org/
download/Former_Ambassador_Donald_Gregg_Discusses_
Park_Chung_Hee.pdf> (accessed May 25, 2013).
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eventually succeeded in discouraging Park, I argue that they 
had another unintended consequence; Park came to realize 
that nuclear weapons provided a significant bargaining lever-
age with a potential to ensure continued U.S. security com-
mitments to South Korea. To a pragmatic leader who was 
aware of South Korea’s relative weakness in Northeast Asia, 
continued U.S. commitment must have been a preferred so-
lution to South Korea’s security dilemma. With this change 
in strategic assessment, I argue, Park began to use his nuclear 
weapons program as a diplomatic tool to ensure U.S. security 
commitment to South Korea. There are two pieces of evi-
dence to support this explanation of Park’s decision making 
process. 
First, President Park held a press interview and publicly 
disclosed South Korea’s nuclear program in 1975. On June 
12, 1975, about six weeks after South Korea’s ratification of 
the NPT, Park held an interview with The Washington Post’s 
reporters, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, and declared 
for the first time that “South Korea, if abandoned by the 
[United States], would go nuclear.”67 Stating that a number 
of South Koreans have doubts about U.S. commitment to 
South Korea, Park bluntly added that “if the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella were to be removed, [South Koreans] have to start 
developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves.”68 This 
public disclosure of South Korea’s nuclear program is a strong 
evidence that implies a change in Park’s intention behind nu-
clear weapons program. If Park wanted to complete his plan 
to develop nuclear weapons, it would have been much easier 
for Park to play hide-and-seek with the United States until 
South Korea succeeded in building a nuclear bomb. Park, 
however, chose to inform the entire world of South Korea’s 
nuclear plans through one of his rare interviews with foreign 
reporters. I believe this demonstrates that Park had learned 
how serious Washington was about preventing South Korea’s 
nuclear proliferation and was using his nuclear weapons pro-
gram as leverage to ensure U.S. security commitment on the 
Korean peninsula. In this regard, The Washington Post was a 
perfect platform to reach out to U.S. citizens and Washing-
ton’s international partners that would press U.S. policy mak-
ers to prevent South Korea’s nuclear proliferation by re-con-
firming U.S. security commitment to the Korean peninsula. 
This change in Park’s intention also seems consistent with his 
pragmatic leadership style. 
Second, a significant change in Park’s rhetoric illus-
trates how Park’s solution to South Korea’s security dilemma 
transformed. In January 1971, President Park held a press 
conference with South Korean reporters to share his concerns 
with the Nixon Doctrine and said that:
Several unusual events are occurring around the Korean 
peninsula. Belligerent Chinese are gaining a higher status 
in the international community, and the United States is 
seeking to pull out from Asia through the Nixon Doctrine 
and disengagement policy. There is no clear alternative that 
67 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Korea: Park’s Inflexibility...” 
Washington Post , June 12, 1975.
68 Ibid. 
can fill a power vacuum created by these policies… This will 
inevitably create an imbalance of power. Peace can only be 
achieved when relative powers are balanced with one an-
other. When this balance is destroyed, maintaining peace 
will be very difficult.69 
Such rhetoric dramatically changed in 1975. On June 
28, 1975, Park held another interview with The Washington 
Post and said that he did not expect U.S. nuclear umbrella to 
withdraw from the Korean peninsula.70 While the 1971 press 
conference and the interview with The Washington Post target-
ed different audiences, Park’s change in rhetoric is notewor-
thy. This change, I believe, was a product of Park’s increased 
confidence in securing U.S. security commitment to South 
Korea. Furthermore, in his meeting with Canadian Secretary 
of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen in June 1975, 
Park stated that South Korea had “no intention, no plan, and 
would not develop a nuclear weapons capability.”71 He fur-
ther stated that “it would not be helpful to [South Korea] 
to develop [nuclear weapons] because both China and Rus-
sia have nuclear weapons capability and under these circum-
stances it would be counterproductive [for South Korea to 
develop nuclear weapons].”72 Such comments in a diplomatic 
scene, where there is a great potential for leakage, illustrate 
Park’s increased confidence in his ability to ensure U.S. secu-
rity commitments to South Korea and provide evidence for 
a change in Park’s strategic calculations. For these reasons, I 
argue that Park’s initial plan to develop nuclear weapons in 
the early 1970s changed in 1975 to use South Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program as a bargaining leverage to ensure U.S. se-
curity commitment to South Korea.
IMPLIcATIoNS FoR ThE FuTuRE oF NoN-PRoLIF-
ERATIoN EFFoRTS
The case of South Korea reinforces the notion that 
the U.S. pressure is sometimes a very effective way to deter 
nuclear proliferation. It is especially the case when the Unit-
ed States is essential for the survival of a nation seeking to 
build nuclear weapons. South Koreans were dependent on 
the United States for their security and economic well-being, 
thus the U.S. strategy proved to be effective in this case. At 
the same time, the evolution of President Chung Hee Park’s 
nuclear ambitions and the changes in his intentions behind 
the nuclear weapons program reveal the need to study various 
cases in dealing with nuclear non-proliferation issue. Hymans 
argues that the existence of various veto players was the main 
disincentive to Japan’s nuclear ambitions, but South Korea 
had different constraints. This study illustrates that the mo-
tivations for developing nuclear weapons and potential con-
straints to the program could vary significantly. Such basic 
69 Park, Pak Chŏng-hŭi Taetʻongnyŏng yŏnsŏl munjip [Compilation 
of Speeches by President Park Chung Hee], 50.  
70 Don Oberdorfer, “Canada Told That S. Korea Won’t Seek Nucle-
ar Arms,” Washington Post, June 28, 1975. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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assumption must be applied to future studies dealing with 
nuclear actors such as North Korea and Iran. It is extremely 
dangerous to make a hasty generalization based on a few cases 
and make strategies based on that generalization. In this re-
gard, this paper has successfully demonstrated how South Ko-
rea’s case is quite complex due to its unique security dilemma, 
President Park’s leadership style, and Seoul’s dependence on 
the United States. Future studies on non-proliferation should 
also seek to undergo such case studies in order to make effec-
tive non-proliferation strategy. 
coNcLuSIoN
The case of South Korea demonstrates that a country’s 
decision to ratify the NPT can involve various factors. While 
the U.S. pressure was the single most important factor in de-
terring South Korea’s nuclear ambition, President Chung Hee 
Park managed to use it in his favor. Given South Korea’s se-
curity dilemma, continued U.S. presence was arguably much 
more favorable than the development of nuclear weapons. 
In addition, given South Korea’s export-driven economy at 
the time, the NPT helped Seoul achieve a certain degree of 
status in the international system. Furthermore, the evolu-
tion of President Park’s ambitions behind the nuclear weap-
ons program reveals the importance of case studies in future 
studies of nuclear non-proliferation. While various veto play-
ers were the main disincentive to Japan’s nuclear ambitions, 
I have shown that the U.S. pressure was the main constraint 
for South Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In this regard, 
this study suggests that different non-proliferation strate-
gies should be employed to different players and that find-
ing appropriate strategy will necessitate close examination of 
a state’s intention behind the nuclear weapons program. It 
is true that these efforts are often hindered by the lack of 
adequate information, but supporters of nuclear non-prolif-
eration regimes should strive to make an assessment that is as 
accurate as possible in order to enhance the effectiveness of 
their non-proliferation efforts. 
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ABSTRACT
This article examines how India’s insistence on a policy 
of strategic autonomy, in conjunction with its inability to in-
crease bilateral trade, has damaged India’s position in Central 
Asia, region critical for India’s energy, trade and security needs. 
The article analyzes the causes of India’s strategic setback in Ta-
jikistan in December 2010 and then suggests that New Delhi’s 
subsequent Connect Central Asia Policy has encountered similar 
economic and security setbacks in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan because of India’s continued policy of strategic 
autonomy.  The article then considers how India may develop 
a strategic partnership Uzbekistan and avoid the same isolation 
it now experiences in the rest of Central Asia.  With India fac-
ing roughly analogous challenges in Southeast Asia and the rest 
of the Asia-Pacific, the article considers the consequences for 
India’s position in the emerging regional architecture if  India 
persists with the same policy orientation it has pursued in Cen-
tral Asia.
INTRoducTIoN
While India is expected to overtake China as the world’s 
most populous country by 2028, questions remain about In-
dia’s capacity to assume a leading role in shaping the new re-
gional architecture emerging in the Asia-Pacific.1  The recent 
setbacks India suffered in its economic and security relations 
with the Central Asian republics seem to be symptomatic of 
India’s general inability to conduct long-term strategic plan-
ning as well as of its reluctance to engage as a counterweight to 
China.2  New Delhi’s poor maneuvering over the past several 
years has left India isolated in Central Asia, a region critical for 
India’s energy, trade and security needs.  In September 2013, 
New Delhi’s Connect Central Asia Policy experienced the latest 
in a series of setbacks when India lost ConocoPhillips’ 8.4% 
stake in Kazakhstan’s massive Kashagan oil field to the Chinese 
National Petroleum Company. Officially announced by New 
1 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
“World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision”, 13 June 
2013, accessed on 21 October 2013, http://esa.un.org/wpp/.
2 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “India’s Feeble Foreign Policy,” For-
eign Affairs 92.3 (2013): 14-19, Political Science Complete, ac-
cessed 28 July 2013, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir
ect=true&db=poh&AN=87000327&site=ehost-live.
INdIA’S NoT-So-SPLENdId 
ISoLATIoN IN cENTRAL ASIA 
THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN THE EMERGING 
ASIAN REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE
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Delhi in June 2012, India’s Connect Central Asia Policy was the 
formalization of New Delhi’s revamped efforts to offset the stra-
tegic setback India first suffered in December 2010 with its loss 
of Tajikistan’s Ayni airbase to Russia.  Although India needs 
to counterbalance Chinese and especially Pakistani influence 
in the region, New Delhi has sought to maintain its strategic 
autonomy from both Moscow and Washington.  This policy 
has caused Russia, in addition to China, to marginalize India 
in the region.   Without a robust strategic partnership with any 
of the major powers, coupled with a delivery deficit in deepen-
ing its economic cooperation with the Central Asian republics 
themselves, New Delhi finds itself sidelined in the region in the 
run-up to NATO’s 2014 Afghanistan withdrawal. This article 
examines how India’s insistence on a policy of strategic autono-
my, in conjunction with its inability to increase bilateral trade, 
has damaged India’s position in Central Asia.  In so doing, this 
article hopes to shed light on possible outcomes for India’s in-
volvement in Southeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific region 
if New Delhi persists with its present policy.  
INdIA’S PREcARIouS FoREIgN PoLIcy IN
cENTRAL ASIA
 
India participates as an observer in Central Asia’s geo-
political and economic association, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO).3  This status provides India no diplomatic 
leverage.  Of the SCO’s two major powers, China and Russia, 
India maintains a geostrategic rivalry with the former and is 
looked upon with increasing suspicion by the latter.  
India has a territorial dispute with China, and faces 
400,000 Chinese troops on its border, as well as additional 
threats from China’s build-up of military infrastructure in Ti-
bet and the Chinese-administered Gwadar port on Pakistan’s 
Indian Ocean coast.  India’s position is weakened by Beijing’s 
ascendant role in the SCO due to China’s deepening bilateral 
economic relations with each of the Central Asian republics, 
Beijing is poised to assume a dominant role in the SCO.  Worse, 
India cannot rely on Russia as a counterbalance to China’s Cen-
tral Asian advances since Russia looks askance on its erstwhile 
Indian ally for developing strategic ties with the United States, 
embodied in a 2008 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. 
Washington, which concluded the agreement with New Delhi 
in defiance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, sought to strength-
en the rising India as a democratic counterweight to China in 
the Asia-Pacific region.  However, India has balked at fulfilling 
this role.  During his May 2012 visit to South Korea to par-
ticipate in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, Indian Prime 
3 The other nations with SCO observer status are Afghanistan, 
Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan.  Belarus, Turkey, and Sri Lanka are 
dialogue partners.  Because of its policy of neutrality, the Central 
Asian republic of Turkmenistan does not officially belong to the 
SCO but its president participates in the organization’s summit 
meetings as a ‘guest’.
Minister Manmohan Singh expressed his doubts to the Korean 
press about the effectiveness of any collective security strategy 
to contain China and declared his intention for India to main-
tain its equidistance from Washington and Beijing.4   
Indian foreign policy discourse has fallen back on its 
moribund policy of non-alignment. As part of the Nehruvian 
legacy reconstructed and perpetuated by India’s Foreign Ser-
vice and political elite, India’s foreign policy has suffered from a 
moralizing, inflated sense of its own self-importance. In 2010, 
when India’s External Affairs Minister attempted to point out 
the deleterious effects of India’s foreign policy discourse to the 
conduct of its foreign relations, he was met with a firestorm 
of controversy.5  India’s discourse about its own importance to 
Central Asia far outstrips the scale of its bilateral relationships 
in the region.6  India’s efforts to increase its bilateral economic 
cooperation in Central Asia, particularly in critical sectors such 
as energy development and production, have been hampered by 
its insistence on strategic autonomy. Because New Delhi lacks 
a strong strategic partnership with the United States, the larger 
Central Asian republics can accede to Chinese pressure to limit 
the scope of their bilateral economic cooperation with India 
without damaging their developing defense ties to the United 
States and NATO.  Conversely, because of India’s lack of strong 
bilateral economic relations with the Central Asian republics, 
the smaller Central Asian republics can accede to Russian pres-
sure to limit the scope of their bilateral defense cooperation 
with India without risking the loss of a major trading partner. 
The collapse of India’s position in Central Asia began in this 
manner with the small Central Asian republic of Tajikistan.
INdIA’S SEcuRITy SETBAcK IN TAJIKISTAN ANd oN-
SET oF coNNEcT cENTRAL ASIA PoLIcy
 
Indian policy makers first looked to Tajikistan to estab-
lish a foreign military presence. As India’s closest Central Asian 
neighbor, the distance between Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe 
and New Delhi is approximately the same distance between 
New Delhi and Mumbai. More significantly, Tajikistan’s south-
4 The Times of India, “We want friendly ties with both US and 
China: PM,” 25 March 2012, accessed on 9 October 2013, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-03-25/in-
dia/31236165_1_open-economy-today-sections-and-stake-
holders-nuclear-security-summit.
5 Spowmya Aji, “Tharoor commits ultimate Cong crime,” India 
Today, 9 January 2010, accessed on 21 October 2013, http://in-
diatoday.intoday.in/story/Tharoor+commits+ultimate+Cong+cr
ime/1/78378.html; The Hindu, “Tharoor sets record straight on 
Nehru controversy,” 10 January 2010, accessed on 21 October 
2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tharoor-sets-
record-straight-on-nehru-controversy/article78675.ece
6 Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, Mapping Central 
Asia: Indian Perceptions and Strategies (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 
2011).
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eastern border is less than 30 kilometers from Pakistani-admin-
istered Kashmir across Afghanistan’s Wakhan corridor. India’s 
only foreign airbase is located in Tajikistan, at Farkhor on the 
Tajik–Afghan border.  India started operating the Farkhor base 
in May 2002, with Russian acquiescence, to support Indian re-
lief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Yet India’s lack of 
broader operations at the Farkhor base renders it strategically 
insignificant.  Without Indian combat squadrons at Farkhor, 
the airbase does not provide India with an alternative attack 
route against Pakistan or the ability to affect militant operations 
in Kashmir. The base’s main function is to transport supplies 
for India’s humanitarian mission in Afghanistan. India airlifts 
resources to Tajikistan’s Ayni airforce base located about 15 
kilometers from Dushanbe, and then transports material ap-
proximately 150 kilometers to Farkhor, where it is then trucked 
to Afghanistan. Thus, the Ayni airbase had been the key to ad-
vancing India’s strategic footprint in Tajikistan, and its loss due 
to Moscow’s pressure on Dushanbe constituted a grave strategic 
setback.
The Ayni airbase, originally used by the Soviets during 
the 1980s, had been abandoned since their 1988-89 withdraw-
al from Afghanistan. India contributed technical assistance 
and US$70 million to renovate the airbase between 2003 and 
2010. India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO), directed by 
India’s Army Corps of Engineers, extended the main runway, 
built a control tower, and constructed three hangars capable of 
housing squadrons of MiG-29 bombers used by the Indian Air 
Force. In September 2010, a Tajik Defense Ministry spokes-
man  confirmed to the press that the Ayni airbase had state-
of-the-art navigational and defense technology and a runway 
extended to 3,200 meters to accommodate all types of aircraft.7 
Nonetheless, there are no reports of Indian combat aircraft hav-
ing ever been stationed at the base. Tajikistan’s small air force 
does not need it. Moreover, Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Divi-
sion (MRD), Moscow’s largest military contingent abroad, is 
stationed in Dushanbe and two other Tajik cities. Moscow has 
been intent on preventing other foreign nations from using the 
base. Although the BRO began the Ayni renovations in 2004, 
New Delhi never developed any meaningful leverage with the 
Tajik government. Dushanbe may have simply used New Delhi 
to force a better deal from Moscow for Russian use of Ayni and 
the bases housing the 201st MRD.  In December 2010, Tajiki-
stan announced that Russia was the only country under consid-
eration to use the Ayni airbase.8 The two countries then began 
negotiating the terms of their future military cooperation and, 
most likely, of Russian support for Tajik president Emomali 
Rahmon’s November 2013 re-election bid. India was effectively 
closed out of Ayni. 
The decision also stemmed from the powerful economic 
influence that Moscow exerts on Dushanbe through the per-
7 “Tajik Military Air Base Completed With Indian Help,” Radio 
Free Europe Radio Liberty, 9 September 2010, accessed 14 Au-
gust 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/Tajik_Military_Air_
Base_Completed_With_Indian_Help/2152731.html.
8 Ramachandran, Sudha. “India air base grounded in Tajikistan,” 
Asia Times, 1 December 2010, accessed 14 August 2013, http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LL01Df02.html.
sonal remittances of Tajik workers in Russia. According to the 
Central Bank of Russia, personal remittances from Tajik work-
ers amounted to US$2.19 billion in 2010.9  In the year India 
lost the use of the Ayni airbase to Russia, personal remittanc-
es from Russia accounted for 39% of Tajikistan’s GDP.10  By 
2012, the year New Delhi announced its Connect Central Asia 
Policy, remittances from Russia accounted for 43% of Tajiki-
stan’s GDP.  Meanwhile, Indian bilateral trade with Tajikistan 
does not act as a sufficient economic counterweight.   From 
2010-2011, India-Tajikistan bilateral trade amounted to only 
US$41.3 million.  From 2011-2012, the period prior to India’s 
inauguration of its India-Central Asia Dialogue, the amount 
of India’s trade with Tajikistan dropped by 31% to US$28.37 
million.11  China’s trade with Tajikistan also dwarfed that of 
India’s.  The volume of Chinese-Tajik bilateral trade amounted 
to US$660 million, a little over half of the US$1.04 billion 
bilateral trade between Russia and Tajikistan.  During New 
Delhi’s decade-long effort to develop a security relationship 
with Dushanbe, India did not concurrently develop a suffi-
ciently significant trade partnership with Tajikistan.  During 
the period, Chinese-Tajik bilateral trade has emerged as impor-
tant economic counterweight to Russia.  Since India was not a 
critical trading partner for Tajikistan, and New Delhi could not 
offer Dushanbe an avenue for wider security cooperation with 
a U.S-led alliance because of New Delhi’s strategic autonomy 
from Washington, there was little cost to Tajikistan for reducing 
its strategic relationship with India.
In the wake of India’s setback in Tajikistan, India con-
vened the first meeting of the India-Central Asia Dialogue in 
the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek in June 2012.  In his keynote ad-
dress, India’s Minister of External Affairs unveiled New Delhi’s 
Connect Central Asia Policy.  Among its declared objectives for 
“deep engagement” with the Central Asian republics, New 
Delhi enumerated the need for strengthened strategic and se-
curity cooperation and long-term partnerships in energy devel-
opment. One year after the inaugural round of New Delhi’s 
India-Central Asia Dialogue, Moscow began sending the first 
installments of a new US$1 billion military aid package to 
Bishkek, effectively closing off Kyrgyzstan to India as it did Ta-
jikistan.  As in Tajikistan, India’s economic relations did not 
serve as a consideration for Bishkek.  From 2011-2012, India-
Kyrgyzstan bilateral trade amounted to only US$30.05 million. 
Despite the Bishkek round of the India-Central Asia Dialogue, 
Indian-Kyrgyz bilateral trade rose to only US$37.12 million in 
2012-2013.12  In sharp contrast, Chinese-Kyrgyz bilateral trade 
9 In 2011, remittances were US$2.71 billion, and in 2012, 
were US$3.02 billion. These figures are likely to be higher 
due to underreporting. Central Bank of Russia, accessed 
19 September 2013, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.
aspx?file=CrossBorder/Personal%20Remittances_CIS_e.
htm&pid=svs&sid=ITM_43505.
10 In 2010, Tajikistan’s GDP was US$5.64 billion.
11 Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Tajikistan Relations Brief,” 
January 2013, accessed 19 September 2013, http://www.mea.
gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/tajikistan_bilateral_brief.pdf.
12 Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Kyrgyzstan Relations,” July 
2013, accessed 30 September 2013, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/
ForeignRelation/India-Kyrgyzstan_Relations_EN.pdf.
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in 2011 amounted to US$4.98 billion.13  Chinese-Kyrgyz bilat-
eral trade further grew to US$5.97 billion in 2012, accounting 
for half of Kyrgyzstan’s total trade.14 Although Russian-Kyrgyz 
bilateral trade accounts for 17% percent of Kyrgyz trade as 
compared to China’s 50%, Moscow also exerts considerable 
economic influence on Bishkek through the personal remit-
tances of Kyrgyz workers in Russia. 15 Although Kyrgyz depen-
dence on remittances from Russia is less than that of Tajikistan, 
remittances account for a large portion of the Kyrgyz economy. 
Remittances accounted for 23% of Kyrgyzstan’s 2011 GDP, 
and rose to 25% of its 2012 GDP.16 
India is not even under consideration for a major role 
in the operation of the ‘Transit Center’ at the Manas airport 
outside of Bishkek after the July 2014 expiration of the U.S. 
lease on the airbase.17  The U.S. military installation at Manas 
has been used to support ISAF forces in Afghanistan.  Turkey, 
which like India has complicated relationships with Russia and 
China, aspires a major role in the operation of the future civil-
ian transit center at Manas. In April 2011, Turkey cancelled 
US$51 million of Kyrgyz debt and gave Bishkek US$10 mil-
lion in grant assistance.18  Not to be outdone by Turkey, Russia 
cancelled US$500 million of Kyrgyz debt in May 2013.19  Rus-
sia had already promised Bishkek US$2 billion for terminating 
the U.S. lease on Manas to compensate for the loss of the an-
nual US$60 million in rent Bishkek received from Washington. 
Having lost Tajikistan, which India regarded as its ‘gateway’ to 
Central Asia, New Delhi has no chance for a significant pres-
ence in Kyrgyzstan in the foreseeable future.  
13 Universal Newswires, “Trade turnover between Kyrgyzstan, 
China increases 18.5%,” 1 August 2012, accessed 30 September 
2013, http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/kyrgyz-
stan/viewstory.aspx?id=12527.
14 European Community, “Kyrgyz Republic: EU Bilateral Traded 
and Trade with the World,” 5 July 2013, accessed 30 September 
2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/
tradoc_113409.pdf.
15 The Economist, “Remittance Man: Russia attempts to draw Ta-
jikistan and Kyrgyzstan back into its orbit,” 7 September 2013, 
accessed 30 September 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/
asia/21584999-russia-attempts-draw-tajikistan-and-kyrgyz-
stan-back-its-orbit-remittance-man.
16 Trading Economics, “Kyrgyzstan GDP figures,” accessed 30 Sep-
tember 2013, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kyrgyzstan/
gdp; In 2011 and 2012, personal remittances from Russia were 
US$1.4 billion and US$1.6 billion, respectively, though these 
figures are likely due to underreporting by Central Bank of 
Russia, accessed 30 September 2013, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/
statistics/print.aspx?file=CrossBorder/Personal%20Remittanc-
es_CIS_e.htm&pid=svs&sid=ITM_43505.  
17 Gordon Lubold and YochiDreazen, “Cashing Out: U.S. Military 
Quits Critical Air Base After $100 Million in Payoffs,” Foreign 
Policy, 18 October 2013, accessed 20 October 2013
18 Universal Newswires, “Kyrgyzstan, Turkey agree to eradicate 
Kyrgyz debt and work on visa regime” 27 April 2013, accessed 6 
October 2013, http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/
kyrgyzstan/tourism/viewstory.aspx?id=3925
19 Erica Marat, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Decision To Renounce Manas Transit 
Center Favors Russia,” 26 June 2013, accessed 4 October 2013, 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/
item/12764-kyrgyzstans-decision-to-renounce-manas-transit-
center-favors-russia.html.
STRATEgIc AuToNoMy ANd INdIAN EcoNoMIc 
SETBAcKS IN KAzAKhSTAN ANd TuRKMENISTAN
India has been sidelined by China in the two larger, 
energy-rich nations of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through 
Beijing’s assertive energy policy.  India’s loss of ConocoPhillips’ 
8.4% stake in Kazakhstan’s Kashagan oil field to the Chinese 
National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in September 2013 
was an embarrassing blow to New Delhi’s Connect Central Asia 
Policy. In November 2012, ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), 
the international arm of India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corpo-
ration, concluded an agreement to purchase ConocoPhillips’ 
8.4% interest in Kashagan, pending Kazakhstan’s approval. 
Considered the largest oil discovery in the last thirty years, the 
US$5 billion stake in Kashagan was perceived by New Delhi as 
a significant foothold in Kazakhstan’s oil industry.  The second 
round of New Delhi’s India-Central Asia Dialogue was held in 
Almaty in June 2013.  In addition to being held in Kazakh-
stan’s commercial center, the second round of dialogue featured 
a special session focused on the bilateral relations between India 
and Kazakhstan.  About one month prior to this second round 
of dialogue, the Indian government announced it had received 
positive indications from Kazakhstan that it would approve the 
sale to OVL.20
However, one month after the Almaty round, Cono-
coPhillips was notified that the Kazakhstan Ministry of Oil and 
Gas would invoke Kazakhstan’s Subsoil Law to pre-empt the 
proposed sale to OVL.21  Instead, the state-owned Kazakh en-
ergy firm KazMunaiGas bought ConocoPhillips’ 8.4% stake in 
the Kashagan field and then sold an 8.33% stake in Kashagan to 
China’s CNPC for the an equivalent US$5 billion.  The head of 
KazMunaiGas informed the press that CNPC also promised up 
to US$3 billion to cover half the cost of Kazakhstan’s financing 
of Kashagan’s second development phase.22  In a public display 
of China’s diplomatic triumph, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
visited Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, in early September to sign 
the acquisition agreement with Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, one of 22 agreements concluded between China 
and Kazakhstan worth US$30 billion.
Kazkahstan’s economic boom is the result of its relations 
with China.  China-Kazakhstan bilateral trade accounted for 
23% of Kazakhstan’s total trade in 2012, whereas Indian-Ka-
zakhstan bilateral trade accounted for merely 0.4%.23 Although 
20 “Kazakhstan positive to India’s hydrocarbons quest,” The Hindu, 
28 April 2013, accessed 10 September 10, 2013, http://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/kazakhstan-positive-to-indias-hy-
drocarbons-quest/article4661271.ece.
21 “ConocoPhillips Notified of Republic of Kazakhstan’s Intent 
to Pre-empt ConocoPhillips’ Sale of Kashagan Interest,” Cono-
coPhillips News Release, 2 July 2, 2013, accessed 10 September 
2013, http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/5451/1825027/.
22 “UPDATE 4-China buys into giant Kazakh oilfield for $5 bln,” 
Reuters, 7 September 2013, accessed 7 September 2013, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/07/oil-kashagan-china-
idUSL5N0H302E20130907.
23 According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the bilateral 
trade between India and Kazakhstan in 2012 totaled US$525.15 
million, accessed 22 October 201, http://www.mea.gov.in/Por-
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a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganization (CSTO), energy-rich and economically prospering 
Kazakshtan is seeking to counterbalance its security relations 
with Russia by developing relations with the U.S. and NATO. 
India’s strategic distance from Washington thus does not serve 
New Delhi in its relations with Kazakhstan.  In August 2013, 
NATO conducted its Steppe Eagle military exercises in Ka-
zakhstan, an annual exercise run by NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace program since 2006 when Kazakhstan signed an Individ-
ual Partnership Action Plan with NATO.  Kazakhstan’s NATO 
trained and equipped airmobile forces brigade KAZBRIG (for-
merly KAZBAT), as well as Kazakh army and airforce units, 
participated in Steppe Eagle 2013, which involved the largest 
number of participating countries to date.24 India was not in-
vited to participate or even be present at the exercises as an 
observer. By not forming a strategic partnership with the U.S. 
as Washington seeks to implement its New Silk Road initiative, 
India finds itself left out in Kazakhstan.  
India was similarly outmaneuvered by China’s energy 
and trade diplomacy in Turkmenistan.  India has placed great 
hopes on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) 
pipeline, for which construction has still not yet begun.  The 
stalled TAPI pipeline is intended to transport gas from Turk-
menistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian town of 
Fazilka on the Indo-Pakistani border.  During the same Central 
Asian tour in which President Xi signed the Kashagan acquisi-
tion agreement in Astana, he also inaugurated the operations 
of Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field, the world’s second larg-
est gas field.  A highly symbolic accomplishment for China, 
the Galkynysh field was developed by a CNPC-led consortium 
without the participation of a major Western energy company. 
Although the TAPI pipeline was originally intended to trans-
port gas from Turkmenistan’s Dauletabad field, the Galkynysh 
field, has emerged as a likely source for the pipeline.  According 
to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Dauletabad field’s 
production forecasts were lower than expected.  Predicting pro-
duction to decline, the ADB reported that analysts doubted 
whether the Dauletabad field could meet the then proposed 
target of transporting 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year 
to South Asia.25  The TAPI pipeline would most likely have 
to transport gas from the Galkynysh field providing Beijing 
with significant influence over the future of the TAPI pipeline 
project.26  China’s state-owned CNPC will be the sole service 
tal/ForeignRelation/India-Kazakhstan_Relations.pdf; Kazakh-
stan’s total volume of trade was US$117.7 billion, accessed 22 
October 2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/sep-
tember/tradoc_113406.pdf
24 Farida Ahmetov, “NATO experts praised Kazakhstan’s military ser-
vants,” Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 4 September 2013, accessed 6 Oc-
tober 2013. http://kazpravda.kz/eng/?p=1081%23more-1081.
25 Asian Development Bank, “South Asian Gas Demand Strong 
Enough for Two Pipeline Schemes” 22 September 2005, ac-
cessed 8 October 2013 http://www.adb.org/news/south-asian-
gas-demand-strong-enough-two-pipeline-schemes.
26 China’s clout is also enhanced by the fact that it has recently 
become Turkmenistan’s largest importer of gas, superseding even 
Russia.
contractor for the second development phase at Galkynysh. 
Perhaps tellingly, Turkmenistan sent no delegation of experts to 
New Delhi’s June 2013 India-Central Asia Dialogue.  Turkmen-
istan, which is not a member of the Russian-led CSTO, seeks to 
use its energy wealth to maintain its independence from Russia 
and prevent itself from being dominated by a Russo-Iranian 
bloc. Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamme-
dov changed course from his predecessor’s strict neutrality and 
has been developing security relations with the U.S., NATO, 
and Israel. India’s economic and energy relations with Turk-
menistan are inextricably bound to Ashgabat’s primary concern 
to protect its strategic assets in the Caspian from Moscow and 
Tehran. New Delhi’s lack of strong defense cooperation with 
Washington diminishes India’s own strategic value for Ashga-
bat.  Turkmenistan can deepen its economic cooperation with 
China at India’s expense without incurring any significant cost 
to its security relationships with the U. S. and its allies.  
uzBEKISTAN ANd PoST-2014 REgIoNAL ARchITEc-
TURE
India’s best remaining option to gain a significant secu-
rity presence in Central Asia is to develop a strategic partner-
ship with Uzbekistan as Tashkent moves to deepen its ties with 
Washington.  In June 2012, Uzbekistan’s President Karimov 
withdrew his country’s membership in the CSTO and has been 
pushing for closer ties with NATO.  As Afghanistan’s Central 
Asian neighbor to the north, Uzbekistan will play a crucial role 
in a post-ISAF Afghanistan.  Like India, Uzbekistan is keen to 
prevent the resurgence of Pakistani-sponsored, Islamist proxies 
in Afghanistan.  Moreover, India’s grand North-South Transit 
Corridor depends on Uzbekistan for its northern outlet from 
Afghanistan to Central Asia.  Despite sharing vital interests 
with Uzbekistan, India’s insistence on strategic autonomy from 
Washington will likely render New Delhi an unattractive stra-
tegic partner for Tashkent.  
The most populous country in Central Asia, energy-rich 
Uzbekistan is not only an essential player in the future security 
and prosperity of Central Asia, but also in India’s own efforts to 
achieve energy security for its growing population.  New Delhi 
has set a goal to generate 25% of the nation’s electricity from 
nuclear energy by 2050.27  India currently imports more than 
half its yearly uranium needs.  As India’s interim goal for 2020 is 
a five-fold increase in the amount of electricity generated from 
nuclear power, India’s demand for uranium will increase com-
mensurately.28  Uranium exports from Uzbekistan constitute a 
key component of India’s civil nuclear policy. Uzbekistan is the 
world’s seventh largest producer of Uranium and geographically 
27 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in India,” accessed 
23 October 2013, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Countries-G-N/India/#.Ume5ilP6XyA.
28 In 2011, Indian nuclear power generated 3,700 MegaWatts elec-
trical (MWe), accounting for approximately 3% of India’s elec-
tricity generation. India plans to increase the amount to 20,000 
MWe by 2020. Rupakjyoti Borah, “India Should Look to Aus-
tralia to Satisfy its Growing Demand for Uranium,” OilPrice.
com, 10 May 2011, accessed 23 October 2013
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closer to India than any of the other major producers.29  Chi-
na has already cornered the market on uranium exports from 
Kazakhstan, the world’s leading producer of uranium.  India 
cannot afford to lose a contract to China for imports of Uzbeki-
stani uranium as it did with the loss of its stake in Kazakhstan’s 
Kashagan oilfield. 
At the beginning of October 2013, a delegation from In-
dia’s Department of Atomic Energy held high-level talks in Uz-
bekistan to secure a contract for the export of uranium to India 
starting in 2014.30 The delegation’s visit followed the Indian Ex-
ternal Affairs Minister’s September 2013 talks with Uzbekistan’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in which uranium exports to India 
were discussed.  Since August 2009, however, the Uranium Re-
sources Company of the China General Nuclear Power Corpo-
ration (CGNPC) formed a joint venture with Uzbekistan’s State 
Committee on Geology and Mineral Resources (Goskomgeo) 
to explore for uranium at the Boztau uranium field in Uzbeki-
stan’s mineral rich Navoi province.31  Named UZ-China Uran 
LLC, the joint venture is Uzbekistan’s sole operator with direct 
foreign participation. UZ-China Uran has doubled its initial 
capitalization and will begin mining operations at the Boztau 
field in 2014.32  Beijing is thus well-positioned to pressure Tash-
kent to limit its uranium sales to India.  Should Beijing choose 
to do so, India’s economic relations with Uzbekistan will not be 
a restraining factor.  In 2012, India-Uzbekistan bilateral trade 
accounted for 0.9% of Uzbekistan’s total trade volume, whereas 
China-Uzbekistan bilateral trade accounted for 16.9%.33  Chi-
na is even expected to overtake Russia as Uzbekistan’s leading 
trade partner.34   If New Delhi does not develop a robust secu-
rity partnership with Washington, it will likely suffer the same 
isolation it is facing in the rest of Central Asia.
IMPLIcATIoNS FoR ASIA-PAcIFIc REgIoNAL ARchI-
TECTURE
 
India faces roughly analogous challenges in Southeast 
Asia and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region.  While China is not 
a member of the ASEAN, in contrast to its leading role in the 
SCO, China is the largest trading partner of the ASEAN coun-
29 Trade Tech – Uranium prices and analysis since 1968, accessed 
23 October 2013, http://www.uranium.info/world_uranium_
production_and_requirements.php.
30 The Times of India, “India looking to import uranium from Uz-
bekistan,” 6 October 2013, accessed 23 October 2013, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-looking-to-import-
uranium-from-Uzbekistan/articleshow/23604677.cms.
31 The China General Nuclear Power Corporation then was called 
the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation.
32 UZDaily, “Uz-China Uran can start uranium mining in 2014,” 
28 November 2012, accessed 23 October 2013, http://www.uz-
daily.com/articles-id-21102.htm#sthash.J6rrvz19.dpbs.
33 The volume of bilateral trade between Bangladesh and Uzbeki-
stan was three times that of India. European Community, “Uz-
bekistan: EU Bilateral Traded and Trade with the World,” 5 July 
2013, accessed 27 September 2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113461.pdf.
34 Even in 2012, Russia’s bilateral trade accounted for 18.1% of 
Uzbekistan’s total trade volume, just 1.2% higher than China’s 
share.
tries.  In 2011, China-ASEAN bilateral trade was US$280.4 
billion, while India-ASEAN bilateral trade was only one-fourth 
of that amount at US$68.4 billion.35  India cannot therefore 
expect to function as a significant economic counterweight to 
China in the ASEAN region in the near future.  Moreover, the 
ASEAN has assumed a greater strategic value for China because 
of the rapid growth in trade relations. The ASEAN became 
China’s third largest trading partner in 2011, overtaking Japan. 
The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
projects that the ASEAN will become China’s largest trading 
partner by 2015.36   India’s value for the ASEAN depends on 
the integration of economic and security cooperation.   In com-
parison to Central Asia, India is better situated to project power 
in Southeast Asia via its Andaman and Nicobar Islands located 
close to the Malacca Strait.  The strait is Southeast Asia’s strate-
gic sea lane, where one-third of the world’s oil and traded goods 
transit every year.  The territorial capital of India’s Andaman 
and Nicobar islands, Port Blair, is home to a large naval base 
and India’s first triservice command, the Andaman and Nicobar 
Command, established in 2001 as part of New Delhi’s ‘Look 
East’ policy.  In July 2012, India’s armed forces commissioned 
its INS Baaz (‘falcon’) naval air station under the Andaman and 
Nicobar Command.  Located at India’s southernmost point on 
Great Nicobar island, INS Baaz is 90 km from the Indonesian 
island of Sumatra and dominates the six degree channel, a ma-
jor access route to the Malacca Strait.
India’s ability to project power in Southeast Asia provides 
New Delhi with leverage in its competition with China to es-
tablish long-term energy development partnerships. This can be 
seen in India’s involvement in Vietnam’s offshore hydrocarbon 
exploration and production industry.   India’s OVL obtained 
its first license to explore for oil and natural gas in Vietnam’s 
littoral waters in 1988. OVL began commercial production of 
gas and condensates from this first facility in 2003.  Despite 
vocal Chinese opposition, OVL and Petrovietnam (Vietnam’s 
state-run Oil and Natural Gas Group) signed a three year con-
tract in October 2012 to expand energy exploration and pro-
duction off the coast of Vietnam.  China views Indian energy 
development efforts in Vietnamese waters as a direct challenge 
to China’s claim to sovereignty over those waters and the rest 
of the South China Sea.  In December 2012, the Chinese for-
eign ministry issued a statement declaring its opposition to oil 
and gas development in the disputed waters of the South China 
Sea.37 The statement was issued in response to remarks by the 
chief admiral of the Indian navy vowing to protect India’s assets 
in Vietnamese waters.  Referring specifically to OVL’s hydrocar-
bon blocks off the coast of Vietnam, the chief admiral told the 
35 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN trade by part-
ner country/region, 2011” November 2012, accessed 27 Octo-
ber 2013, http://www.asean.org/images/2013/resources/statis-
tics/external_trade/table24r.pdf.
36 Bao Chang, “ASEAN, China to become top trade partners,” 
People’s Daily Online, 20 April 2012, accessed 27 October 2013, 
http://english.people.com.cn/90778/7794001.html.
37 Reuters, “Vietnam condemns China’s sea claims as ‘serious vio-
lation’,” 4 December 2012, accessed 27 October 2013, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/us-china-sea-idUS-
BRE8B303M20121204.
hits and Misses: ASEAN and Regional Security Southeast Asia    |   hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)            7372           hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)   |   India’s Not-So-Splendid Isolation in central Asia
press that India was prepared to defend against any threat to its 
interest in the South China Sea.38
However, in order for India to effectively face growing 
Chinese economic clout and a more muscular Chinese naval 
presence in the region, New Delhi will have to develop a robust 
strategic partnership with the U.S. and its Asian allies.  India 
has not developed significant security relations with any of the 
other ASEAN nations who are in territorial dispute with China. 
India’s maritime neighbor Indonesia faces no territorial claim by 
China but is one of the most important powers in the region. 
Despite India’s 2005 Strategic Partnership Agreement with In-
donesia, New Delhi did not significantly expand its security co-
operation with Jakarta for over five years.  In April 2011, India 
and Indonesia conducted the first high-level dialogue between 
their respective militaries.39  In late February to early March 
2012, Indian and Indonesian forces held their first joint-mili-
tary exercise at India’s Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare 
School in Mizoram.40  These positive developments come in the 
wake of the rapidly growing security cooperation between the 
United States and Indonesia since the two countries signed a 
2010 Framework Arrangement for defense cooperation. 
Beyond the ASEAN, India needs to alter its policy of 
strategic autonomy from the major Asia-Pacific maritime pow-
ers –the United States, Japan, and Australia.  In October 2013, 
the foreign ministers of the United States, Australia, and Japan 
met for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).   In an unmis-
takable signal to China, the ministers declared their opposition 
to “any coercive or unilateral actions that could change the sta-
tus quo in the East China Sea.”41  Addressing the conflicts in 
the South China Sea, the statement also called for “unimpeded 
trade and the freedom of navigation” and for “ASEAN and 
China to agree on a meaningful code of conduct.”  The force-
ful TSD joint statement came on the heels of an agreement 
between Washington and Tokyo to revise their Guidelines for 
Defense Cooperation to provide Japan with a more active role 
in regional security.42  The Guidelines were last revised in 1997 
before China’s economic rise in the region and its provocative 
38 Sandeep Unnitahn, “Indian Navy prepared to defend its inter-
est in South China Sea, says Admiral DK Joshi,” India Today, 3 
December 2012, accessed 27 October 2013, http://indiatoday.
intoday.in/story/india-prepared-to-intervene-in-south-china-
sea-navy-chief/1/235881.html.
39 The Times of India, “India, Indonesia to hold maiden combat 
drill,” 9 February 2012, accessed 29 October 2013, http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-09/india/31041707_1_
indonesia-military-ties-exercise.
40 Defence Forum India, “Indian, Indonesian Troops Conduct 
Joint Jungle Warfare Drill,” 1 March 2012, accessed on 27 
October 2012 http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/mili-
tary-multimedia/32680-indian-indonesian-troops-conduct-
joint-jungle-warfare-drill.html.
41 U.S. Department of State, “Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint 
Statement,” 4 October 2013, accessed 30 October 2013, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215133.htm.
42 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Security Con-
sultative Committee: Toward a More Robust Alliance and Great-
er Shared Responsibilities,” 3 October 2013, accessed 30 Oc-
tober 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215133.
htm.
actions in the East China and South China Seas.  As the U.S.-
Japanese joint statement entitled “Toward a More Robust Alli-
ance and Greater Shared Responsibilities” made clear, the new 
Defense Cooperation Guidelines will be aimed at deepening 
Japanese and American security cooperation to counteract in-
creasing instability in the Asia-Pacific region.43  
India’s developing naval cooperation with Japan may 
provide New Delhi with the mechanism to participate in a 
U.S.-led security alliance.  In May 2013, one year after he ex-
pressed his doubts in South Korea about the efficacy of coun-
terbalancing China, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Tokyo 
for a summit meeting with his Japanese counterpart Shinzo 
Abe to improve defense ties between the countries. Speaking 
of “[m]aritime security across the linked regions of the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans,” Prime Minister Singh declared Japan to be 
“ a natural and indispensable partner in our quest for stability 
and peace in the vast region in Asia that is washed by the Pa-
cific and Indian Oceans.”44  Even in 2012, India and Japan had 
already conducted their first joint naval exercise involving four 
ships from the Indian Navy.  The regularization of joint naval 
exercises leading to a robust strategic partnership between India 
and Japan may enable India to join Japan, as well as the United 
States and Australia, in a quadrilateral partnership which Shinzo 
Abe termed as “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.”45 In so 
doing, India would increase its strategic value in the Asia-Pacific 
region and prevent itself from being marginalized in Southeast 
Asia as it has experienced in Central Asia.
coNcLuSIoN
With NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, 
Russia and China are well placed to prevent India from pro-
jecting power in Central Asia. Unless India can act as a strate-
gic partner in an Indo–American ‘New Silk Road’ framework, 
New Delhi will watch from the sidelines as the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization constructs its own Russo-Chinese domi-
nated trade, transit, and security corridor from the Baltic to 
the Pacific.  India may avoid a similar fate in Southeast Asia 
by moderating its policy of strategic autonomy.  India’s recent 
upgrade of its defense cooperation with Japan may indicate that 
New Delhi has embarked on a new direction that will improve 
India’s capacity to maintain strategic partnerships across the 
larger Asia-Pacific region.
43 Lesley Wroughton and David Alexander, “U.S., Japan to mod-
ernize alliance to counter 21st century,” Reuters, 3 October 
2013, accessed 30 October 2013.
44 B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Japan is an indispensable partner in In-
dia’s quest for stability in Asia: PM” The Hindu, 29 May 2013, 
accessed 30 October 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/in-
ternational/world/japan-is-an-indispensable-partner-in-indias-
quest-for-stability-in-asia-pm/article4759535.ece.
45 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syn-
dicate, 27 December 2012, accessed 13 October 2013, http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-
japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe
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ABSTRACT
The US rebalance to Asia and the simultaneous rise of 
China have created new opportunities and anxieties for South-
east Asian countries. Incidents in the South China Sea and the 
growing security dilemma between great powers have raised 
questions regarding regional stability and the role of ASEAN 
and the ARF in that regard. In ASEAN’s early days, it sought 
to entrench the norm of regional autonomy in Southeast 
Asia. However, by the end of the Cold War, it was realized 
by countries within the region that drawing China and the 
United States into their regional affairs was necessary for their 
survival. Since then, ASEAN and later the ARF, were created 
to ‘enmesh’ external powers into its affairs using it as a strategy 
for regional stability. Despite its intentions, ASEAN remains 
restricted in its ability to keep apace the new geopolitical chal-
lenges coming with a growing Sino-US security dilemma. This 
is largely because its members tend to give greater importance 
to national versus regional interests. While conflict between 
the United States and China is by no means inevitable, the 
dangers of an exacerbating security dilemma and miscalcula-
tions do remain and should be avoided.  
INTRoducTIoN
Great power competition is not new to Southeast Asia. 
The recent naval incident between the USS Cowpens, a guided-
missile cruiser, and a Chinese Warship operating near its only 
aircraft carrier the Liaoning, was quick to reach international 
headlines as a marker for renewed tensions between the United 
States and China in the Western Pacific. Several renowned in-
ternational media sources including Reuters and the Financial 
Times1 stated that it was a ‘near-miss’2 and ‘the most significant 
US-China maritime incident in the disputed South China Sea 
since 2009’3. The official response of United States and China 
1 Geoff Dyer, “US naval near-miss in South China Sea adds to 
tensions,” Financial Times, December 14, 2014, accessed March 
8, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/32fd63fe-644c-11e3-
98e2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2vMRMuxvn.
2 David Alexander, “Chinese inexperience a factor in warships’ 
near-miss: U.S. admiral,” Reuters, January 16, 2014, accessed 
March 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-
usa-china-warships-idUSBREA0F02220140116.  
3 David Alexander and Pete Sweeney, “U.S., Chinese war-
ships narrowly avoid collision in South China Sea,” Reuters, 
December 14, 2013, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/12/14/us-usa-china-ships-idUS-
BRE9BC0T520131214. 
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were more nuanced, on the other hand. In his remarks with 
Philippines’ Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert S. Rosario, the 
US Secretary of State John Kerry reaffirmed that the situation 
was not viewed as one of ‘rising tensions’ and it is not seeking 
to do anything but ‘continue with a process that President 
Obama initiated a number of years ago when he began the 
rebalance to Asia’4.  The words coming from China’s Ministry 
of National Defense were that ‘Defense authorities of the two 
countries have reported relevant information to each other 
via normal channels and stressed that U.S. armed forces have 
an opportunity to develop their relations and both sides are 
willing to enhance exchanges, practice closer coordination 
and make efforts to maintain regional peace and stability’5. 
The gap between the position taken by the media and that 
taken officially reflects one of the key inferences the paper 
is aiming at making: while the official lines indicate a low 
likelihood of conflict between the US and China, it does not 
rule out the possibility of maritime miscalculations and an 
exacerbating security dilemma between the two in Southeast 
Asia region. 
While it may be an overstatement that Southeast Asian 
security depends upon the shape that Sino-US bilateral rela-
tions take, it is one of the key determinants of the prospects 
for regional stability.6 The US rebalance to Asia has incited 
an uneasy response from China. Some have even termed it 
a ‘comprehensive containment package’ that includes a ‘new 
military doctrine of air-sea battle; launched a game-changing 
economic project called the Trans-Pacific Partnership; initi-
ated the rotation of US marines in Australia; and stationed 
coastal battleships in Singapore’.7 While Chinese assertive-
ness remains a prominent discourse amidst the emerging East 
and Southeast Asian security analyses, it can be argued that 
the rebalancing effort –which may not seem as new as it is 
4 John Kerry, “Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert 
del Rosario,” US Department of State, accessed March 6, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218835.htm. 
5 Xinhua, “China, U.S. communicate effectively over warship 
encounter: ministry,“ Xinhuanet, December 18, 2013, accessed 
March 6, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
12/18/c_132977602.htm. 
6 Zhu Feng, “US Rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific: China’s Re-
sponse and the Future Regional Order,” Discussion Paper, Centre 
for Strategic Studies: New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington 
(2012). 
7 Lanxin Xiang, , “China and the Pivot” Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy 54, 5 (2012), 113-128.
made to seem - has limited Beijing’s space to maneuver in the 
international system leaving it with the need to consolidate its 
power domestically. Arguably, the US rebalance has also in-
creased the voice of the People’s Liberation Army in Chinese 
domestic and foreign policy and has contributed to a surge in 
Chinese military spending.8 The concern with the emerging 
geopolitics is whether Southeast Asian countries have a part 
to play in maintaining regional stability given the growing 
security dilemma between the two great powers. This paper 
studies the capability and contribution of the Southeast Asian 
states in managing the balance of China-US presence in the 
region through ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions). It argues that this is challenging due to two reasons: 
Southeast Asian states are far from speaking in a unanimous 
voice over regional security issues and seem to be prioritizing 
national interests over regional ones; the ability of ASEAN 
and ASEAN led ‘institutions’ like the ASEAN Regional Fo-
rum (ARF), built on the aim of achieving consensus-based 
solutions from a number of varied, national-interest driven 
states, is limited, so these institutions could not act and take 
charge over the region’s security issues.
The first section discusses that the challenges of main-
taining an effective great power management strategy to-
day, are rooted in the region’s history since the early days of 
ASEAN. Undoubtedly, the institution helped give Southeast 
Asia a ‘regional identity based on a set of norms that focused 
on ‘regional cooperation’ and ‘regional autonomy’. It was es-
tablished; however, that the latter became difficult to sustain 
fairly soon, since the regional environment was fraught with 
inter and intra state disputes in the broader context of the 
Cold War that seeped into the region. The second section 
discusses how this drew great powers into the region to man-
age regional power struggles. Since then, external relationship 
between US and China is critical in determining regional sta-
bility in Southeast Asia. 
The emergence of the post-Cold War order and a rising 
China, offered both opportunities and challenges to South-
east Asian countries. This perpetuated a strategy of ‘hedging’ 
amongst Southeast Asian countries that consisted of deep 
engagement with China on one hand, and ‘soft balancing’ 
8 Zhu Feng, “US Rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific: China’s Re-
sponse and the Future Regional Order,” Discussion Paper, Centre 
for Strategic Studies: New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington 
(2012). 
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against potential Chinese aggression or disruption of the sta-
tus quo’ on the other9.  Arguably, it acted as a sort of insur-
ance policy in the international system that offset the risks of 
engaging with either the traditional or rising power10. This 
moved them further away from acting regionally but carving 
independent strategies to engage with the US and China to 
avoid the risk of balancing against or bandwagoning with the 
latter.  The challenges of sustaining this effort in the light of 
the Obama-endorsed rebalancing effort, remain the focus of 
the last section. The paper concludes by stating that as the 
notion of ‘regionalism’ – including the role played by regional 
institutions – in Southeast Asia remains fractured and con-
tested, and only offers a thin layer to the foundation of its 
security architecture. As the recent naval incidents illustrate, 
conflict between the two is not inevitable, but dangers of an 
exacerbating security dilemma and miscalculations do remain 
and should be avoided. 
FRAMEWORK
As a framework of analysis, it is rather challenging, 
and in fact, serves of limited explanatory value, to catego-
rize the interactions between Southeast Asian states and great 
powers within the confines of existing international relations 
theory. Evelyn Goh makes this observation in her article in 
the International Security Journal in 2008.11 However, even 
for the scholars on the region who are synonymous with cer-
tain theoretical approaches to their work on subject, adher-
ing to them in their complete entirety is rare. For instance, 
in a well-argued review essay in the Pacific Review, author 
Sorpong Peou12 notes that late Michael Leifer13 and Amitav 
Acharya14, known for their respective realist and constructiv-
ist approaches, raised questions and make observations in 
their work that steered away from their main approach. Even 
for scholars Sheldon Simon and Kai He, a single approach 
would be parsimonious and hence viewed Southeast Asian 
security by integrating realist and neoliberal perspectives15. 
9 Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in South-
east Asian Regional Security Strategies,” Policy Studies 16, East 
West Centre (2005) accessed on March 7, 2014 http://www.east-
westcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/PS016.pdf 
10 Rommel Banlaoi, Philippines-China Security Relations: Cur-
rent Issues and Emerging Concerns. (Manila : Yuchengco Center, 
2012).
11 Evelyn Goh,, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in South-
east Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International 
Security, 32, 3 (2007/8): 113-157.
12 Sorpong Peou, “Realism and constructivism in Southeast Asian 
security studies today: a review essay,” The Pacific Review, 15, 1 
(2002): 119-138.
13 Micheal Lefier, ASEAN and the security of South-East Asia (Oxon, 
Routledge, 1989).
14 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast 
Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2001)
15 Sheldon Simon, “Realism and neoliberalism: International rela-
tions theory and Southeast Asian security,” The Pacific Review, 
8, 1 (1995 ):5-24; Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and Inter-
national Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Bal-
ance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” European Journal of 
Simon argues that since the end of the Cold War, South-
east Asian states have practiced both self-help and collabo-
ration16. Kai He furthered Simon’s framework into bridging 
the gap between neorealism and neoliberalism in explaining 
state behavior in Southeast Asia17. He argues that rather than 
solely pursuing hard-balancing strategies – in a military sense 
– countries in the region seemed to have pursued inclusive 
institutional balancing strategies to draw external states into 
the region through multilateral institutions where they could 
constrain their behavior through a framework of norms and 
manipulate agendas to address their interests. This portion of 
He’s analysis overlaps with Acharya’s argument in his land-
mark publication ‘Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia.’ He highlighted that the unique aspect of 
ASEAN-endorsed regionalism was that it was not meant to 
prevent great powers from interfering in the affairs of the re-
gion, but enhance the bargaining power of small and weak 
states in their dealings with the Great Powers.18 
From the existing theoretical literature on Southeast 
Asia, it seems that the integration of great powers, rather than 
the characteristic behavior of balancing or bandwagoning 
has determined regional security outcomes. In that regard, 
Evelyn Goh’s concept of ‘enmeshment’ has strong explana-
tory value for the nature of great power relations in Southeast 
Asia19. Her analysis however risks overstating the ‘regional’ 
nature of a great power strategy. While great and middle pow-
ers are drawn into the region forming a complex web of link-
ages that would ensure their long-term engagement, there is 
only a specific limit within which it can bring about regional 
stability. Here, the words of Leifer resonate. Regional order 
in Southeast Asia remains elusive ‘as the region’s stakeholders, 
including interested outside powers do not share assumptions 
about the foundations of interstate conduct’20.  Essentially, 
Southeast Asian states are individual entities acting in their 
own national interests, and the relationship and interest with 
the US and China varies among countries. Indeed, ‘Singapore 
has expanded its agreement for US naval facilities in the city-
state – apparently without affecting its very significant eco-
nomic ties with China. Malaysia enjoys the best of relations 
with both China and the US, in a way the Philippines does 
not. Cambodia seeks to avoid turning its back on America 
International Relations, 14, 3 (2008): 489-518. 
16 Sheldon Simon, “Realism and neoliberalism: International rela-
tions theory and Southeast Asian security,” The Pacific Review, 8, 
1 (1995): 8.
17 Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations 
Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strat-
egies in Southeast Asia,” European Journal of International Rela-
tions, 14, 3 (2008): 494.
18 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast 
Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 51-52.
19 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast 
Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Se-
curity, 32, 3 (2007/8): 113-157.
20 See Seng Tan, “Specters of Leifer: Insights on Regional Order 
and Security for Southeast Asia Today,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 34, 3 (2012): 
309-337. 
76           hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)   |  hits and Misses: ASEAN and Regional Security Southeast Asia hits and Misses: ASEAN and Regional Security Southeast Asia    |   hARVARd ASIA QuARTERLy 15.3/4 (2013)            77
even as it embraces, or is embraced by, China. Myanmar now 
looks forward to greater American economic engagement but 
whilst augmenting its ties with neighboring China. Thailand 
has a military treaty arrangement with the US, but does not 
seek to antagonize China’21. These differing national strate-
gies make it challenging to achieve a Southeast Asian regional 
position over great power management for years to come. 
SouThEAST ASIAN REgIoNALISM: FRoM AuToN-
oMy To ENMEShMENT
Despite there being inter-linkages between Southeast 
Asian countries in the pre-colonial period, the existence of 
Southeast Asia as a political region is a twentieth century 
construct.22 The formation of ASEAN played a major role 
in consolidating and institutionalizing the region as a collec-
tive body of nations in the international system. While the 
founding members decided that regional cooperation should 
be one of the main aims of ASEAN, most were nascent states, 
carving national sovereign identities, amidst regional mis-
trust and antagonism. The founding members were locked in 
sovereignty disputes amongst themselves, placing ASEAN’s 
building blocks on an unsteady platform.
Amidst many things, ASEAN countries differed sig-
nificantly over the extent to which external intervention was 
permitted. While Malaysia and Indonesia favored limited or 
no external intervention, other ASEAN countries like Philip-
pines, Thailand and Singapore relied heavily upon its security 
alliances with foreign powers. These sharp differences came 
to light in the Vietnam-Cambodia War from 1977 to 1991. 
As the United States reduced its presence in the region by the 
end of the Vietnam War, Thailand, as a frontline country to 
the conflict, saw China as a means of military protection and 
support, and hence an important ally in Vietnamese (and, 
by extension, the Soviet Union’s) aspirations in the region. 
Sino-Thai military cooperation paved the way for new ASE-
AN that began a strategic alignment with China and was less 
–although not completely– enmeshed in American affairs.23 
This marked the beginning of new strategic landscape across 
the region, which moved away from being a Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality to one in which great powers were 
‘enmeshed’ into international or regional society, enveloping 
[them] in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, 
with the long-term aim of integration.24
The strategy of enmeshment was also crystallized by 
changes in the global political economy. By the late 1980s 
there was a wave of Western Protectionism that made ASEAN 
21 Majid Munir, “Forging a Regional Strategy,“ LSE IDEAS RE-
PORTS: The New Geopolitics of Southeast Asia (2012): 81-80.
22 Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in the study of international rela-
tions: The rise and decline of a region,” The Pacific Review, 9, 2 
(1996): 199-228. 
23 Alice Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-
Century Asia,” Asian Survey, 43, 4 (2003):  622–647.
24  Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast 
Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Secu-
rity, 32, 3 (2007/8): 121. 
countries concerned about their access to and dependence on 
Western markets. The 1992 Europe’s Maastricht Treaty, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and U.S. 
efforts to link human rights to trade heightened these fears.25 
This increased their need to search for alternative economic 
partnerships to hedge those with the United States. This led 
to the emergence of an East Asian multilateral engagements 
and dialogues. The need for this intensified for the region, 
especially since the Asian Financial Crisis. ASEAN plus three 
(APT: ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea) was once 
such agreement. Proposals for economic cooperation the 
‘New Millennium Yazawa Initiative’ and the ‘East Asia Vision 
Group’ were submitted by 1998 during the second ASEAN 
summit.26 
China, which was hardly affected by the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis, was applauded for helping stabilize the region’s 
economy by not devaluing its currency.27 In the early mil-
lennium, it showed more signs of favoring a cooperative ap-
proach and helped set up economic mechanisms to prevent 
another Asian financial crisis such as the Chiang Mai Initia-
tive Multilateralism (CMIM) and the Asian Bond Market 
Initiative. It drew ASEAN into regional trade by initiating the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in 2002.28 
As China’s relations with ASEAN were evolving on 
economic terms, Washington renewed its ties with the region 
after terror attacks in the United States on 11th September 
2001 and the Bali Bombings, where it declared the region as 
the second front in the war on terror.  
While ASEAN countries welcomed China’s economic 
presence, they were suspicious of its growing influence in the 
region as far as security was concerned. Apart from changes in 
the external environment, ASEAN underwent major internal 
change in the Post-Cold War era. It opened its membership 
to Vietnam (1995), Myanmar (1997), Lao PDR (1997) and 
Cambodia (1999). While on one hand this meant a wider 
regional community of ‘One Southeast Asia’, it increased 
intra-mural tensions by making the task of holding a com-
mon position towards external powers increasingly difficult.29 
New members came with their own backlog of national in-
terests and individual external relations. By bringing Vietnam 
on board, ASEAN imported Sino-Vietnamese rivalry on to 
ASEAN’s list of regional issues, as both countries were histor-
ic rivals who then clashed over disputed islands in the South 
China Sea. Myanmar came at quite a price, given its poor 
human rights record under the military junta, and this seri-
25 Alice Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-
Century Asia,” Asian Survey, 43, 4 (2003):  622–647.
26 Kazushi Shimizu, “Economic Integration in East Asia: issues and 
Tasks in the Post World Financial Crisis,” Economics Journal of 
Hokkaido University, 41 (2012), 47-57.
27 Thomas Lum , Wayne Morrison, ,& Bruce Vaughn, , “China’s 
“Soft Power” in Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for the Congress 
(Washington DC, 2008).
28 Emmanuel Yujuico, “The Philippines,” in The New Geopolitics of 
Southeast Asia, ed. Nicholas Kitchen, LSE IDEAS Report (2012), 
61-66.
29 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast 
Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 103. 
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ously undermined ASEAN’s international standing. Lastly, 
Cambodia with its large-scale Chinese influence would mean 
keeping the Chinese engagement within check very difficult. 
The concerns with additional membership coupled with the 
‘ASEAN way’ of managing regional issues through consensus-
based decision making, soft institutions, flexible cooperation 
and non-intervention in internal matters have made achiev-
ing a stable regional security architecture extremely challeng-
ing especially with regard to the South China Sea dispute.  
Chinese assertiveness over territorial features in the 
South China Sea made necessary strong American security 
presence for Southeast Asian countries. The changing security 
architecture after the Cold War caused by the supposed pow-
er vacuum was the catalyst for creating a new forum known 
as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1993.30 The 
aim of the ARF was to bring all interested parties in South-
east Asian regional security on a common platform ‘to foster 
constructive dialogue and consultation on political and secu-
rity issues of common interest and concern; and to make sig-
nificant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building 
and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region’.31 
The idea behind creating a region-wide security forum 
was to allow so-called middle powers such as Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia to rope both China and the United 
States in the regional security process.32  Like ASEAN itself, 
the highly diverse membership of ARF made decision mak-
ing increasingly difficult due to the presence of rival powers 
and clashing interests.33 Furthermore, the ARF has inherited 
the ASEAN principles of non-interference and consensus in 
its discussion of security issues. Thus far, the progress on re-
solving the South China Sea issue has been slow and stuck 
in diplomatic deep-freeze, with a meek response. Attempts 
to tackle the South China Sea issue began in 1992, where 
ASEAN, in agreement with China, produced the Declaration 
on the South China Sea, in which ‘all parties concerned’, were 
urged to create ‘a positive climate for the eventual resolution 
of all disputes’.34 Despite this, not much changed in the Chi-
nese position over its claims in the South China Sea. Hence, 
in 1994, at the first meeting of the ARF, the South China Sea 
issue was not even mentioned in the official sessions, but only 
post-dinner, in the dead of the night and outside the formal 
session.35
30 Rodolfo Severino, In: Michael Kingsford,  “Can the ASEAN Re-
gional Forum have a Role in Maintaining Regional Security,” 
(2012) Shedden Papers, 1-13.
31 “About The ASEAN Regional Forum,” ASEAN Regional Forum, 
last modified July 25, 1994, accessed April 21, 2013, http://ase-
anregionalforum.asean.org/about.html ,.
32 Rodolfo Severino, The Asean Regional Forum (Singapore: Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009)
33 Ibid. 
34 “Declaration on the South China Sea ASEAN,” Centre for In-
ternational Law, last modified on July 22, 1992 accessed April 
21, 2013, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1992/1992-asean-declaration-
on-the-south-china-sea-signed-on-22-july-1992-in-manila-phil-
ippines-by-the-foreign-ministers/.
35 Rodolfo Severino, The Asean Regional Forum (Singapore: Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009)
In 2002, China signed the Declaration on the Con-
duct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC). The DoC es-
sentially consisted of trust and confidence building measures 
with five voluntary cooperative activities.36 It was meant to 
lead up to the ratification of a legally binding ‘Regional Code 
of Conduct’ for all countries involving in the South China 
Sea disputes. However, no agreement has been reached thus 
far.37 Since the signing of the agreement on the DoC, Beijing 
and ASEAN both agreed that they needed to reduce tensions 
arisen from the South China Sea situation. The former; how-
ever, has made it clear that it opposes active involvement of 
the ARF in South China Sea disputes. China’s actions are a 
product of the ASEAN way’s consensus-based decision mak-
ing, which implies that if China does not wish to discuss the 
South China Sea Issue, it need not.38
The concern with the ARF is that there has been no 
unanimity amongst members for what its functions actually 
are in relation to regional security. For ASEAN countries, 
the ARF is an instrument to maintain a regional balance of 
power through a continued U.S engagement on one hand, 
and Chinese engagement on the other. For ASEAN member 
countries, this would ensure that the latter’s engagement is 
restrained to a rules-based agreement in the practice of ‘good 
international behavior’.39 China, on the other hand, viewed 
the ARF as a representative of a multipolar world order coun-
tering a Washington-centered one, by the end of the Cold 
War. 40  For the US, it has helped improve its position towards 
its allies and smaller regional players, assuring them of a con-
tinued presence in the region; furthermore, it legitimizes its 
security presence and naval postures. While it is in the in-
terests of most ASEAN members that regional stability and 
a sustainable balance of power are maintained through this 
framework, it is becoming increasingly challenging given the 
‘new geopolitics shaping Southeast Asia’,41 characterized by a 
growing Chinese presence and influence on one hand, and 
America’s rebalance to Asia on the other.
36 Carlyle Thayer, “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China 
Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?,” The Asia-Pacif-
ic Journal: Japan Focus (2013) accessed on February 19 2013, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Carlyle_A_-Thayer/. 
37 Sanchita Basu Das, “ASEAN: a united front to tackle the South 
China Sea issue,” East Asia Forum, 13 May, 2012, accessed April 
21, 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/13/asean-a-
united-front-to-tackle-the-south-china-sea-issue/.  
38 Michael Kingsford, “Can the ASEAN Regional Forum have a 
Role in Maintaining Regional Security,” Shedden Papers (2012): 
1-13.
39 Ralf Emmers, “The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor 
within the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, 23, 2 (2001) 275-291.
40 Ibid. 
41 Munir Majid, “Southeast Asia between China and the United 
States,” in The New Geopolitics of Southeast Asia, ed. Nicholas 
Kitchen, LSE IDEAS Report (2012): 21-35.
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PoST ThE ‘PIVoT’: SuSTAININg ENMEShMENT 
The reassertion of American supremacy in Asia has 
been one of the key foreign policy objectives in the Obama 
Administration as it ‘pivots’ to or ‘rebalances’ in the region 
with increased presence. The message endorsed by this is 
that America is planning to play a leadership role in Asia.42 
It builds on tenants of Bush Administration’s foreign policy 
in Asia, such as the strengthening of relations with existing 
allies, initiation of a flexible and sustainable troop presence, 
Free Trade Agreement and negotiations, the focus on the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and new partnerships with 
India and Vietnam.43 
The management of relationship with the US and 
China has been a key diplomatic objective of the pivot. Es-
sentially, the approach has been two-pronged: reaffirming 
and strengthening cooperative ties, and simultaneously estab-
lishing a strong American presence in the region in Asia to 
encourage constructive Chinese behavior and provide confi-
dence to regional leaders who wish to resist potential Chinese 
hegemony.44 The strategy in practice; however, illustrates a 
focus on the second approach more than the first. Its military 
dimensions, though modest, seem to be targeting the South 
China Sea dispute, such as the rotational deployment of 
2,500 U.S. Marines in northern Australia within projecting 
distance of it, and four new U.S. Navy littoral combat ships 
developed for rapid reaction in coastal waters – in Singapore. 
45 It has obviously not won much support in China and has 
given hardliners fodder to raise alarm about what they per-
ceive as containment. 
This indicates that a new strategic environment shapes 
Southeast Asia. It has been particularly challenging for ASE-
AN to manage, as the very powers that it was created to en-
mesh, clash, it can have disastrous consequences since most 
countries in the region seek to engage both powers. As argued 
earlier, ASEAN’s inclusiveness is one of its key weaknesses, 
especially since its members vary in the nature of engagement 
with either power. In the last two years, members have made 
such decisions with regards to tensions in the South China 
Sea, making it a dispute that has been extremely difficult to 
resolve.  ASEAN’s biggest setback was in July 2012 when for-
eign ministers of member countries failed to agree on a joint 
communiqué at the end of their meeting in Phnom Penh. 
Members were divided over whether or not to include refer-
ence to disputes in the Scarborough Shoal and oil leasing in 
42 “The American Pivot to Asia,” Nam Viet News, accessed 21 Feb-
ruary 2013, http://namvietnews.wordpress.com/the-american-
pivot-to-asia/ 
43 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Law-
rence, B. Dolven, Micheal F. Martin, and Ronald O’Rourke, 
“Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ 
Toward Asia,” Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress (2012). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and 
Transition in Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2013), 112.
Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the communi-
qué. While most members were in favor of their inclusion in 
the communiqué, Cambodia, whose representative happened 
to be the ASEAN chair in 2012, rejected it repeatedly and 
vetoed the draft prepared by other ASEAN members.46 Since 
then, relations between Philippines and Cambodia have de-
teriorated, signaling a division in the members of the organi-
zation.47 It is argued that Cambodia’s strong bilateral ties with 
China influenced its position in ASEAN.48 
Last January, Philippines made a unilateral move to 
take China to arbitration over the issue of maritime delimita-
tions in the South China Sea. Frustrated with the failure of 
ASEAN to manage a resurging China, Philippines made a 
strong decision to take legal action against it. Not all South-
east Asian countries have overtly supported Philippines’ 
move. Singapore, for instance, stressed on the fact that it 
was a ‘national decision’ made by the Philippines and ter-
ritorial disputes of the South China Sea can only be settled 
by ‘claimant states’.49 Hence, in many ways, there appears to 
be a shift away from regionalism amongst Southeast Asian 
nations.  
Despite the tensions with China, the economic dimen-
sions of Obama’s rebalancing strategy only reaffirm the need 
for its long-term Chinese presence in the region. Essentially, 
it focuses on stimulating trade relations with great empha-
sis on the TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership). The TPP was re-
launched as a proposal for a free-trade zone by the Obama 
administration in the East Asia Summit in Bali in 2009.50 
Characterized by the principles of transparency, protection 
of intellectual property, labor rights and environmental pro-
tection, the TPP aimed at including the major economies of 
the Asia Pacific. The current group of member countries in-
cludes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Singapore, Mexico, Peru and New Zealand, while Japan 
and Thailand have considered joining. While this has been 
welcomed in the region, it has been realized by the less-de-
veloped countries that the standards for joining the TPP are 
46 Carlyle Thayer, “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China 
Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?,” The Asia-Pacific 
Journal: Japan Focus (2013) accessed on February 19 2013, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Carlyle_A_-Thayer/.
47 Munir Majid, “Forging a Regional Strategy,” in The New Geopoli-
tics of Southeast Asia, ed. Nicholas Kitchen, LSE IDEAS Report 
81-80.
48 Donald K Emmerson, “ASEAN stumbles in Phnom Penh,” East 
Asia Forum, July 23, 2012, accessed March 6, 2014, http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/23/asean-stumbles-in-phnom-
penh-2/  
49 “MFA Spokesman’s comments In response to media queries 
on the Philippines’ initiation of arbitration proceedings against 
China under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),” Singapore 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  last modified 23 January, 2013, ac-
cessed  May 21, 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/me-
dia_centre/press_room/pr/2013/201301/press_20130123.html 
50 Jonathan Fenby, “China’s geo-economic strategy: does China 
have a foreign policy? Domestic Pressures and China’s Strategy,” 
London School of Economics and Political Science. London: 
LSE IDEAS reports (2012).
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extremely high. Last April, Philippines’ Trade and Industry 
Secretary Gregory Domingo stated that the country is not 
prepared to join the TPP.51 ASEAN countries still rely on ex-
clusive Asia-Pacific economic integration like the APT and 
ASEAN + 6.52 The meeting on the latter was held in Bali last 
February to undertake negotiations pertaining to the world’s 
largest free trade area under the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP).53 The RCEP has similar ob-
jectives to that of the TPP in terms of trade liberalization and 
economic integration, but the difference is that the RCEP 
has special and differential treatment towards less-developed 
ASEAN countries and that it remains specific to the Asia Pa-
cific region. In this way, exclusive Asian multilateralism –with 
China as a strong pillar– acts as a successful counterweight to 
US-based economic engagement. 
Evidently, the dual Sino-US presence is essential for 
Southeast Asian regional security. Despite China’s rise be-
ing an economic boon to the region, the US rebalance was 
welcomed to keep the latter’s assertiveness over sovereignty 
claims in check. That said, countries themselves are hesitant 
about US commitment to the region, given its financial con-
straints to sustain its military deployments in Asia.54 Obama’s 
absence in the APEC and EAS summits last year due to the 
shutdown in Washington was demonstrative of the limita-
tions of American engagement with the region.  
As Southeast Asian nations continue to hedge between 
the US and China, ASEAN will constantly need to act on 
its feet and draw them into presenting a regional strategy to 
deal with major powers in the region. This would, in the long 
run, give the region space to operate independently between 
the two great powers.55 While the incident between the USS 
Cowpens and the Chinese warship in the South China Sea 
was quickly managed, it would be unfortunate if miscalcula-
tions such as these would escalate further resulting in danger-
ous consequences for regional stability. 
51 Paolo G Montecillo, “PH not yet ready for trans-pacific trade 
agreement,” accessed May 7, 2013, http://business.inquirer.
net/117837/ph-not-yet-ready-for-trans-pacific-trade-agreement. 
52 ASEAN+6 includes the 10 ASEAN countries and six countries 
China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. 
53 “Official meeting with the ASEAN +6 members is imminent,” 
SANET, accessed on March 3, 2013, http://sanet.eu/en/info-
center/daily-news/daily-news-details/article/official-meeting-
with-the-asean-6-members-is-imminent.html. 
54 “What Happened to the Asia Pivot in 2013?” Council on Foreign 
Relations, accessed on http://www.cfr.org/china/happened-asia-
pivot-2013/p32108. 
55 Donald K. Emmerson, “Challenging ASEAN: the American piv-
ot in Southeast Asia,” East Asia Forum July 23, 2012, accessed on 
January 22, 2014 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/13/
challenging-asean-the-american-pivot-in-southeast-asia/ 
coNcLuSIoN
The interest of China and the United States in increas-
ing their presence in the region has altered the strategic land-
scape in Southeast Asia. This has brought into question the 
role of ASEAN as the pillar of Southeast Asian representation 
in the international multilateral order in managing Sino-US 
presence in the region, keeping the possibility of conflict at 
bay. Managing the Sino-US security dilemma has much to do 
with developing ways and means to tackle the South China 
Sea issue, given that tensions can cause serious miscalcula-
tions, if they escalate.
Since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asian re-
gional strategy as endorsed by ASEAN, moved away from 
regional autonomy to enmeshment of external powers. This 
was mainly because countries within the region realized the 
importance of Chinese and American presence in the region. 
The rise of China offered numerous economic opportuni-
ties to the region. Several forums sprung as offshoots of this 
strategy, in the form of regional security forms and economic 
arrangements to bring the ASEAN voice to the international 
forefront. Later, middle powers were drawn in, through the 
ARF with the aim of their long-term and sustained engage-
ment with Southeast Asia. 
Currently, as China and the US seek to reassert their 
presence and influence in Asia, ASEAN centrality has come 
under tremendous strain. It is challenging for ASEAN to 
forge a regional identity when Southeast Asian countries 
themselves are divided over how key security issues such as 
the South China Sea problem should be dealt with and the 
extent they would go to achieve a unanimous and peaceful 
solution. ASEAN’s role is central to the Southeast Asian strat-
egy of great power enmeshment, and it needs stronger lead-
ership orientation to play this more role effectively to keep 
apace the emerging strategic environment in the region.  
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ABSTRACT 
I offer a preliminary assessment of a range of strategic 
options for China and the United States, put them together 
in an analytical framework to generate a set of plausible sce-
narios, and examine what combination of such scenarios is 
most likely to take place.  I argue that neither China nor the 
United States is likely to dominate the region alone.  A bi-
polar East Asia is the most likely scenario because there is 
little that stops the rise of Chinese power to reach parity with 
American power.  The strategy to minimize negative implica-
tions from that balance of power for the United States is the 
continuation of internal balancing and external balancing ef-
forts.  While a unipolar East Asia under Chinese or American 
leadership is plausible in the long run, that system is likely to 
be unstable and unpopular on both sides of the Pacific.  
INTRoducTIoN
20 years after the end of the Cold War, East Asia is at a 
crossroads.  With a series of territorial disputes and rising eco-
nomic power, the region has gained much attention from the 
world.  In part to respond to China’s rapid rise in economic 
and military power, the United States has announced a “Pivot 
to Asia” by beefing up its military presence through enhanced 
rotations of troops and equipment in the Philippines, Aus-
tralia, and Singapore, and advancing its agenda for greater 
economic cooperation region-wide.  The two key drivers of 
these dynamics, China and the United States, are such power-
ful entities that they get to determine the main course of ac-
tion of the region in future.1 However, it is not entirely clear 
what the strategic landscape of East Asia will be as the two 
states compete for regional and global leadership.  There are 
a variety of scenarios we can draw for the future of Asia.  It is 
imperative to pursue these scenarios because as power shifts 
from the West to the East, the future of the region is likely 
to impact the stability of global politics and economy, and 
determine resources that these countries will spend on other 
regions.  Answers to these questions will help us envision the 
future of great power politics in East Asia.  
This article explores a range of strategic options for Chi-
na and the United States, constructs an analytical framework 
to generate a set of plausible scenarios, and examines which 
combination of scenarios is most likely to occur.  In so doing, 
I discuss five strategic options for both sides while dealing 
minimally with operational and tactical dynamics.  My main 
argument is that neither China nor the United States is likely 
to dominate the region alone.  A bipolar East Asia is the most 
likely scenario because there is little that stops the rise of Chi-
nese power to reach parity with American power.  Among 
the best strategies for the United States to minimize negative 
implications from that balance of power is the continuation 
of internal balancing and external balancing efforts.  While a 
unipolar East Asia under Chinese or American leadership is 
plausible in the long run, that system is likely to be unstable 
and unpopular on both sides of the Pacific.  But first, we 
1 Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and 
Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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should begin with a brief discussion on the history of great 
powers.  
LEARNINg FRoM ThE PAST
What does the past tell us about great power politics in 
East Asia?  A useful historical reference comes from Robert 
Art, who analyzes three major dyads of the 20th century us-
ing military balance, economic interdependence, and ideo-
logical competition as indicators of rivalry.2  The first dyad 
is between Britain and Germany in the pre-1914 era.  Even 
though the level of economic interdependence between them 
was high, and the military tension and ideological between 
them was considered low, the two countries still ended up in 
World War I.  The second dyad is between Britain and Ger-
many in the pre-1939 Europe.  While the level of economic 
interdependence was deemed low to medium, the ideological 
competition was medium to high, military perception was 
dominated by the presumed airpower threat, and the out-
come of the rivalry was World War II.  The third dyad is the 
Cold War between the United States and USSR.  The military 
2 Robert Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: 
Implications for the Long Haul,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
125, No. 3 (2010). 
balance was maintained by nuclear deterrence (although the 
tension was found later to be high), the level of economic 
interdependence was low, the ideological competition was 
deemed high and intense, and the outcome was a series of 
proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere with an uneasy 
peace between the two superpowers.  
Art concludes that security factors are more important 
than economic and ideological ones in deciding the likeli-
hood of great power war, a point that I agree with.  Yet there 
is a question about the conclusiveness of this article, as none 
of the variables he examines turns out to be independently 
powerful enough to determine the outcome of rivalry.  Fur-
thermore, Art’s picture is missing a key variable: the regime 
type of the challenger and its interactions with that of the 
hegemon.  We need to include the regime type in the analysis 
in order to grasp the likelihood of conflict because internal 
politics of a nation shapes its foreign policy, so I add it to 
Table 1.  On the surface, the Sino-American relationship 
today resembles the pre-WWI British-German rivalry that 
Art describes; the level of economic interdependence is high 
but ideological competition is low.  In Europe, Britain and 
Germany ended up in war despite relatively low military ten-
sion and both sides being democratic.  Between China and 
the United States today, the military tension is rising and the 
Table 1: Historical examples of rivalry between major powers
Dyad Military tension
Level of economic 
interdependence
Ideological 
competition Regime type Outcome 
Britain-
Germany, 
pre-1914
Considered to be low High Low Both democratic War 
Britain-
Germany, 
pre-1939
Low due to presumed 
airpower threat Low to medium
Medium to 
high Both democratic War 
US-USSR 
during the 
Cold War
Initially thought to be low 
but turned out to be high, 
nuclear deterrence
Low High and intense
Democratic vs non-
democratic
Uneasy 
peace
Sino-US 
today
US military power declin-
ing relative to that of 
China
High Low to non-existent
Democratic vs non-
democratic
Source: Art, “The United States and the Rise of China, p. 366.
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former is not democratic.  According to this comparison, a 
major war is likely between China and the United States.   
However, we must avoid drawing premature conclu-
sions from such a comparison.  Differences abound between 
the three historical cases and today’s Sino-American relations. 
First, the rise of economic interdependence between the two 
may have a powerful pacifying effect.  While the ideologi-
cal competition may be low to non-existent, both sides have 
adopted different political systems, which frequently trans-
late into short-term bickering about human rights abuses and 
sovereignty.  Second, while Art argues that economic inter-
dependence and ideological competition are not main deter-
minants of whether the two sides would go to war, and that 
security is a more important variable to predict the likelihood 
of war, the evidence does not support this claim.  If ideologi-
cal and economic factors were not central, then great power 
war would become likely only if both sides reacted strongly 
to major security challenges.  China’s democratization and 
growing participation in the world economy today will do 
little to stop it from going to war if the security situation 
intensifies.  If trade disputes with the United States become 
politicized and ideological differences become an issue of 
contention, they will make war more likely.  For these rea-
sons, we must revise the comparison table in order to better 
reflect the Sino-American relations.  On one hand, ideologi-
cal competition is not as relevant in the current rivalry.  On 
the other hand, differences between liberal democracy and 
socialist/communist systems are so pronounced today that we 
should discuss indicators of China’s domestic politics and its 
relationship with American democracy.  
LoNg-TERM ScENARIoS
 
Long-term analysis of great power competition in 
East Asia is best informed by currently available literature on 
grand strategy.  Following an existing definition, I consider 
grand strategy to be a set of ideas for deploying a nation’s 
resources to achieve its interests in security, prosperity, and 
democratic liberty in the long run.3  Grand strategy is the 
highest level of policy manifestations encompassing the ma-
jor interests that a country has in political, diplomatic, mili-
tary, and economic affairs, conceptually standing above stra-
tegic, operational, and tactical interactions.4  There are many 
types of grand strategies. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross men-
tion four types for United States: Neo-isolationism, Selective 
Engagement, Cooperative security, and Primacy.5  On the 
other hand, China deploys a different set of grand strategies, 
including Hegemony, Balancing, Bandwagoning, Isolation-
3 Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, 
“Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,” 
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/2013). 
4 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in 
American Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006). 
5 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. 
Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 
1997-98). 
ism, and what Avery Goldstein calls a strategy of transition.6 
Countries have different aims and capabilities, and operate 
under distinct environments, so they naturally have differ-
ent options, although there are overlapping options they can 
choose from, as I will show in this article.  Below I will exam-
ine the implications of each scenario and the probability of 
each happening.  Of course, there are limits to this intellec-
tual exercise. Long-term predictions cannot be precise.  It is 
worth trying however, as the matter is so important to the fu-
ture course of Asian politics.  Considering the limits, it makes 
sense for us to conduct a preliminary assessment by way of 
using recent international relations literature and analysis of 
historical patterns and current affairs.  Between the two pow-
ers, the following set of options illustrates a reasonable range 
of grand strategy scenarios.  Following Aaron Friedberg, the 
list includes U.S. primacy, Chinese primacy, Sino-American 
bipolarity, continental-maritime divide, US-China-India 
tripolarity, and the establishment of an East Asian commu-
nity, as summarized in Table 2 below.7  
In the first scenario, the United States may consoli-
date its dominant position in East Asia into regional pri-
macy.  Because this scenario brings about security and eco-
nomic benefits to its allies through base operations and joint 
exercises, it is generally popular among US allies like South 
Korea, Japan, and the Philippines but less so among non-
allies that are at times hostile to US interests, such as North 
Korea, China, and its partners like Cambodia and Pakistan. 
However, it is not certain if this scenario may be achieved in 
the future because it presupposes China’s acquiescence and 
a magical reversal of the ongoing reduction of US defense 
commitments around the world.  After all, some scholars see 
the United States as nothing more than a regional primacy 
in the Western Hemisphere and the country does not con-
trol all the global commons, especially in the ground, cyber, 
and space domains.8  Furthermore, it is not certain that the 
United States can stay at the top of the game even if it wants 
to because of its economic constraints on military power pro-
jection.  Base issues challenge US primacy, too, because U.S. 
overseas bases remain vulnerable to political shifts in their 
host nations and are dependent on host-nation support.9  In 
addition to the troops rotation promised as part of the stra-
tegic rebalancing, the United States would probably have to 
halt troop reduction from Japan, especially Okinawa, and put 
maritime and air assets closer to Taiwan.  The stability of this 
6 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy 
and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005), chapter 2.
7 Aaron Friedberg, “The Geopolitics of Strategic Asia, 2000-
2020,” in Ashley Tellis, Andrew Marble and Travis Tanner, 
eds., Strategic Asia 2010-11, Asia’s Rising Power and America’s 
Continued Purpose (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 
2010). 
8 Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military 
Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, 
No. 1 (Summer 2003).
9 Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics 
and American Globalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007). 
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system is questionable.  Some scholars believe that the system 
would be stable under a unipole which allows its junior allies 
to free-ride on defense responsibility. For others, the system 
would be unstable because other powers are likely to want to 
topple it.  
The second scenario is Chinese primacy.  Some con-
tend that this system has proven to be stable from a historical 
point of view.  Between the 10th and 19th centuries, China 
dominated secondary political units in the region, such as 
those in Korea and Vietnam, built a tributary order on the 
basis of military, cultural, and economic superiority, and al-
lowed its participants great latitude in their activities.10  To-
day, the Chinese primacy may be “restored” if it could con-
tinue its economic growth and military expansion, prevent 
other countries from forming a countervailing coalition, and 
if the United States is either forced or willing to acquiesce. 
Assuming that the United States would stay out of Asia, this 
system would put most of its neighbors – even those rival 
states like India and Japan – under its tutelage.  The system 
would probably be popular among a small number of states 
like North Korea, Laos, and Cambodia but not so among Ja-
pan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and India.  The system is more 
plausible than likely, however, because the United States and 
its allies would most likely do something to prevent it from 
happening.  The cost of withdrawal from Asia and expected 
cost of having to restore it in the future if it wishes to, is 
simply too much for the United States to bear.  The path to 
Chinese primacy would also be unstable, as America’s decline 
would force its allies in the region to challenge a more aggres-
sive China, which may precipitate a war with China and get 
the United States entangled in a regional conflict.  
Third, East Asia may turn into a bipolar system be-
tween China and the United States if China’s power reaches 
10  David Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and 
Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
a general parity with American power, a scenario that is be-
coming realistic day by day.  A bipolar East Asia may be more 
stable than any other forms of distributions of power.  Real-
ists like John Mearsheimer expect China to rise to regional 
primacy whenever possible.  In this scenario, US allies are 
likely to remain on the US side, but China’s rise would force 
the rest of the countries in East Asia to choose sides, which 
divides the region into two opposing poles.11  There is also a 
pacifying power of economic interdependence and nuclear 
deterrence between China and the United States, making 
East Asia peaceful even if the region is split into two.  How-
ever, this scenario will not be attractive for Washington as it 
would mean that the United States has weakened its influence 
on one of the most economically and strategically important 
parts of the world.  Yet it is likely to occur if the United States 
goes in the direction of “offshore balancing,” an alternative 
strategy for Washington to encourage its regional allies, nota-
bly in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, to check and 
balance rivals while maintaining the ability to deploy forces 
offshore to engage in conflict if necessary.  
Fourth, East Asia may get divided into two geopolitical 
groups: the continental and maritime groups.  This would 
occur as an extension of bipolarity, with the continental side 
mostly made up of authoritarian states and the maritime side 
being largely democratic in governance.  The continental side 
would be led by China and include North Korea, Russia, 
Pakistan, Myanmar, Laos, Central Asian states, and possibly 
Vietnam.  This alignment pattern is possible because of com-
mon regime types (non-democracy) and the general inclina-
tion of each state not to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
each other.  Some of those states, like North Korea, Russia, 
and Pakistan, cooperate on military buildup.  The maritime 
side would be led by the United States and include its de-
11  John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: 
Norton, 2001). 
Table 2: Long-term scenarios in East Asia
Scenario Description Implications Likelihood
U.S. primacy The US takes a sole leadership role and governs the region Unstable  Plausible 
Chinese primacy China takes a sole leadership role and governs the region Unstable  Plausible
Sino-American bipo-
larity
China’s power reaches a general parity with American 
power and both sides are in a balance Stable Likely 
Continental-mari-
time divide
East Asia is divided between continental and autocratic 
states under Chinese leadership and maritime and demo-
cratic states led by the US
Stable Unlikely
Tripolarity China, India, and the United States agree on a three-way distribution of power Unstable  Unlikely
East Asian commu-
nity
China, Japan, and the United States work together to 
solve regional problems Unstable Unlikely
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fense treaty allies (South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and 
Australia), Indonesia, Singapore, India, and possibly Mongo-
lia.  The states generally share democratic values, institutions, 
ideologies of freedom, capitalist economic systems and poli-
cies, and often ally against common threats from the above 
alignment.  The “divided Asia” scenario is more specific than 
the bipolarity one in that most countries in the region are 
specifically assigned to either pole.  Along with the Chinese 
primacy scenario, Friedberg thinks this divide is also likely 
to occur.  Despite the famous “strategic partnership,” Beijing 
and Moscow remain suspicious of each other’s intent and do 
not explicitly show close relationships on key security issues 
like nuclear weapons and border disputes.  
This scenario is problematic, however, in several re-
spects.  It is unclear if the alignment will be drawn this way 
precisely, especially with regard to Russia’s willingness to fall 
under this system.  Mongolia, Myanmar, and Vietnam’s posi-
tions are not clear, either, because they may side with the Unit-
ed States in the wake of growing Chinese assertiveness in the 
region, or seek to play one against the other.  Instead of taking 
a clear stance for one side against another, these lesser powers 
have traditionally preferred to use “light” alignments.12  An-
drew Shearer even argues that the dominant stance of many 
Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and Indonesia, 
is a combination of hard balancing and soft-balancing against 
China, along with a collective effort to maintain security ties 
with the United States as a hedge.13  On the other hand, it 
remains questionable whether the foreign policy stances of 
Indonesia and India will align with that of the United States. 
Dan Slater makes it clear that Southeast Asian countries are 
so divergent that the region will not be aligned neatly.  The 
ordering principle of the region, including Burma, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia, lies instead in the varying levels of 
state capacity and authoritarian durability.14  Furthermore, 
countries in Southeast Asia are especially wary about making 
choices between the United States and China, as taking one 
side would likely provoke negative reactions by the other, and 
therefore they prefer a third route centered on “enmeshing” 
the powers into a web of regional institutions and interdepen-
dence.15  Therefore, an East Asia divided along the maritime/
continental line is unlikely to emerge.  
The fifth scenario is a tripolarity, which may occur 
under an unlikely condition that military power of China, 
India, and the United States become equal.  From a Chinese 
12 John Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and 
the Great Powers since 1975 (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2011).  
13 Andrew Shearer, “Southeast Asia and Australia: Case Studies in 
Responding to China’s Military Power, in Ashley Tellis, Travis 
Tanner, and Jessica Keough, eds., Strategic Asia 2011-12, Asia 
Responds to Its Rising Powers (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2011).   
14 Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian 
Leviathans in Southeast Asia (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010).   
15 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast 
Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International 
Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008). 
view, this option may be plausible.  Taylor Fravel argues that, 
“China views India’s rise as a positive development that pro-
motes China’s own core interests,” more than it challenges 
them.  This stance allows China to “avoid a potentially costly 
confrontation that would harm the growth of both countries, 
block the formation of a close U.S.-India relationship, and 
reduce the overall influence of the United States over China.” 
In short, China would not mind working with India.16  There 
are many obstacles, however, to this scheme.  Firstly, India, 
which has emphasized the role of independence as a former 
colony and non-alignment member, is unreliable as a strate-
gic partner either for China or the United States.  Evidence 
for this view comes from the fact that the ongoing US “Pivot 
to Asia” has been conducted without much input from In-
dia and that China is geopolitically closer to Pakistan than 
to India.  Secondly, India does not trust China.  Harsh Pant 
argues that India’s distrust of China is growing because In-
dia feels that China is the only one that does not accept its 
place as a rising power that should be accommodated into 
the global order.17  Arun Sahgal also shows that India seeks 
to develop credible hard power as a dissuasive strategy against 
China.18  Lack of trust makes it difficult for the two countries 
to rise simultaneously and accept each other as major powers 
in the region.  Another case in point is the growing conflict 
over water in Asia.  With a number of rivers and lakes cross-
ing national boundaries in the region, water conflict stimu-
lates interstate tensions over shared resources and exacerbates 
long-term territorial disputes, notably the border dispute that 
has intensified in recent months between India and China. 
This conflict is further underscored by China’s unwillingness 
to cooperate with its neighbors, such as India and Vietnam, 
even though it taps the resources of international rivers.19 
Thus even if achieved, the tripolar system is likely to be un-
stable with the three powers competing against each other for 
regional dominance.20  
Lastly, the idea of an East Asian community has been 
entertained in limited quarters of academic circles.  The idea is 
that if countries work together to solve regional problems, no 
primacy is necessary.  According to Friedberg, China, Japan, 
and the United States would shape whatever may ultimately 
emerge.  According to this view, such a community may work 
because China favors regional groups like ASEAN+3 where it 
would be able to assert itself.  Japan promotes groups where 
it would offset China’s diplomatic power.  The United States 
prefers an open, inclusive pan-Pacific organization.  This idea 
16 M. Taylor Fravel, “China Views India’s Rise: Deepening 
Cooperation, Managing Differences,” in Tellis, Tanner, and 
Keough, eds., Strategic Asia 2011-12. 
17 Harsh Pant, “India Comes to Terms with a Rising China,” in 
Tellis, Tanner, and Keough, eds., Strategic Asia 2011-12. 
18 Arun Sahgal, “China’s Military Modernization: Responses from 
India,” in Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 
2012-13: China’s Military Challenge (Seattle: National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 2012). 
19 Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). 
20 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: 
Waveland Press, 2010), pp. 202-303.  
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may work in Southeast Asia, too, because countries there 
want to enmesh powerful outsiders in a web of regional in-
stitutions. The system would be unstable, however, because 
in reality these states are more likely to seek to outcompete 
the others.  China has little to gain from this system where it 
would be tied into arrangements that restrict its freedom of 
action.  Japan may be seeking a new grand strategy as well; 
Richard Samuels sees Japan’s new course based on what he 
calls a “Goldilocks consensus,” a “grand strategy that is not 
too hard but not too soft, not too Asian and not too Western,” 
so a firm alignment pattern cannot necessarily be expected of 
Japan in the near future.21  Additionally, Japan has developed 
an economic system quite dissimilar to the Chinese system to 
the extent that China and Japan are competing against each 
other rather than collaborating.  The more likely scenario, for 
Claude Meyer, is where the two countries compete in leading 
Asia.22  In addition, lack of cooperation is apparent in the 
sphere of space development.  James Clay Moltz’s research 
demonstrates that China, India, and Japan have all pursued 
national space programs independent of each other and com-
peted against one another in building up regional space pro-
21 Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the 
Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
22 Claude Meyer, China or Japan: Which Will Lead Asia? (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
grams.23  Because Asia remains divided by ideology, history, 
and lack of trust, there is strong doubt about the feasibil-
ity of this community, as well as the stability of this model. 
The whole scheme is nothing other than a theoretical exercise 
with utopian flavor.  US allies like the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Australia that view China’s assertiveness with suspicion 
may welcome the strategic rebalancing, but they also rely on 
Chinese investment for development.  
 
FIVE STRATEGIES
There are five strategies that China and the United 
States can adopt to generate these scenarios.  These strate-
gies are short-term because the two countries can implement 
them quickly.  There are many effects that each of these strat-
egies generates, so they can each lead to more than one sce-
nario.  Unlike those scenarios, the strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, so they can theoretically take place simultaneously. 
But they are also distinct strategic responses, and each has 
varying influence on great power politics.  These strategies 
are retrenchment, internal balancing, external balancing, soft 
balancing, and preventive war, as seen in Table 3 below.  
23 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, 
Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012).  
Table 3: Strategies between China and the United States
Strategy Description Likelihood Scenarios they serve
Retrenchment
Hegemon reduces global commitment, includ-
ing in East Asia, and adjusts its strategic priori-
ties. 
Unlikely 
Chinese primacy
Bipolarity
Divided Asia
Tripolarity
East Asian community
Internal balancing Nations increase military power internally in order to balance others.  
Likely, along with 
other strategies
American primacy
Chinese primacy
Bipolarity
Divided Asia
Tripolarity
External balancing Nations form and strengthen alliances in order to balance others.  
Likely, along with 
other strategies
American primacy
Chinese primacy 
Bipolarity
Divided Asia
Tripolarity
Soft-balancing Challenger forms a coalition of states to under-mine primacy diplomatically. Unlikely 
Bipolarity
Divided Asia
Tripolarity
Preventive war Hegemon initiates war against challenger in or-der to prevent power transition. Unlikely 
American primacy
Chinese primacy
Bipolarity 
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Retrenchment
America’s strategic overstretch in the post-Iraq era and 
ensuing fiscal constraints of the last few years drive the first 
strategy of retrenchment.  The hard lessons of fighting re-
silient insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq – even without 
completely eliminating those insurgents – have taught law-
makers in Washington that it is high time for them to put 
the financial house in order.  A combination of defense bud-
get cuts, collapse of the health care system, and the financial 
meltdown at home is pushing the United States to reconfig-
ure its policy priorities and share its defense burdens with its 
allies.24  Thus in the face of mass violence in Syria, Libya, Iraq, 
and Egypt – and despite China’s leveraging against America’s 
withdrawal from global activities – the United States would 
stay out of trouble around the world that could entangle it in 
a protracted war.  Although it may not spell instability im-
mediately, this cost-saving posture may prove to be a “game-
changer” because it is likely to further encourage China to 
rise and provoke a power transition.  The situation would 
be unsettling because, when the effects of US retrenchment 
kick in, China’s geographic size, economic power, and mili-
tary resources will dwarf those of its neighbors and because 
many Asian states would no longer be able to depend on the 
freedom of navigation along China’s eastern seaboard where 
the Chinese navy has amassed so much power.  Further, this 
option comes as a test of America’s extended deterrence and 
reputation for protecting the Asian order.  
Retrenchment strategy may generate a set of situations 
that may be conducive to the creation of Chinese primacy, Si-
no-US bipolarity, divided Asia, tripolarity, and the creation of 
an East Asian community.  Needless to say, US retrenchment 
is a recipe for a tectonic change in East Asian security and 
economy that may lead to Chinese primacy in every aspect. 
China would come out as the biggest benefactor of the sys-
tem in which it would be able to exert the strongest influence 
to shape major events and policies in East Asia.  Yet retrench-
ment would also help usher in bipolarity if the United States 
were able to “stop its decline” as a result.  It might also lead 
to the emergence of a divided Asia because it allows China to 
be on a par with the United States although, again, the spe-
cific alignment pattern implied in the divided Asia scenario is 
uncertain.  Retrenchment strategy would also result in tripo-
larity if China, the United States, and India can agree on a 
relatively equal distribution of regional power and maintain 
stability among them.  Finally, retrenchment would support 
the establishment of an East Asian community if it allowed 
China and Japan to share regional leadership and filled a void 
created by America’s reduced role.  
The likelihood of retrenchment is low, however, as US 
actions do not seem to follow it.  America’s unique alliance 
network, the so-called “hub and spokes” system with it being 
24 The literature on retrenchment is expanding.  See, for instance, 
Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald, “Graceful Decline: The 
Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International 
Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011).  
at the center of East Asia and with others forming alliances 
with it, continues to hinge on the American supply of public 
goods and guarantee of the security of its allies.  The stra-
tegic rebalancing indicates nothing other than Washington’s 
renewed strategic reorientation to a long-term challenge, far 
from the erosion of commitment.  The continued volatility in 
the Middle East and North Africa may encourage Washing-
ton to stay attentive to other regions, but not necessarily to 
retrench.  Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William 
Wohlforth argue that advocates of retrenchment tend to over-
estimate the budgetary costs of deep engagement, systemic 
pushback against the policy, and the possibility of entrap-
ment, while underestimating security and economic benefits 
it brings.  The United States would gain security benefits in 
terms of the power to deter the rise of challengers, restrain 
partners from taking provocative actions, and keep access to 
US bases around the world, while it would also gain a greater 
ability to maintain the global economic order through the re-
duction of arms race and security dilemma, keep the freedom 
of navigation and sea lanes of communication available for 
commerce, and protect property rights in the ocean.25  
Internal Balancing
Because global politics is a self-help system, internal 
balancing is a natural state of affairs for most governments 
in East Asia.  From a pure realist standpoint, governments in 
East Asia would find American security protection unreliable 
because the United States might change its strategic posture 
someday and because there is no guarantee that the United 
States would help them in the case of Chinese aggression. 
Internal balancing takes place when countries increase mili-
tary power to secure survival.  Washington increases military 
power in order to keep the status quo while China does so in 
order to change the status quo in its favor.  While resources 
for US defense are decreasing, China has spent a large portion 
of its GDP annually on national defense, including weapons 
that can be used for offensive purposes.  Because internal bal-
ancing has a lot to do with the material aspect of economic 
and military power, it may make the Sino-US relations be-
come increasingly conflict-prone.  But balancing behavior 
does not tell us much about states’ intentions.  Michael Chase 
argues that Chinese scholars do not paint a simple, black-
and-white picture of US policy.  Beijing sees US policy in 
the so-called “two-handed China policy” based on the ele-
ments of engagement on the one hand and containment on 
the other.  Of course, they see the United States as a declining 
power after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the recent 
financial crisis, but they know that China still has a long way 
to go to catch up.26  Thus, even if China wanted to challenge 
US balancing, it would not necessarily be able to do so.  Thus 
the gap in military power may be closing, but it would take 
25 Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, 
America.” 
26 Michael Chase, “Chinese Suspicion and US intentions,” 
Survival, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June-July 2011).
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many years before China can catch up with the United States. 
Because the balancing strategy alone is unlikely to be a “game 
changer” in Asia, it is more likely to be accompanied by an-
other strategy than implemented alone.  
Internal balancing strategy supports options for Ameri-
can primacy, Chinese primacy, bipolarity, a divided Asia, and 
tripolarity.  Primacy under either Chinese or American lead-
ership may emerge if one side achieves an overwhelming mili-
tary edge over the other, whether in conventional or nuclear 
capabilities.  This is not a likely scenario, however, because it 
is difficult for one side to completely out-balance the other. 
While the United States maintains its overall edge in military 
power, there is little that can stop China from continuing 
its investment to reach military parity with the United Sates 
both in nuclear and conventional weapons.  In other words, 
neither China nor the United States is likely to achieve pri-
macy just by internally balancing.  On the other hand, inter-
nal balancing strategy is likely to be a core national behavior 
under a bipolar system, as it will determine the pattern of 
alignments and military balance between the two sides.  A di-
vided Asia is a possible outcome as well, but internal balanc-
ing alone will not be sufficient to create a complex alignment 
pattern under the scenario.  However, internal balancing will 
not become the only way that countries adopt; states will en-
gage in other behaviors along with it to increase their chance 
of survival.  The same logic works for the creation of tripolar-
ity, although the system itself is unlikely to emerge in the near 
future for the reason discussed above.  
External Balancing
External balancing takes place when countries form 
and strengthen alliances with others.  Because international 
politics is a self-help system, this is another “constant” in the 
statecraft of most Asian states, including South Korea, Japan, 
and Taiwan in the face of Chinese military modernization,27 
but it is worth mentioning because it remains the most realis-
tic option for many East Asian countries.  The United States 
externally balances China by strengthening its alliances with 
junior partners like Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Thai-
land, and South Korea and continues to do so under the 
strategic rebalancing.  China has no formal allies of its own, 
but it continues to buttress diplomacy by working via the 
ASEAN and APEC frameworks and the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization (SCO) involving Russia, Central Asian na-
tions and several observer nations like Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Turkey.  External balancing is also a key part of America’s 
effort to act consistently with its allies’ expectations in order 
to reassure other allies, especially given the fiscal constraints it 
faces.  As Friedberg writes, “in part because of the constraints 
under which they now feel themselves to be operating, Amer-
ican policymakers have been especially eager to engage others 
27 Christopher Hughes, “China’s Military Modernization: U.S. 
Allies and Partners in Northeast Asia,” in Tellis and Tanner, eds., 
Strategic Asia 2012-13.
in a collective effort to balance Chinese power.”28  
China and the United States adopt this strategy in 
combination with others, such as internal balancing, that are 
designed to buttress their capability while benefiting from the 
growing financial ties with each other.  But they also want to 
ensure that their partners would not stir unwanted trouble. 
The United States reassures that its allies will not be “aban-
doned” during crisis, but doing so increases the chance of 
getting “entrapped” in a war it does not desire.  It is partly 
because of this moral hazard that allies face incentives to mis-
behave because of the false sense of insurance.  For alliances 
to work, the balancer must take steps to keep its commitment 
credible, but doing so will tie its hands in ways that constrain 
its options.  This notion of avoiding entanglement is histori-
cally grounded in East Asia, as Victor Cha shows that the 
United States built asymmetric alliances with South Korea, 
Japan, and Taiwan during the Cold War in order to restrain 
their national leaders from taking drastic actions against 
communist China and avoid unnecessary conflict with the 
Soviet Union and China.29  The “strategic ambiguity” that 
the United States maintains towards Taiwan reflects its im-
plicit fear about being drawn into unnecessary conflict with 
China as well as a sense of mistrust in U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
In order to minimize the danger of entrapment, therefore, 
the United States reassures target nations.  The United States 
sends its signals to China that the United States would nei-
ther take aggressive actions against it nor encourage Taiwan’s 
independence as long as China does not attack Taiwan.  The 
United States also signals to Taiwan that American extended 
deterrence is there to protect them as long as Taiwan does not 
declare independence.30  
If it is carried out, external balancing strategy can move 
East Asia into the direction of American primacy, Chinese pri-
macy, bipolarity, a divided Asia, and tripolarity.  First, exter-
nal balancing serves the restoration of American primacy by 
shoring up its existing allies and forming tacit alliances with 
“swing states” like Vietnam and Burma, although it may face 
China’s counter-efforts to make its own alliance formations. 
However, China’s strategic partnerships with the likes of Rus-
sia and Pakistan has not particularly increased its chance to 
build a primacy of its own, so primacy of either China or the 
United States is unlikely to occur.  Third, a bipolar East Asia 
may result from external balancing behaviors if the United 
States and China agree on the relative division of East Asia 
through the establishment of opposing yet restraining alli-
ance systems.  Bipolarity in the region would see China and 
the United States form their alliance structures to rival against 
each other and end up in a situation like the Cold War, spur-
ring arms races and security dilemma but with a quite stable 
system.  A divided East Asia and tripolarity scenarios are also 
28 Aaron Friedberg, “The Euro Crisis and US Strategy,” Survival, 
No. 54, No. 6 (December 2012), p. 20.
29 Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in 
Asia,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2010).  
30 Nancy Bernkoph Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan 
Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011).  
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possible but they are less likely to occur.  For one, external 
balancing alone will not create such a specific alignment pat-
tern predicated in the divided Asia scenario.  The same issue 
applies to tripolarity.  Unsurprisingly, there are obstacles to 
this strategy.  Countries in Southeast Asia are not likely to be 
part of this balancing strategy because they prefer enmeshing 
regional powers and going through limited alignments that 
steer between neutrality and formal alliances.  
Soft Balancing
We understand soft balancing strategy as an effort of 
weaker states to oppose unilateral actions of stronger states. 
Unlike the two “hard” forms of balancing, the soft version 
occurs when weaker states decide that the dominance of a 
stronger state is unacceptable, yet the military disadvantage 
is so overwhelming that they balance only diplomatically.31 
A recent example is a decision of some members of the inter-
national community not to join the “coalition of the willing” 
to fight Iraq in 2003.  As a challenger to American power, it 
would be China that would adopt this strategy in this con-
text.  China may do so by working with others like Russia, 
Pakistan, and SCO partners to weaken America’s standing.  If 
implemented, soft balancing would generate forces for bipo-
larity, a divided Asia, and tripolarity.  Soft balancing serves 
bipolarity if China and the United States use their diplomatic 
means to divide East Asia into two camps, for the same rea-
son as they may seek to divide East Asia between continental 
and maritime forces.  However, it would be a bipolarity based 
heavily on diplomatic attraction and persuasion, one subject 
to change depending on how the two powers decide to use 
hard power to influence the region.  At the same time, soft 
balancing can theoretically help create a tripolar Asia if Chi-
na, India, and the United States can agree on the centrality of 
diplomacy as a means to conduct statecraft in the region.  It is 
unclear if the tripolarity can be sustained because other states 
in East Asia, such as Japan, Russia, Singapore, and Indonesia, 
would join the race to compete against the three.  
The problem with soft-balancing is that China is less 
likely to adopt this measure today than a few years ago when 
the United States made a series of unilateral actions vis-à-
vis Iraq that proved unpopular in the international society. 
Now, the United States is a lot less likely to take such ac-
tions, as seen in its relatively passive stance in recent NATO 
operations in Libya and Mali, so there is less incentive for 
China to soft-balance America today.  Additionally, China’s 
ability to form a coalition of partners is questionable due to 
its unpopular activities in the South China Sea and its poor 
human rights records with regard to the Muslim populations 
in Xinjiang and Uighur, and with its own citizens.  Its in-
31 Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” 
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005); 
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft 
Balancing,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 
2005); T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” 
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005). 
vestment flows into the Middle East and Africa have won 
some financial allies, but there are long-term questions about 
China’s strategic intent behind what is often perceived to be 
a Chinese version of economic imperialism, as well as criti-
cism about the Chinese-built infrastructure being unreliable. 
While China has initially wooed the world by the use of rhet-
oric such as “charm offensive” and “peaceful rise” and taking 
advantage of unpopular American adventurism in places like 
Iraq,32 a more recent research by Chin-Hau Huang argues 
that China’s push to project soft power has not been effec-
tive because Beijing seeks to resolve regional territorial dis-
putes by military coercion, and serious reforms on political 
and civil freedoms come too slowly in China, which affects 
its international reputation.33  Thus instead of soft-balanc-
ing the United States, as Goldstein argues, China’s strategy 
is designed to foster favorable conditions for continuing its 
modernization while reducing the risk that others will see it 
as a threat.  China does so through the combination of active 
multilateral policy and development of good bilateral rela-
tions with major countries.34  
Preventive War
In the worst case scenario, the United States as a de-
clining hegemon may be tempted to launch preventive war, 
a war to curtail the challenger’s rise even if the threat is not 
necessarily imminent.  The hegemon might do this if it be-
lieved that its decline is no longer evitable, and there is a good 
chance of preventing the challenger from further rising.35 
Such a war may become even more probable if the challenger 
aspires for power transition through violent means, and if the 
defending regime declines to be replaced as such.  The pres-
ence of nuclear weapons on both sides will make it difficult 
for the war to go beyond the conventional level, restraining 
both sides to instead engage in less destructive means.  Yet 
because both sides are sure that nuclear exchange would be 
too costly for them to bear, they may be tempted to raise the 
intensity of conventional war as high as possible.  The stabil-
ity/instability paradox, in short, may help prompt a highly 
intense war when there is actually no need for it.  Depend-
ing on its outcome, preventive war can bring about situations 
where we see American primacy, Chinese primacy, bipolarity, 
and the divide as possible outcomes.  Victory in preventive 
war would likely generate a winner, but the process would be 
ugly and demanding.  It would take the United States a lot of 
resources and strong public support to win this war decisively. 
If waged, however, preventive war will become increasingly 
difficult for the United States to win because China’s military 
32 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power 
is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008).
33 Chin-Hau Huang, China’s Soft Power in East Asia: A Quest 
for Status and Influence?  (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2013).
34 Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge.
35 Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
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power would prove increasingly resilient.  In contrast, China’s 
victory would accelerate the rise of China and, although it 
would depend on how it is fought and won, make it more 
plausible for East Asia to have Sino-American bipolarity, if 
not outright Chinese primacy, in which case East Asia would 
be unstable because U.S. allies in the region would seek to 
balance the unipolarity and the United States would seek to 
topple the unipolarity soon.  At this moment, however, the 
United States is likely to maintain overall superiority in the 
projection of military power in the Pacific.  
Fortunately, neither side sees the option as serving their 
interest for now.  Any major war would severely upset the 
fiscal base for both sides.  On one hand, for Washington, 
costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the economic mal-
aise at home have made it difficult to gain popular consensus 
for foreign adventures, let alone carrying out mutual killing 
with the world’s second largest economy.  Robert Art argues 
that a major war with China – kinetic or cyber – is unlikely 
because the United States cannot stop China’s rise without 
adopting a mutually devastating economic policy.  The war 
would further undermine US economy, backfire politically, 
and it will not be effective if only the United States fought 
it.36  The ground for preventive war is not even there because 
as Michael Beckley argues, the United States is now wealthi-
er, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared 
to China than it was in 1991.37  Robert Lieber argues that 
America is not in decline in the areas of size, population, 
demography and resources, economy, scientific research and 
technology, competitiveness, military power, and attractive-
ness to talented immigrants.38  
For China, on the other hand, preventive war is not a 
good reaction to draw from the United States.  Aware that 
it has a long way to go to defeat the United States militarily, 
Beijing seeks to “win without fighting” in order to replace the 
United States as the leading power.  Although China’s mili-
tary capability has increased in recent years, it may not neces-
sarily harbor an aggressive intention, a point that many Chi-
na scholars have recognized in recent years.  Thus historically, 
China’s stance on aggression has been defensive in nature.39 
Andrew Scobell demonstrates that China’s strategic culture 
through the Cold War centered on the “Cult of Defense,” 
although recent generations of Chinese leadership have been 
more flexible in the use of force and doctrinal thinking.40  For 
Thomas Fingar, China prefers to work with its neighbors to 
36 Robert Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: 
Implications for the Long Haul,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
125, No. 3 (2010).   
37 Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will 
Endure,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12). 
38 Robert Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: 
Why the United States Is Not Destined to Decline (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
39 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation 
and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
40 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great 
Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
continue its growth.41  Chinese reticence toward the use of 
force is likely to undermine the preventive war option.    
coNcLuSIoN
 
Which scenario is more likely to emerge than others in 
the current world affairs?  In this preliminary analysis, I argue 
that bipolarity is most likely because China’s power continues 
to rise while fiscal pressure on the United States continues to 
generate pressure for the strategic rebalancing short of mak-
ing greater military investment to keep its sole leadership role 
in the region.  This is where China and the United States 
contend for regional dominance by consolidating their part-
nerships without going to war.  The United States is at an ad-
vantage at this moment, given its existing alliances and over-
seas bases across the Asia-Pacific, although China’s economic 
power and soft power may win it some allies like Pakistan, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and North Korea.  In contrast, 
the continental/maritime division scenario is less likely to 
emerge because at this moment we do not see the described 
alignment pattern in current affairs.  Thus the most likely sce-
nario to occur is a bipolar structure where the United States 
will keep its traditional security allies on its side and China 
seeks to expand its sphere of influence in the ocean, resulting 
in the creation of a relatively stable balance of power across 
the Pacific where countries continue to engage in economic 
activities and check each other’s military, space, and cyber ca-
pability.  There are four strategies that may lead to this bipolar 
system – retrenchment, internal balancing, external balanc-
ing, and soft-balancing.  The countries can adopt all these 
strategies at once, but an initial US retrenchment is likely to 
be replaced by America’s continued effort to balance the rise 
of China both internally and externally, as well as through the 
activities of its allies to check China’s rise on their own.  One 
the other hand, soft-balancing strategy will not be decisive 
enough to create a bipolar East Asia.  
 The other scenarios are less likely to occur.  First, 
if China and the United States want primacy of their own, 
they would focus on choosing from the strategies of inter-
nal and external balancing and preventive war.  The first two 
strategies are realistic, while going to war does not meet seri-
ous expectations of either country.  The problem, however, is 
that primacy will neither materialize easily nor be stable, so 
it remains to be a less likely option than bipolarity.  On the 
other hand, if strong desires exist for a tripolar system, then 
China, India, and the United States should come to the table 
to negotiate a mutually acceptable distribution of power, but 
given divergent national interests of these countries and be-
cause there are issues of mutual trust and cooperation, this 
strategy is unlikely to bear fruit.  A tripolar system would 
also be unstable because the three nations would compete for 
regional dominance and will try to force other states to take 
side with them.  If a region-wide security community is the 
way to go, the United States would have to slightly retrench 
41 Thomas Fingar, “China’s Vision of World Order,” in Tellis and 
Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2012-2013. 
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and allow China and Japan to rise relatively.  But this sys-
tem is unlikely to happen because, again, there are embedded 
problems of collaboration among the three, as well as among 
many Southeast Asian nations who prefer sovereignty over 
regional cooperation.  Finally, the strategy of soft-balancing is 
unlikely to emerge because it is doubtful that China will suc-
ceed in forming and sustaining a coalition of states to balance 
American power diplomatically and because it will probably 
not be sufficient to shape sustainable long-term scenarios.  
Based on the findings, this analysis highlights two poli-
cy prescriptions for the United States.  First, it should prepare 
for a bipolar East Asia by keeping its defense commitment 
in the region at a modest level and managing the impact of 
its financial problems on the military.  Keeping balance be-
tween these objectives will not be easy, especially if the fiscal 
constraint proves to exceed the current expectation and tilt 
the balance against the security dimension.  Another chal-
lenge will be in the assumption that the United States would 
somehow find a way to let China grow as a peer competitor, 
encourage it to become a responsible stakeholder, and make 
a transition to bipolarity without sending misleading signals 
for China to take over regional leadership.  What the United 
States will be required to do then is to send credible signals 
to China and its allies about America’s intentions to manage 
the power transition on its own terms while keeping to the 
minimum any potential strategic repercussions that this tran-
sition is likely to generate.  Doing all this will take enormous 
political, economic, and military capital, but it will be critical 
for the future of American strategic posture and the stability 
of global politics.  Although preventive war is unlikely, the 
United States should avoid getting drawn into regional con-
flict involving its allies and territorial disputes.  
Second, to make a “soft-landing” at an emerging bi-
polar structure in the Pacific, Washington should continue 
to use available resources to balance China’s rise both inter-
nally and externally.  Seeking new partners to the existing 
inventory of allies in the Pacific will be important, especially 
with regards to the roles of India and Russia.  At the same 
time, efforts must be made to restrain its partners from taking 
provocative actions and reassure its allies about their security. 
Keeping balance between a growing list of potential allies and 
the need to avoid unnecessary conflict will not be easy.  But 
again, the ability to effectively address concerns among play-
ers in East Asian security will be a key part of success for the 
United States to adequately manage the future of the region. 
(Views expressed here belong solely to the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policy of the United States Gov-
ernment, Department of Defense, or Air War College.) 


